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Layered legacies – an introduction 
Henryk Alff, Matthias Schmidt, Michael Spies, Rune Steenberg 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, academic 
interest in Central Asia experienced a boom, in par-
ticular regarding the concepts of post-socialism 
and transformation. Not only did the new inde-
pendent states become more involved in world pol-
itics, but they also became more accessible to inter-
national research activities, especially by Western 
scholars. Thirty years down the road, the Central 
Asian republics are still often granted the epithet 
“post-Soviet.” While this is technically true, the re-
gion also has a pre-Soviet history of feudalism, Rus-
sian colonialism or the imperial Great Game, each 
of which has influenced Central Asian societies. 
Moreover, it has been shaped and differentiated by 
several more recent phenomena, such as the US-led 
invasion of Afghanistan, the importing and re-ex-
porting of Chinese consumer goods, labor migra-
tion to Russia and the establishment of important 
institutions and initiatives like the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union 
or the Belt and Road Initiative – all references to 
important past and recent historical phases that 
have shaped the region in ways still visible today. 
As some observers have remarked, Central Asia 
could also meaningfully be deemed post-post-So-
viet, as its particular contemporary problems and 
challenges seem to derive more from the concrete 
policies implemented by Western development 
agencies and international banks in the so-called 
“transformation phase,” meant to mark the West’s 
victory in the Cold War, than from any Soviet legacy 
(Buyandelgeriyn 2008; Pétric 2005). While still 
shaped by its Soviet and colonial past, the region's 
social institutions, political developments and eco-
nomic asymmetries closely resemble those of other 
regions on the margins of the capitalist world sys-
tem. Military instability now emanates less from 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and 
more from the US-led incursion in 2001, the drug 
trade it helped to spawn and the growing rise of Is-
lamism and its recruiting in reaction to Western ag-
gression in the Middle East as well as home-grown, 
condescending secularism (Chaudet 2006; McCoy 
2017; Montgomery, Heathershaw 2016). Similarly, 
Central Asia's economic marginality can be said to 
now reflect global value chains, the effects of the 
Global Financial Crisis, Russia's economic struggles 
and China's rise and geo-political tensions with the 
US (Fehlings, Karrar 2020; Reeves 2012) – at least 
to a degree as large as Moscow's planning decisions 
and ecologically unsound resource extraction and 
agricultural modernization in Soviet times. Thus, 
one should think of those elements of Soviet legacy 
that still play a role in current developments as be-
longing to one of several types of important lega-
cies. In this sense, each social phenomenon ob-
served in Central Asia today has its own unique 
combination of elements from the past deriving 
from what we call “layered legacies” – legacies of 
different phases that reinforce, interact with or 
contradict each other in complex ways and can 
have very different consequences in different local 
contexts (Ibañez-Tirado 2015). 
This volume examines some of the on-the-ground, 
concrete effects of the region's layered legacies. Ec-
lectically zooming in closely on important topics in 
the region, such as urban planning, water manage-
ment and access, agricultural production, commu-
nal cooperation, migration patterns, ethnicity, Is-
lam and gender, the papers in this volume present 
the contemporary situation in Central Asia in light 
of its three most recent historical phases: the Soviet 
era, post-soviet transformations and capital-driven 
glocalization. While each contribution engages 
with particular topics in a concrete and mainly mi-
cro-scale manner, the overarching question ex-
plored across these different examples pertains to 
the relative relevance and dynamic interaction of 
these layers of legacies. Are Soviet structures still 
relevant today? How much was disrupted and de-
termined by “shock therapy” and other forms of 
transformation efforts in the 1990s (Kuehnast, 
Dudwick 2004)? And to what degree are the Cen-
tral Asian republics and its societies today affected 
by global socio-economic and political dynamics of 
power and inequality (Beyer, Finke 2019; Silova, 
Niyozov 2020)? Moreover, how are the policies, 
support and demands of China, Russia, the US, the 
Asian Development Bank, the IMF and the World 
Bank playing out locally, and what lasting struc-
tures have the different phases of modernization, 
development and coloniality created 
2019)? 
These questions were addressed in two workshops 
that brought together Central Asia researchers 
from various disciplinary backgrounds to present 
and discuss their ongoing research on the region. 
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The first workshop took place on 7–8 February 
2020 at Augsburg University and was entitled 
“Transformation after the transformation: Central 
Asia in focus of human geography and social sci-
ences”. The second one was held as a virtual work-
shop hosted by Eberswalde University for Sustain-
able Development on 4–5 March 2021, entitled 
“Beyond post-Soviet: Path dependencies and new 
trajectories of change in Central Asia”. These two 
events also served as the first annual meetings of 
the Central Asian Studies Network in Germany 
(CASNiG), an open network of Central Asia re-
searchers and experts set up to exchange ideas, 
concepts and findings, and to promote collabora-
tion, mutual support and solidarity.1 
This volume presents selected papers based on 
contributions from the two workshops, addressing 
contemporary issues and layered legacies in Cen-
tral Asia from various angles. The first two papers 
focus on water. In her contribution on ‘Masculinity 
and water diplomacy in Central Asia’, Jenniver 
Sehring goes beyond the analysis of policy-level 
water governance. She draws attention to the indi-
vidual interactions of officials in water manage-
ment and through a gendered perspective scruti-
nizes collaborative and confrontational actions 
shaping water use practices. Thematically related, 
focuses on the material dimension of 
water use. Highlighting the prolonged roles of So-
viet water pumps in Kyrgyzstan’s villages, many of 
which have now fallen into disrepair, she provides 
a theoretically informed study of heritage and so-
cial memory in rural Central Asia. 
While also focusing on natural resource use, the 
next three papers address questions relating to col-
laborative approaches, participation and local 
knowledge in a dynamic social-ecological environ-
ment. Challenging established claims that coopera-
tive-based approaches to agricultural development 
have largely failed, due to the negatively connoted 
Soviet legacy, Ottavia Cima deconstructs the role of 
development discourses and foregrounds the im-
portance of in-depth qualitative research in achiev-
ing this end. Michael Spies and Martin Welp signify 
participatory approaches, prominently stake-
holder-knowledge mapping, as an additional, 
highly effective and socially just tool that can sup-
port socially and ecologically more sustainable 
land use practices in rural Central Asia – in their 
case agroforestry systems. Similarly, Andrei Dörre, 
in his micro-level study of irrigation management 
1 See www.casnig.geo.uni-augsburg.de 
in the Western Pamirs, emphasizes the significance 
of local knowledge as a means of both securing ac-
cess to resources under conditions of highly frag-
mented smallholder farming and climatic pres-
sures, on the one hand, and sustaining community 
cohesion on the other. 
Moving away from rural environments, Tabea Roh-
ner and Wladimir Sgibnev, in their respective pa-
pers, investigate the social and political dimensions 
of urban infrastructure and development. Focusing 
on the monotown of Tekeli in south-eastern Ka-
zakhstan, and addressing the lived realities of its 
inhabitants, Tabea Rohner calls for a nuanced revi-
sion of post-Soviet urban development outside the 
capital cities. According to the author, such settle-
ments are often falsely regarded as failures. In his 
explorative analysis of innovation processes in 
Central Asia’s urban public transport systems, 
Wladimir Sgibnev highlights the often overlooked 
development dynamics unfolding outside the large 
metropolitan centers and thus challenges powerful 
discourses of peripheralization. 
Finally, two more papers address critical questions 
related to changing identities and public dis-
courses. Drawing on deeply contentious societal 
debates around the migration of Kazakhs from the 
neighboring countries to Kazakhstan since the 
explore certain types of social marginalization and 
inclusion as colonial legacies under the guise of 
post-coloniality. In her analysis of discourses 
around the emergence of women’s Islamic veiling 
in the Kyrgyzstani public, Gulzat Baialieva identi-
fies a number of different paths for Kyrgyzstani 
women to wear a hijab, including pressure from 
their family but also individual choices in order to 
take ownership of their own lives and morality. 
Baialieva describes attitudes to veiling as reflecting 
generational conflicts in Kyrgyzstan: many 
younger women choose the hijab over traditional 
alternatives in order to escape the colonial stigma-
tization of backwardness tied to local Islam. In a 
globalized Islam expressed in the hijab, they find a 
vision of the future away from the “colonial past 
and postcolonial uncertain present”. 
The papers each focus on topics highly relevant to 
contemporary Central Asia and its ongoing societal 
and economic developments. They provide details 
of transformations beyond the obsolete imaginary 
of a teleological “transformation phase” from so-
cialism to capitalism and present today’s Central 
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Asia as intertwined spaces and a phenomenon for 
which the post-Soviet marks but one amongst sev-
eral phases of shaping influence. We look forward 
to more exchanges within the frame of CASNiG and 
hope that the present papers and the overarching 
concept of layered legacies will contribute to a nu-
anced historical understanding of contemporary 
Central Asia and beyond. 
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Masculinity and water diplomacy in Central Asia 
Jenniver Sehring 
Most of the literature on transboundary water governance in Central Asia has approached the 
issue from a state-centric and rationalist perspective. This paper aims to complement these 
studies by adding two perspectives: First, drawing on International Practice Theory, I argue 
that water conflict and cooperation are shaped not only by strategic interests of governments, 
but also by the practices of diplomats and water officials involved in transboundary water co-
operation at different levels. As will be shown, water diplomacy in Central Asia is characterized 
by both confrontational and collaborative practices and thus the existence of contradictory yet 
interwoven and complementary paths of water diplomacy. Second, drawing on Feminist Insti-
tutionalism, I show the gendered nature of these water diplomacy practices by analyzing how 
actors explain and legitimize both confrontational and cooperative practices with reference to 
existing ideas of masculinity. Combining these two approaches sheds light on how state inter-
actions are shaped by social practices and how these social practices in turn are shaped by a 
gendered logic of appropriateness. 
 
Introduction 
The five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan – are connected by the two major rivers of the 
region, Amudarya and Syrdarya, which flow into 
the Aral Sea and together form the Aral Sea basin.1 
Other major transboundary basins include the Chu 
(Chuy) and Talas basin, shared by Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, and the Ili-Balkhash basin, shared by 
China and Kazakhstan. In addition, many smaller 
rivers and canals of the extensive irrigation system 
cross national borders. In Soviet times, these rivers 
were managed according to the region’s inter-re-
publican integrated water and energy system: Wa-
ter from the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers was 
stored in upstream reservoirs in the Kyrgyz and 
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) and sup-
plied to irrigation systems in the downstream Ka-
zakh, Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs for agricultural 
production. In exchange, oil, coal and gas were 
transferred from downstream to upstream repub-
lics. This system ensured that water stored up-
stream would be available for irrigation during 
summer and not used for energy production in 
winter. When the Central Asian republics of the 
USSR became independent in 1991, rivers and in-
terrepublican canal systems became transbound-
ary, the joint water-energy management system 
disintegrated. Countries had to agree on how to al-
locate water. The Central Asian successor states, 
                                                                
1 In this paper, I refer to Central Asia as the countries of Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbek-
istan. Afghanistan is also part of the Aral Sea basin, but not 
with the support of international donors, estab-
lished transboundary river basin organizations like 
the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
(ICWC), the International Fund for Saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS) and its related bodies and the Chu-Talas 
Commission to jointly manage the transboundary 
rivers. At the same time, unequal allocation quotas, 
vested and conflicting interests of the agriculture 
and energy sectors and the unequal power rela-
tions among the states have led to political ten-
sions, resulting even in statements threatening 
with war and incidents of local violent border con-
flicts involving water disputes (Bichsel 2011; 
Menga 2017; Sehring, Diebold 2012). Thus, trans-
boundary water politics in Central Asia is charac-
terized by co-existing conflict and cooperation. In-
terstate water agreements and organizations have 
been set up, but compliance to agreements is weak 
and implementation of joint activities ineffective 
(Krasznai 2017; Sehring, Ibatullin 2021). 
Most of the literature on transboundary water gov-
ernance in Central Asia has approached the issue 
either from a state-centered International Rela-
tions (IR) perspective, focusing on strategic inter-
ests and power asymmetries of the riparian states, 
or from an economic perspective, focusing on ben-
efit-sharing models. This paper aims to comple-
ment these studies by adding two perspectives: 
First, drawing on International Practice Theory, I 
argue that water conflict and cooperation are 
considered here and also not a member in the regional wa-
ter bodies.  
Jenniver Sehring 
8 
shaped not only by strategic interests of govern-
ments, but also by what I call water diplomacy 
practices – meaning the practices of diplomats and 
water officials involved in transboundary water co-
operation at different levels. As will be shown, wa-
ter diplomacy in Central Asia is characterized by 
both confrontational and collaborative practices 
and thus the existence of contradictory yet inter-
woven and complementary paths of water diplo-
macy. Second, drawing on Feminist Institutional-
ism, I show the gendered nature of these water di-
plomacy practices by analyzing how actors explain 
and legitimize both confrontational and coopera-
tive practices with reference to existing ideas of 
masculinity. 
This focus on gender deems relevant as water di-
plomacy exists at the intersection of two highly 
masculinized fields: diplomacy and water re-
sources management. By masculinized I mean that 
not only positions are mainly held by men (which 
requires us to look at male and female actors), but 
also that the core norms and guiding principles are 
shaped by men and are based on male experiences 
(which leads to ideas and concepts perceived as 
masculine and feminine). In most countries, 
women were officially excluded from leadership 
positions in diplomacy until about 100 years ago, 
and married women even longer (Enloe 2014; 
Neumann 2012). Still today the vast majority of 
ambassadors are men.2  Equally, the water sector is 
shaped by masculinized practices and discourses 
(Zwarteveen 2008, 2017). Water experts mainly 
come from engineering disciplines that have been 
male-dominated. These engineers decide on and 
plan water supply, construction of dams and allo-
cation of water. Also at transboundary level, most 
leadership positions in river basin organizations 
are held by men: thus, water management, policy 
guidance and decision-making across a basin is of-
ten done by men, and upon the advice of men (Best 
2019). Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions 
(Carmi et al. 2019; Earle, Bazilli 2013; Lossow 
2015), there is hardly any research on the role of 
                                                                
2 At the same time, women have always played, for example 
as wife of ambassadors, a crucial – but informal and unpaid 
– role, see Enloe 2014. 
3 This research is part of a joint study of IHE Delft and the 
Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) on the role 
of women in decision-making processes related to trans-
boundary water management, funded by the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs via DUPC2. I am grateful for feedback re-
ceived when presenting drafts of this paper at the 10th Hy-
gender in transboundary water conflict and coop-
eration processes. 
Also, in Central Asia the majority of the profes-
sional and technical positions of the state water ad-
ministrations, including ministries, agencies and 
basin management, are held by men (see for exam-
ple for Kyrgyzstan: Musabaeva 2014, for Uzbeki-
stan: review.uz 2019). At the transboundary level, 
in all the main bodies of the Aral Sea basin (namely 
the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, the 
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination and 
the Basin Water Organizations) the chairmen as 
well as national representatives, heads of delega-
tions, scientific centers and secretariats have been 
almost exclusively men. Notably, the secretariats of 
the ICWC (until recently) and of the Chu-Talas 
Commission (until today) have been headed by 
women. The same holds true for ministers in 
charge of water and foreign affairs. A few women in 
deputy minister/director and expert positions are 
exceptions. A feminist perspective on water diplo-
macy necessarily has to start with uncovering how 
– through but also beyond the marginal numbers of 
women – the dominance of men has led to the dom-
inance of masculinized practices, thus practices 
that can be performed by men or women but are 
based on male experiences and ideas. 
This paper presents results of an ongoing study 
and thus should be read as a reflection based on 
work in progress that awaits further fine-tuning.3 
Framing the study: International Practice 
Theory and Feminist Institutionalism 
Many analyses and explanations of water conflict 
and cooperation in Central Asia follow the general 
approaches in International Relations and studies 
of transboundary waters: they analyze geograph-
ical location, geopolitical conditions, strategic in-
terests, power asymmetries, costs and benefits of 
the involved states – assuming rational behavior 
and often taking a state-centric perspective. I want 
to add to these studies another perspective that 
dro-hegemony Conference on “The Power of Representa-
tion and the Representation of Power in Water Conflict and 
Cooperation“ (The Hague 4-5 October 2019), at the work-
shop “Transformations after the transformation: Central 
Asia in focus of human geography and social sciences“ 
(Augsburg, 7-8 February 2020), and at the IHE Water Gov-
ernance Seminar (Delft, 23 July 2020), and in particular for 
the detailed comments of Matthias Schmidt, Rune Steen-
berg and Margreet Zwarteveen. 
Masculinity and water diplomacy in Central Asia 
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sheds light on two aspects that are often over-
looked, but are, as I will argue, relevant to under-
stand the dynamics of water conflict and coopera-
tion in Central Asia. These are the actual practices 
of water diplomacy, and the gendered nature of 
these practices. 
International Practice Theory 
Scholars of International Relations (IR) tend to an-
alyze (water) diplomacy and international cooper-
ation as either strategic action based on power 
asymmetries and interests or as driven by norms. 
Diplomatic practitioners, in contrast, often refer to 
common sense and intuition when describing their 
actions and perceive mainstream IR studies as too 
abstract and reductionist to capture „what is actu-
ally going on in the engine room of global politics“ 
(Sending et al. 2015b:2). Therefore, practice-based 
approaches aim to understand social change and 
agency-structure dynamics through the everyday 
activities of those doing politics and focus on the 
analysis of social practices and their materializa-
tion in artefacts. While having a long history in so-
cial sciences, practice-based approaches are rela-
tively new in the field of IR.4  In this chapter, I will 
follow Adler and Pouliot (2011:6), who define 
practices as „competent performances, (…) socially 
meaningful patterns of action which, in being per-
formed more or less competently, simultaneously 
embody, act out, and possibly reify background 
knowledge and discourse in and on the material 
world.“ The reference to competences stresses that 
practices, in contrast to a behavior or habit, are rec-
ognizable by standards (often based on tacit know-
how or common-sense) and are part of a social con-
text. They are the „result of inarticulate know-how 
that makes what is to be done self-evident or com-
monsensical“ (Pouliot 2008:258). In a concrete ne-
gotiation, for example, diplomats have to act with 
the (restricted) information and guidance they 
have received and have to rely on their assessment 
of the situation, on the ‘usual procedures‘ and their 
intuition. At the same time, water officials in water 
negotiations and in international water institutions 
are often not trained in international law or nego-
tiation strategies but master the rules of interna-
tional politics through implicit learning, relying on 
their common sense and political instinct, by know-
ing that they might face political and/or social 
sanctions if they do not act as expected. 
                                                                
4 For an overview see Adler, Pouliot 2011; Adler-Nissen 
2013; Bueger, Gadinger 2018; Sending et al. 2015a. 
Drawing on the International Practice Theory per-
spective, I argue that water conflict and coopera-
tion in Central Asia is shaped not only by strategic 
interests of governments, but also by the water di-
plomacy practices of the involved actors at various 
levels. These actors, who I call here water diplo-
mats, are mainly officials from the ministries re-
sponsible for water management and diplomats 
from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, plus repre-
sentatives of international actors and (few) re-
gional and international experts who support pre-
paring agreements or facilitating meetings. With 
water diplomacy practices I mean the ‘competent 
performances’ employed in doing transboundary 
water cooperation at intergovernmental meetings 
at different levels, for example in the bodies and 
working groups of river basin organizations, dur-
ing official negotiations, or in informal settings. The 
questions to be asked are then, for example: What 
is seen as ‘normal’ or adequate behavior in negoti-
ations? How is the leader of a national delegation 
expected to act – toward the opposing parties, or 
towards his/her own team? Which tactics for se-
curing own interests or reaching compromise are 
used and how are these justified? 
Looking at water diplomacy practices can help to 
understand how decisions on transboundary wa-
ters are not only the result of strategic interests of 
the highest government levels but are also im-
pacted by taken-for-granted rules and modes of in-
teraction, pragmatic and tactical considerations, 
and their interrelation with power relations. 
Feminist Institutionalism 
Given the understanding of practices as being 
based on common sense, it is essential to keep in 
mind the claim of feminists that „what is called 
‘common sense’ is, in reality, knowledge derived 
from experiences of men’s lives, usually privileged 
men“ (Tickner 2006:25) – in particular in a field 
that is dominated by men. To better understand 
how practices of water conflict and cooperation in 
Central Asia are gendered, I draw on Feminist In-
stitutionalism, which evolved in recent years as a 
dedicated school of New Institutionalism in Politi-
cal Science (Mackay et al. 2010). In general, New In-
stitutionalism has put focus on how actors are be-
ing shaped and are shaping institutions, defined 
here as „a set of rules stipulating expected behav-
iour and ruling out behaviour deemed undesirable“ 
Jenniver Sehring 
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(Streeck, Thelen 2005: 12-13) in both formal and 
informal ways. Different schools putting different 
weight on power, ideas, rational behavior or histor-
ical path dependencies for explaining the persis-
tence or change of institutions (e.g. Cleaver, Koning 
2015; March, Olsen 2013a; Streeck, Thelen 2005). 
Seeing institutions as gendered means to under-
stand gender roles not existing primarily at indi-
vidual level but emphasize that „constructions of 
masculinity and femineity are intertwined in the 
daily life or logic of political institutions“ (Mackay 
et al. 2010:580). 
Analyzing gender as a social construct requires to 
look at structural aspects (division of labor, num-
bers of men and women working in a certain field), 
as well as identities (individual perceptions and 
ideals) and the symbolic, discursive embeddedness 
of these (Harding 1986; Zwarteveen 2017). Behav-
iors, roles and identities of, in our case, male and 
female water diplomats, are determined through 
processes of socialization, norms and practices in 
bureaucracies, intergovernmental organizations 
and culturally considered ‘acceptable’ behavior for 
men and women (see also Mackay et al. 2010). For 
example, certain masculine ideas about leadership 
can be performed by both men and women but are 
socially accepted only for men. At the same time, a 
male leader can show soft, ‘feminine’ character 
traits that are ridiculed. To shed light on how these 
institutions impact men’s and women’s role in wa-
ter diplomacy, I will use Chappell’s (2006) concept 
of a ‘gendered logic of appropriateness’. Scholars of 
Sociological Institutionalism argue that rules are 
followed and norms are powerful not only because 
of domination mechanisms, but because actors 
perceive them as natural and rightful. In a specific 
situation, they act as they (unconsciously) assume 
it is appropriate given the institutional setting 
(March, Olsen 2013b). In a gendered understand-
ing, „this logic prescribes (as well as proscribes) 
‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine forms of be-
havior, rules, and values for men and women 
within institutions“ (Chappell, Waylen 2013:601).  
Based on this understanding, this paper will show 
which institutions in the sense of rules and ideas 
of expected and accepted behavior are underlying 
water diplomacy practices in Central Asia and 
how these practices are gendered. 
Methodology 
Social practices as well as gender norms are diffi-
cult to research as they represent the status quo, 
unquestioned behavior and ‘common sense’ 
(Chappell, Waylen 2013; Kronsell 2006). Qualita-
tive methods in data collection and analysis seem 
best suited to make such implicit practices explicit. 
Therefore, this analysis used qualitative interviews 
conducted in 2019 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Beyond this, it draws on my own ob-
servations by being a participant in many policy 
events related to transboundary waters in Central 
Asia over the past ten years. But qualitative meth-
ods also have their limitations. When asked about 
their own experiences, most female as well as male 
interviewees insisted that in their professional 
sphere there are no differences between genders, 
that they are all assessed as experts and on the ba-
sis of their professional performance only. Only 
when digging deeper, different perceptions and as-
sumptions about women and men became visible; 
and I am sure this paper still scratches only at the 
surface of gendered practices. 
The interviewees were mainly water diplomats, 
thus women and men who have been members of 
staff or of working groups of the Chu-Talas Com-
mission and IFAS bodies, have been participating in 
interstate water meetings as part of country dele-
gations or of international projects. In addition, 
some interviews were conducted with experts who 
work in the water sector in general in different 
functions. A list of interviews quoted in the text 
with the acronyms used can be found below. While 
the interviewees included experts with experience 
in various transboundary water bodies of the re-
gion, the focus was on the Chu-Talas Commission, 
where 31% of staff and members of working 
groups are women. While the two chairpersons are 
men, the two heads of the national secretariats of 
the commission are women. With the assumption 
that gender norms become more apparent in a 
mixed-gendered setting, the Commission seemed 
therefore a suitable case to study. Consequently, 
the results presented here reflect experiences 
throughout the region, but are mainly from Ka-
zakhstani and Kyrgyzstani interviewees and 
should not be generalized for whole Central Asia. 
Many interviewees commented on the gender-re-
lated differences between countries; these differ-
ences play out also in regional water bodies and 
will be looked at in further research. 
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Confrontational and collaborative water 
diplomacy practices: two ideas of mascu-
linity 
Understanding water diplomacy as a masculinized 
field does not mean that there is only one idea of 
masculinity. Rather, multiple masculinities can 
have a place and even serve the structure of mas-
culinized institutions (Kronsell 2006; Neumann 
2012). In line with the co-existing conflict and co-
operation on water in Central Asia, both confronta-
tional and collaborative practices shape water di-
plomacy. I define confrontational practices as in-
volving talking aggressively, swearing, being un-
compromising, or walking out of negotiations, of-
ten associated with prioritizing own interests and 
getting one’s voice heard. Collaborative practices 
include avoiding open confrontation, seeking com-
promise, using informal and technical levels to find 
common understandings, and respecting different 
perspectives, often associated with the ability to 
reach workable solutions and create a trustful at-
mosphere among the riparian states. The associ-
ated narratives in Central Asia relate to two differ-
ent types of masculinity, which I call here brother-
hood and strongmen. 
Confrontational practices: Uncompromising 
strongmen 
Tensions and disputes around transboundary wa-
ters in Central Asia, as everywhere, often have their 
causes in conflicting interests between upstream 
and downstream countries. Prominent in Central 
Asia are the tensions that have been regularly 
emerging about the construction of new dams and 
around the question if water from the upstream 
dams should be released in summer (for irrigation 
in downstream areas) or in winter (for energy pro-
duction in upstream countries). Other issues at 
stake are the costs of operation and maintenance of 
hydro-technical facilities and sharing of costs and 
benefits, or fear of increasing dependency on 
neighboring countries for water security. Such dis-
putes can be easily explained with the traditional 
IR approaches. However, third party actors trying 
to foster water cooperation in the region often have 
been stunned by seemingly ‘irrational’ decisions 
and resistance to compromise even if own national 
interests are apparently not at stake. Participants 
and observers characterize water negotiations as 
extremely tough and without much room of ma-
neuver for the actual negotiators. Negotiations in 
regional water fora regularly get stuck not because 
the issue as such would be controversial or because 
of easily identifiable contradicting strategic inter-
ests of states. Rather, government officials seem to 
reject compromise as a matter of principle, because 
they have too strict guidance from higher level and 
they fear to take political risks if they take decisions 
that are perceived as too soft (Krasznai 2017; inter-
views 6INT, 7INT, 15KAZ). 
These practices align themselves with the concept 
of ‘strongmen’, commonly used to describe politi-
cal leadership based on personalist and authoritar-
ian forms of power. Media often use this term in 
their reports on the Presidents and political leaders 
of Central Asia. Academic scholars employ the con-
cept to describe political leaders at local level and 
as a particular kind of post-Soviet masculinity that 
combines (often semi- or illegal) business activities 
with the reinforcement of ‘traditional’ patronage 
networks and gender norms (Jones Luong 2004; 
Reeves 2014; Uehling 2007). Water negotiations at 
bilateral and regional levels are part of this general 
political culture. Using the logic of strongmen to 
look at water diplomacy helps to understand why 
reaching compromises in water negotiations is 
seen as weakness and cooperation becomes diffi-
cult even if it would provide benefits for all riparian 
countries. Public “muscle-flexing” by showing one-
self as uncompromising on national water interests 
is considered important to keep the image as a 
strongman and keep credibility (interview 6INT). 
At the same time, the authoritarian command style 
associated with strongman leadership in the coun-
tries prevents delegates in water negotiations to be 
flexible and innovative in finding solutions. Water 
cooperation functions with the same logic as over-
all politics in the region and follows what is consid-
ered appropriate negotiation styles and strategies. 
The gendered nature of these confrontative prac-
tices became even more apparent when I asked in-
terviewees what happens when women sit at the 
negotiation table. A male interviewee explained: 
„Any time if we have, at the negotiation table, we 
have a woman, all attention [goes] to this woman, 
of course. (…) [Usually] it's a really hard discussion; 
if we have women, it's more slowly, not so really 
active and hard” (15KAZ). Similarly, a female mem-
ber of the Chu-Talas Commission noted: „The [ef-
fect of] participation of women in such commis-
sions is, first, probably, tact: Men also try to behave, 
probably be diplomatic among themselves. Be-
cause, I also saw such situations when there were 
very controversial moments. Men do not hold back, 
but when there are more women participating, 
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they all nevertheless, probably, think and try to 
somehow behave more diplomatically” (13KYR). 
These quotes show that confrontational interac-
tions in water negotiations are shaped by percep-
tions about gender-specific behavior, they reflect 
the gendered logic of appropriateness of how male 
water diplomats are expected to behave among 
men, and how they are expected to behave towards 
women. 
Collaborative practices: The solidarity of  
brothers 
Notwithstanding the confrontational practices de-
scribed above, there is also a lot of water coopera-
tion to be observed in Central Asia. This is not only 
evident in the formal transboundary water institu-
tions set up and kept alive (even with minimal po-
litical commitment), but in particular at two less 
prominent levels: the technical level, and informal 
ways of interaction. 
The technical level refers to mid-level experts in 
the national water bureaucracies and the imple-
menting bodies of IFAS like the Basin Water Organ-
izations (BWOs) or the working groups of the Chu-
Talas Commission. Here, operational management 
issues are often effectively handled even in times of 
political disagreements, like the operation and 
maintenance of shared hydro-technical infrastruc-
ture, data sharing requests among experts, etc. 
(Sehring, Ibatullin 2021, 13KYR, 14KAZ). At a polit-
ical level, numerous examples have shown that on 
urgent challenges, political leaders or high-level 
representatives could reach compromise. How-
ever, this often occurs outside formal negotiations. 
One example are temporary water releases in 
drought periods agreed by phone between the re-
sponsible persons of the respective countries and 
not based on any official written agreement (6INT). 
Informal practices play an important role in reach-
ing compromises or seeking help from each other. 
It is important to note that these confrontational 
and collaborative practices are not existing in con-
tradiction to or independently of each other, but 
are interlinked: As one interviewee noted, some-
times heads of delegation object to cooperation, 
but instruct their subordinates to collaborate, nev-
ertheless. Official muscle flexing is accompanied by 
unofficial mutual help (6INT, 7INT, 15KAZ). 
                                                                
5 The relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have 
been extremely tense, partly related to Tajikistan’s plans to 
finish the construction of the Rogun dam at a major tribu-
tary of the Amudarya, which was heavily opposed by 
A usual justification to engage in such (often infor-
mal) water cooperation is the reference to the 
moral obligation to help ‘your brother’, referring to 
the close historic and cultural ties between the peo-
ple in the different riparian countries. While inci-
dentally (and in recent years increasingly) also 
used by diplomats and political leaders, it is mainly 
the technical water experts who justify their coop-
erative behavior in this way (6INT, 9KYR, 14KAZ, 
15KAZ). They refer to themselves as ‘vodniki’ 
(translatable as water specialist) and constitute a 
community that shares similar paradigms and ap-
proaches. In particular, the older generation has 
followed a joint education in the USSR, which has 
provided them with strong personal ties, but also 
with shared norms on water management and 
therefore often similar opinions on the best solu-
tions. It is striking, however, that the reference to 
‘brotherhood’ seems to be a stronger justification 
for cooperation than by referring to professional 
standards and needs. Beyer and Kojobekova 
(2019:2) note that „[w]hen actors invoke some-
thing as traditional, they engage in an act of sense-
making in which they align their own actions with 
the expectations of others.“ In this respect, in water 
diplomacy the reference to (imagined) brothers 
with mutual obligations and long-standing rela-
tions lends legitimacy to an individual behavior 
which might be against formal rules or orders (like 
sharing data or giving access to water) but thanks 
to this narrative becomes recognized by others as 
appropriate. 
The reference to brotherhood is also evoked at a 
high political level, most remarkable in the recent 
rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Tajiki-
stan.5 In his press statement after his first visit to 
Uzbekistan after 17 years, the Tajik president Rah-
mon referred three times to the „brotherly people 
of Uzbekistan“ and both presidents addressed each 
other repeatedly as „dear brother“ (Government of 
Tajikistan 2018) and set the tone for changing the 
previous tensions around the Rogun dam to a col-
laborative approach. This reference to (imagined) 
kinship might not be surprising in Central Asia, 
where kinship terms are a steady feature of poli-
tics. Historically, it has actually been a crucial ele-
ment of all known diplomatic systems (Neumann 
2012). 
Uzbekistan. However, after the former Uzbek president 
passed away and current President S. Mirziyoyev came into 
power, relations have eased. 
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Strongmen-like muscle flexing in official meetings 
(confrontation) and brotherly cooperation in less 
visible and informal settings go hand in hand. At 
the same time, also in formal high-level water di-
plomacy, reference to brotherly relations can jus-
tify cooperation. However, be it formally or infor-
mally, at technical or political level, the kins are 
named as brothers, not as sisters. Male water dip-
lomats can easily identify with both, brothers or 
strongmen, and thus have the space to choose their 
behavior accordingly. Both practices together con-
stitute dynamics of water diplomacy that cannot be 
fully grasped with explanations looking for strate-
gic or rational reasons but are equally important 
for both understanding the challenges of water co-
operation in Central Asia and for identifying possi-
ble avenues for conflict resolution. 
Female water diplomats and the gendered 
logic of appropriateness 
The analysis in the previous section showed highly 
masculinized practices of water diplomacy. But it 
did not show a field where women are absent. As 
mentioned above, although in small numbers and 
varying for different organizations and countries, 
women are part of national delegations, of working 
groups, participate as experts and in rare instances 
also in leading positions. If the practices and narra-
tives of water diplomacy in Central Asia are shaped 
by ideas of masculinity, what does this mean for fe-
male professionals in this field? How do women 
(and men) make sense of their presence and ab-
sence in certain positions and how does this reflect 
on their tactics and behavior?  
There are many ways in which gender perceptions 
affect the role of women in water diplomacy, and 
this chapter cannot provide a comprehensive anal-
ysis. I therefore choose to focus on one aspect, the 
perception of leadership, because leadership (in 
the form of strongmen) is such an important fea-
ture of the hegemonic idea of masculinity in the re-
gion. 
Strong, masculine leadership 
An obvious pattern in the interviews was that 
(male) water diplomats are expected to be strong 
leaders and being a strong leader is seen as some-
thing masculine. Among my female interviewees, 
leadership was commonly associated with male be-
havior and “male character” (12KYR): „The male 
logic is to govern, to command” (8KYR). The char-
acteristics that are considered as needed for a good 
leader, like making clear decisions and giving com-
mands, are associated with men. And even when 
talking about female leaders, their ‘male character-
istics’ would be stressed: „She was a good deputy 
director. Well, she was like a man. Honestly, we 
were all afraid of her. A very strict woman. (…) If a 
woman, for example, has a male character, then she 
makes a good leader. But if a woman is, so to speak, 
soft, she will not be suitable for a leading role” 
(12KYR). 
If leadership, strong will, commanding and making 
decisions are seen as male characteristics, what are 
considered female characteristics? A common as-
sumption in the interviews (both of men and 
women) was that men are better leaders, and 
women more accurate workers: „A woman is more 
assiduous and does more analytics. And men 
mainly command” (2KAZ). This was also given as 
an explanation for why there are many women at 
mid-level but not at high-level positions: „The mid-
dle level is the heads of departments. In this range, 
the executives, the heads of departments are 
mostly women, because paperwork can only be 
scrupulously done by a woman. (…). Where you 
need to count a lot, [work] with papers, with num-
bers” (5KAZ). Consequently: „In my opinion, for 
solving the tasks of water diplomacy at a higher 
level, men who can take responsibility for making 
decisions are more suitable. Women are better 
suited for tasks requiring diligence and daily per-
formance, for example, to fill out daily reports, to 
keep various materials in order, etc.” (12KYR). 
These perceptions reinforce the dominance of men 
in leadership positions.   
However, there is also a second narrative, and this 
relates to how women (are expected to) behave 
when they are in leadership positions. 
Caring, feminine leadership 
The characteristics associated with women are the 
opposite of a strongman. If women are in leader-
ship roles, then it is assumed that they would not 
pursue their own power interests but care for soci-
ety: „A woman, of course, knows better all the de-
tails, and more – she feels everything. (...) and re-
garding leadership roles of women, they will al-
ways try to do good not only for themselves but for 
you and for someone, because children are in the 
first place for her. She does not say this is my child, 
this is your child. For her, this is a child as a whole. 
Yes, a woman thinks about everyone, 
right” (4KAZ)? In a similar vein, an NGO leader 
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stated: „Why does the civil society sector have a fe-
male face? All say that is because women are more 
worried about the health of the family, children, the 
planet. They are more sensitive, open to it” (3KAZ). 
For the Chu-Talas Commission, one female inter-
viewee noted the following: „We work more with 
our soul. We invest more emotionally, we are more 
responsible, empathize. I thought that I was the 
only one, it turns out all of them” (11KAZ). She 
mentioned as an example the work of a women-
dominated working group under the Chu-Talas 
commission, who would not present two separate 
national reports at the meeting, but coordinate and 
agree beforehand and present a joint report. One of 
the female members of this working group re-
marked: „we always try to find some kind of com-
promise” (13KYR).  
In the idea of masculine leadership, it is essential to 
keep the image of being strong and powerful. For 
women in leadership positions, however, it is con-
sidered inappropriate to show their power. The 
reason seems to be located less in professional life 
but in the private sphere: They should not hurt 
male dignity but respect ‘mentality’. Many women 
interviewed said that this is rather a phenomenon 
of rural areas, thus of female heads of farms or Wa-
ter User Associations, but it would not affect them 
as urban, educated women. However, a female uni-
versity professor stated: „I am a Doctor of Science, 
and my husband is a Candidate of Science. I will 
never tell him, you are a candidate, I am a doctor. 
Never, he will be offended. I do not say that I have 
a higher salary than he. He turns away, he feels bad 
and is offended. This topic is painful for him, so I try 
to somehow not touch these things” (4KAZ).6 
Thus, if women are in leadership positions, they are 
assumed to be less self-interested, more caring and 
modest – characteristics contrasting the masculine 
leadership ideal of strongmen. While there are ob-
vious examples of female leaders who are as tough 
as (or even tougher than) their male colleagues, 
these cannot (yet) challenge the internalized gen-
der stereotypes. One male interviewee, when asked 
about a previous female water diplomat in a lead-
ership position who was known for her uncompro-
mising attitude, simply said: „she is no good exam-
ple” (15KAZ). 
                                                                
6 In the former Soviet system, “Doctor of Science“ is a higher 
degree than “Candidate of Science“, the latter being equiva-
lent to a PhD. 
Conclusion 
The institutions and processes that shape interna-
tional water conflict and cooperation are often de-
scribed in gender-neutral terms. However, moving 
beyond a state-centric approach and looking at the 
social practices of those who are engaged in water 
diplomacy through leading negotiations, partici-
pating in joint working groups, working for trans-
boundary commissions, etc. can reveal not only 
how these practices shape state interactions but in 
addition how practices are shaped by a gendered 
logic of appropriateness.  
I identified two distinct yet interwoven sets of wa-
ter diplomacy practices in Central Asia: confronta-
tional and cooperative practices. Both are linked 
with certain ideas of masculinity – either strong 
leadership or brotherly solidarity. For the first, 
compromise in water negotiations is seen not as 
solution but as failure for the strongmen; hard ne-
gotiation styles are the norm. At the same time, 
technical and informal collaboration and, when 
convenient, high-level statements, make reference 
to the idea of brotherhood. Thus, male experts and 
policymakers can justify both confrontational and 
cooperative practices with certain ideas of mascu-
linity, but women are excluded from these narra-
tives. Since strong leadership is such an important 
aspect, I chose to focus on how ideas of leadership 
are gendered, and how female leaders are per-
ceived. I have shown that both male and female wa-
ter experts explain the lack of women in leadership 
positions with essentialist ideas about gender dif-
ferences: Women would be good in diligent, analyt-
ical work, and men in taking decisions and getting 
them executed. This relates to the ideal of a strong 
leadership associated with confrontational prac-
tices – and with men. For female water diplomats, 
a more collaborative narrative could be observed: 
The role of many women as mothers feeds the idea 
of a more caring, responsible leadership of women 
and an associated more compromising approach to 
water negotiations. This narrative is in line with 
stereotypical ideas of feminine leadership and ne-
gotiations styles, observed (and questioned) glob-
ally (e.g. Due Billing, Alvesson 2000; Maoz 2009). 
For women in leadership positions who show con-
frontational behavior, there is no equivalent idea of 
‘strong feminine leadership’. In contrast, these 
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women are portrayed as ‘being like men’. This gen-
dered idea of leadership is closely linked to ideas of 
appropriate behavior of women, which excludes 
for example aggressive negotiation styles. Finally, 
also when female water diplomats are not per se 

































in water negotiations is perceived to contribute to 
more cooperative dynamics in the meetings: male 
water diplomats, adhering to the gendered logic of 
appropriateness, soften their confrontational prac-
tices in mixed-gender settings. 
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5KAZ Female Kazakh water expert Almaty 19 September 2019 
6INT Female international water expert  Tashkent 3 April 2019 
7INT Male international water expert  Tashkent 3 April 2019 
8KYR Female Kyrgyz water expert and former mem-
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Bishkek 20 December 2019 
9KYR Female Kyrgyz member of the Chu-Talas Com-
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Bishkek 19 December 2019 
10KYR Female Kyrgyz water expert  Bishkek 18 December 2019 
11KAZ Female Kazakh member of the Chu-Talas Com-
mission 
Bishkek 18 December 2019 
12KYR Female Kyrgyz member of the Chu-Talas Com-
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13KYR Female Kyrgyz member of the Chu-Talas Com-
mission  
Bishkek 19 December 2019 
14KAZ Male Kazakh member of the Chu-Talas Commis-
sion  
Bishkek 18 December 2019 
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Rethinking the heritage of the Soviets’ blue wells: Progressing from highly 




















Fig. 1: While the blue well remains, it has lost its 
functionality 












Fig. 2: The blue well has been relocated on the 
edge of the street. It has lost both its functionality 
and its place within the community in Kyzyl-Tuu 
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Fig. 3: Blue well reinstalled into a tap system 









Fig. 4: Blue well with a modified handle and wa-
ter outlet 























Fig. 5: Blue well in Kyzyl-Tuu 






































































































The “failure” of cooperatives in Kyrgyzstan? A postcapitalist critique of a 
biased narrative 
Ottavia Cima 
After Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the Soviet Union, international development agencies 
promoted the establishment of service and marketing cooperatives in the agricultural sector. 
However, the dominant narrative claims that cooperatives of this type in Kyrgyzstan, as well as 
in other postsocialist countries, have failed. This apparent failure is commonly explained by the 
legacies of the past socialist regime. This paper questions such narrative and causality high-
lights their problematic consequences. I first present the narrative as it is reproduced by schol-
ars, development actors, governmental representatives and farmers. I then turn to scholars of 
postdevelopment, post capitalism and postsocialism to set the theoretical basis for the decon-
struction and critique of the narrative of failed cooperatives. On this basis, I argue that the nar-
rative is part of a broader hegemonic discourse on development and on the economy. I conclude 
by sketching a postcapitalist approach to building alternative representations of cooperatives 
and cooperation in Kyrgyzstan and beyond it. 
Introduction 
After the end of the Soviet Union, international de-
velopment agencies such as the International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank supported the es-
tablishment of formal institutions for community-
based cooperation in several postsocialist1 coun-
tries, including Kyrgyzstan. Such institutions in-
cluded, for instance, water users’ associations 
(Sehring 2009; Soliev et al. 2017; Theesfeld 2019), 
pasture users’ associations (Baerlein et al. 2015; 
Dörre 2015) as well as agricultural service and 
marketing cooperatives or, in short, service coop-
eratives (Lerman, Sedik 2014). However, several 
scholars, including the ones just mentioned, state 
that institutions of this kind were often unsuccess-
ful in these contexts. In particular, it seems that 
they rarely managed to implement effective rules 
for the sustainable management of natural re-
sources or mechanisms to support farmers in ac-
cessing services and markets. Scholars often ex-
plain these difficulties by pointing to the legacies of 
socialist regimes, insisting on the persistent dis-
crepancy between formal policies and informal in-
stitutional arrangements, and the continual pre-
dominance of the latter (Sehring 2009; Theesfeld 
2019). Many also point to a widespread inherited 
distrust of formal institutions and of people more 
generally, resulting in a lack of social capital 
(Gerkey 2013; Kaminska 2010). 
In the particular case of agricultural cooperatives 
in postsocialist countries, some scholars suggest 
                                                                
1 The category “postsocialist” has been questioned (Müller 
2019) and will be discussed later. It is still used in this paper 
to refer to countries of the former Soviet Union and in 
that farmers’ experience within socialist produc-
tion collectives (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) – both 
also called kooperativ in Russian – today repre-
sents a persistent referent for farmers’ representa-
tions of cooperatives (Gardner, Lerman 2006). This 
referent, they maintain, constitutes an obstacle to 
the understanding and acceptance by farmers of 
the principles of service cooperatives, a model of 
cooperative where, in contrast to the collective 
production on socialist farms, farmers produce 
separately but join together to market their pro-
duce and to access specific services. Gardner and 
Lerman, two agricultural economists known as 
specialists in the transformation of the agricultural 
sector in postsocialist countries (see Lerman et al. 
2004), claim for instance, borrowing the words of a 
study by the Plunkett Foundation, that „the use of 
the word ‘cooperative’ in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope will not only create the wrong impression, it 
will also create barriers to progress. The old style 
of cooperative or collective has no relevance in the 
new free-market approach” (Gardner, Lerman 
2006:5). The authors argue further that „among 
many of the rural population [… there is] a strong 
psychological resistance to cooperation, bred from 
years of abuse of the whole concept by socialist re-
gimes” (Gardner, Lerman 2006:5). 
Such ideas (and even turns of phrase) about the 
negative legacies of the socialist past not only ap-
pear regularly in publications on agricultural trans-
formation after socialism (Lipton 2009; Theesfeld 
2019); they also emerged in my interactions with 
Central and Eastern Europe that experienced a Soviet or So-
viet-inspired regime before 1989/1991.   
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different actors in Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, the dis-
tinction between the “old style” of cooperatives 
(meaning the socialist farms) and the “modern” co-
operatives (meaning the model of service coopera-
tives promoted by international agencies after the 
end of the socialist regimes) is recurrent in publi-
cations and in verbal interactions. The second type 
of cooperative is presented as the only “proper”, 
“true” and desirable type, while the first is dis-
missed and stigmatized as a “pseudo” (Theesfeld 
2019) or “improper” application of the cooperative 
principles. 
In this paper2 I question the narrative of failed com-
munity-based cooperation in postsocialist coun-
tries for the specific case of agricultural coopera-
tives in Kyrgyzstan, and highlight its problematic 
consequences. I first describe how not only schol-
ars but also development workers, governmental 
actors and farmers reproduce and internalize this 
narrative. I discuss how its internalization by these 
actors produces a sense of powerlessness and 
hopelessness, in addition to limiting the possibili-
ties for supporting and expanding effective and in-
clusive cooperation practices. I then turn to schol-
ars of postdevelopment, postcapitalism and 
postsocialism to set the theoretical basis for the de-
construction and critique of the narrative. On this 
basis, I will argue that the narrative of failed coop-
eratives is part of a broader hegemonic discourse 
on development and on the economy that imposes 
a normative teleology and marginalizes local 
knowledge and experience. In particular, I will 
show that the idea that cooperatives have failed is 
constructed in relation to a specific understanding 
of success, i.e. a limited and narrow definition of a 
“true” cooperative but also of “development” or 
“progress”. I conclude by sketching an approach to 
building alternative representations of coopera-
tives in Kyrgyzstan that would not only allow a bet-
ter grasp of the complexity of local realities, but 
would also nurture a more hopeful perspective on 
postsocialist ruralities, which suffer from a double 
stigmatization as postsocialist and as ruralities 
(Kay et al. 2012). 
2 I am grateful to Paulina Simkin and Matthias Schmidt for 
organising and hosting the workshop “Transformations af-
ter the transformation” in Augsburg in February 2020: this 
paper is a revised version of my presentation at the 
Agricultural cooperatives in Kyrgyzstan: a 
narrative of failure 
As a consequence of the decollectivisation process 
in the 1990s, the agricultural sector in several 
postsocialist countries is highly fragmented today 
(Lerman, Sedik 2014, Fig. 1). In Kyrgyzstan, most of 
the agricultural production originates from private 
smallholdings with an average plot size of 3 hec-
tares (Lerman, Sedik 2009). Farmers face the typi-
cal challenges for smallholders, which concern ac-
cess to markets for agricultural inputs, to market-
ing channels for agricultural outputs, to machinery, 
information, credit and insurance (Abele, Frohberg 
2003). International analysts, in particular agricul-
tural economists, have supported the establish-
ment of cooperatives as a solution to the challenges 
produced by the decollectivisation process 
(Deininger 1995; Lerman 2013). 
Fig. 1: Fragmented plots in the Issyk-Kul 
province 
Source: Picture by the author. 
The International Co-operative Alliance defines a 
cooperative as „an autonomous association of per-
sons united voluntarily to meet their common eco-
nomic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly-owned and democratically-con-
trolled enterprise” (ICA 2019). The model pro-
posed by analysts for the agricultural sector in 
postsocialist countries is the service cooperative: 
individual farmers maintain their private produc-
tion and cooperate with other farmers for the joint 
marketing of their produce, the joint purchase of 
agricultural inputs or for financial services. Service 
cooperatives are widely known in Western econo-
mies, where they emerged from the individualized 
workshop. I thank Matthias Schmidt, Michael Spies, Rune 
Steenberg and Lucie Sovová for their comments on an ear-
lier version of the paper. 
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marketing strategies of farmers as a way to rein-
force their private farming enterprises. This model 
differs from the model of production cooperatives 
where, on the basis of a collectivist vision, the 
means of production are pooled or collectively 
owned, and farmers carry out agricultural produc-
tion collectively. The most notorious example of 
production cooperatives are socialist agricultural 
collectives such as the Soviet kolkhozes and sov-
khozes. However, these examples can hardly be 
considered cooperatives in the sense advanced by 
ICA, since usually membership was not free but im-
posed, and internal governance was controlled 
from the top down. 
In their academic publications and policy reports 
on the agricultural sector after socialism (which in-
form policymaking by local governments) and 
based on often implicit assumptions about the pri-
macy of the neoliberal capitalist economic model, 
analysts tend to present service cooperatives as the 
only desirable and viable type of cooperative 
(Deininger 1995; Gardner, Lerman 2006). They 
build a neat opposition between service coopera-
tives and production cooperatives. The model of 
production cooperatives is usually equated with 
socialist agricultural collectives and is therefore 
dismissed as an improper application of the coop-
erative principles that „has no relevance in the new 
free-market approach” (Gardner, Lerman 2006:5). 
Other, more democratic, examples of agricultural 
cooperatives (Agarwal 2010) do not appear in 
these considerations: this omission suggests in fact 
that what has no relevance in the free market is the 
collectivist vision that underpins the model of pro-
duction cooperatives more generally. 
The topic of agricultural cooperatives gained visi-
bility in Kyrgyzstan in the 2000s, when interna-
tional donors integrated the promotion of service 
cooperatives into their rural development pro-
grams (Beishenaly, Namazova 2012). These activi-
ties included the establishment of special credit 
funds for cooperatives, information campaigns 
about the structure and functioning of coopera-
tives, and support provided to the government in 
the revision of the legislation on cooperatives. Alt-
hough the number of registered cooperatives 
boomed in those years, today many scholars and 
development actors claim that cooperatives did not 
succeed in the country (Lerman, Sedik 2013; 
3  Fieldwork took place between 2013  and 2017; expenses 
were covered by the Fonds de recherche du Centenaire of 
the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and by the research 
Rijsoort, Berg 2012). These accounts suggest that 
in many cases farmers registered a cooperative 
only as a way to access the special credit schemes 
and without reconfiguring their agricultural prac-
tices according to the cooperative principles 
(Beishenaly, Namazova 2012). 
The explanation of the assumed failure of coopera-
tives in Kyrgyzstan put forward by scholars repro-
duces the recurrent argument that some kind of 
legacy from the socialist past is the cause of the dif-
ficulties in implementing community-based coop-
eration in postsocialist countries. The explanation 
provided by foreign and local development work-
ers, governmental representatives, local authori-
ties as well as farmers and villagers I met while 
conducting fieldwork3 in Kyrgyzstan reproduces 
the same argument. Most of my interlocutors 
stated that the attempts to establish agricultural 
cooperatives in the country have been unsuccess-
ful, that most of the registered cooperatives today 
exist only “on paper” and that the Soviet past is 
somehow responsible for this failure. 
Development workers insisted on the distinction 
between the two models of cooperatives. In their 
narratives, service cooperatives are the “modern” 
cooperatives, the only “true” ones and the only 
ones worthy of support. Production cooperatives, 
on the other hand, represent the past and the “So-
viet style”: they should therefore be avoided at any 
cost and forgotten as quickly as possible. According 
to this category of actors, the failure of coopera-
tives in Kyrgyzstan derives from a misunderstand-
ing of and a lack of knowledge about the concept of 
cooperative amongst the local population. They 
maintain that this, in turn, is a problem originating 
in the Soviet past: because farmers (and govern-
mental actors the like) refer to the Soviet model of 
agricultural collectives, they are unable to under-
stand the “true” model of cooperative and there-
fore cannot recognize its advantages. Moreover, 
the argumentation continues, because farmers re-
member the negative experiences with Soviet kol-
khozes and sovkhozes, they are mistrustful of any 
form of cooperative and are not ready to engage 
with other models of cooperative that would facili-
tate their work and increase their revenues. 
If one discusses cooperatives with governmental 
actors or farmers in Kyrgyzstan, one will quickly 
confirm that both indeed lack knowledge about the 
budget of the Geography Unit of the same university. My ac-
knowledgments go to both. 
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definition and classification of cooperatives. On 
several occasions, I asked civil servants what type 
of cooperative governmental programs wish to 
promote. My questions usually resulted in awk-
ward moments of misunderstanding: my interloc-
utors did not understand my questions and offered 
what seemed to me random answers. Similarly, 
when asked about local cooperatives, villagers pro-
vided confusing answers: they mentioned some de-
velopment projects, some small enterprises that in-
dividual villagers established recently, or the pri-
vate activities of the chairpersons of a registered 
cooperative. 
Despite this confusion about definitions, govern-
mental actors and villagers too reproduce the idea 
that cooperatives have failed in the country. The 
former lament the lack of available resources to re-
alize the governmental programs for the promo-
tion of cooperatives. They point simultaneously to 
the lack of understanding about cooperatives 
among farmers as well as to their passivity and la-
ziness. Farmers themselves, in turn, complain that 
their fellow villagers (and sometimes they them-
selves too) have inherited an attitude of passivity 
and laziness; they see this attitude as part of a gen-
eralized “Kyrgyz mentality” that was exacerbated 
by their Soviet experience. According to my inter-
locutors, this inherited attitude makes people indi-
vidualistic and reluctant to cooperate with others. 
These insights reveal that the narrative of failed co-
operatives in Kyrgyzstan not only produces un-
questioned absolute dichotomies between service 
cooperatives and production cooperatives, as well 
as between the (Soviet) past and the (mod-
ern/Western) future; it also stigmatizes the local 
population as backward, as trapped in a “mental-
ity” that makes them passive and lazy, and that re-
sults in the series of “lacks” (of knowledge, under-
standing, engagement) that are assumed to be the 
cause of the failure of cooperatives. This narrative 
generates a sense of hopelessness and powerless-
ness among villagers, who internalize the idea that 
they are inadequate for “modernity” and therefore 
incapable of achieving the status of being “devel-
oped”. In the next section I turn to three items of 
scholarship that have revealed how similar narra-
tives produce similar mechanisms in contexts as di-
verse as the deindustrializing Global North, devel-
opment programs in the Global South, and reform 
programs in postsocialist countries (that some 
have called the Global East, Müller 2020). The re-
flections on these academic endeavors will allow us 
to understand where this narrative originates, as 
well as to start drawing up alternative representa-
tions. 
Subjects of postdevelopment, postcapital-
ism and postsocialism 
The production of polarized binaries is a typical 
process of the developmentalist discourse de-
nounced by postdevelopment scholars as far back 
as the 1990s (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Pigg 
1992). The developmentalist discourse presents 
development as a linear, predefined path towards 
a specific type of modernity – a modernity that cor-
responds to the ideal of Western market economies 
and liberal democracies – while dismissing local 
practices in the Global South as backward. Rooted 
in this teleology, development programs often re-
produce the very categories of developed and un-
developed – and of the First World versus the Third 
World (Cima 2015). Development cannot exist 
without its Other; subjects in the Global South are 
thus discursively trapped in a negative position, 
defined by their lack of development. 
Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham, writing under 
the joint pen name of Gibson-Graham, have built on 
the reflections of postdevelopment scholars and 
noted that the economic sphere is seen as the key 
for “development” in other spheres, for instance in 
the social or the political sphere (Gibson et al. 
2010; Gibson-Graham 2005). Furthermore, the fo-
cus of development programs on the economic 
sphere usually concerns specific kinds of activities, 
namely formalized, productive and entrepreneur-
ial activities (see Kim et al. 2018 for the case of Kyr-
gyzstan). More generally, Gibson-Graham 
(2006b:6) have argued that dominant representa-
tions of the economy are „capitalocentric”: they are 
biased because „other forms of economy are […] 
understood primarily with reference to capital-
ism”. Not only is the economic sphere usually val-
ued more than other spheres, but also only specific 
kinds of economic activity are usually considered 
to be legitimate parts of the economy: formalized, 
monetized and mainly capitalist activities includ-
ing wage labor, commodity transactions on mar-
kets and private enterprises. The countless other 
practices that people carry out in the pursuit of 
their livelihoods are too often defined in relation to 
capitalism, as capitalism’s Other. One example is 
care work in the household, which is mostly unpaid 
and informal, and is commonly understood as per-
taining to a “reproduction sphere” that is defined in 
opposition to a “production sphere”. 
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Gibson-Graham (2006a) have further argued that 
these biased representations of the economy are 
problematic not only because they overlook entire 
dimensions of social life but also because they pro-
duce feelings of lack and inadequacy. Their obser-
vations emerged in the 1990s in the Global North, 
where entire towns, regions or countries and their 
populations were suffering the material and emo-
tional consequences of deindustrialization: unem-
ployment, insecure livelihoods, lack of prospects 
for the future. Because of the dominant capital-
ocentric representations, losing one’s job meant 
not only facing the material difficulties linked to 
losing a source of revenue; it also meant losing the 
main signifier of one’s identity, the main element 
through which one’s identity is defined (Gibson-
Graham 2006b). These mechanisms are character-
istic of late capitalism to this day (see also Fisher 
2009). As a way to counter them, and to nurture 
more positive representations, Gibson-Graham 
(2006a) suggest a postcapitalist perspective that 
strips capitalism of its privilege as the default 
model, and instead recognizes the plurality of the 
economic practices that make up an economic sys-
tem and that can define multiple, sometimes more 
positive, identities. 
I suggest that the processes described by postde-
velopment and postcapitalist scholars are particu-
larly relevant in postsocialist contexts. As recently 
observed by Müller (2019), even the adjective that 
is commonly used to refer to these contexts – 
“postsocialist” – reveals a fixation with the past, a 
backward-looking stance that „buttresses a contin-
ued exoticisation of the East as Other and back-
ward, ‘defining the present in terms of its past’” 
(Müller 2019:539, quoting Sakwa 1999:3). Indeed, 
the temporal prefix in the term “postsocialism” 
traps entire societies in the determinations of one 
specific past experience – an experience that has 
negative connotations in the dominant representa-
tion. These determinations produce specific sub-
ject positions (of individuals but also of entire 
groups and territories) that are defined in the neg-
ative, as lacking something, as no longer being so-
cialist and not yet being modern/capitalist. 
Like the subjects of development, defined by their 
lack of modernity, and the unemployed ex-workers 
in deindustrializing contexts, defined by their lack 
of wage labor, “postsocialist” subjects are defined 
in the negative by their lack of both socialism and 
capitalism/modernity. They are trapped until fur-
ther notice in an interstitial space, in-between, un-
able to move and look forward (Müller 2020). Like 
the subjects of development and late capitalism, 
“postsocialist” subjects are filled with feelings of 
abandonment, frustration and failure. Moreover, 
their local experience, knowledge and epistemolo-
gies are devalued and neglected and, therefore, 
rarely inform the policies and programs that are 
designed to support the “development” of postso-
cialist regions (Müller 2021). 
A hegemonic discourse on cooperatives, 
development and the economy 
Several scholars, especially among anthropolo-
gists, have emphasized the importance of informal 
economic practices in postsocialist contexts 
(Ledeneva 1998; Morris, Polese 2013). Sabates-
Wheeler (2004) has highlighted the fact that infor-
mal cooperation, for instance in the form of spon-
taneous groupings of farmers, is very widespread 
in rural Kyrgyzstan and that it is crucial for the ag-
ricultural sector (this is confirmed by Lerman 
2013). Botoeva (2015) has meticulously described 
how Kyrgyzstani villagers base their livelihoods on 
systems of cooperation and exchange that are often 
informal, sometimes monetized and sometimes 
not. These observations suggest that the state-
ments about a lack of cooperation in the country 
are at least partial and counter the argument, men-
tioned above, that social capital is generally absent 
in postsocialist contexts. 
During my stays in rural Kyrgyzstan, I observed 
that villagers conduct several agricultural activities 
collectively, though not mainly in the framework of 
a formalized cooperative (see Cima 2020). For in-
stance, some villagers cultivate the land of their rel-
atives who have moved to the capital city, who in 
exchange receive fresh products from the village. 
Some help their relatives and friends for the most 
labor-intensive tasks and are then helped in turn 
with similar tasks (Fig. 2). Some join their plots for 
one agricultural season, sharing the field tasks. 
Some join others to buy agricultural inputs or to 
contact a merchant who will buy their produce. 
Some, sometimes, mobilize the framework of a for-
mal cooperative to gain quick access to specific re-
sources, such as loans or agricultural inputs. These 
activities are flexible and adaptive. Although they 
are mostly not formalized, they are regulated 
through well-established reciprocal expectations 
and obligations. Through these forms of coopera-
tion, villagers are able to adapt their agricultural 
production through flexible asset pooling and, 
sometimes, to take advantage of economies of scale 
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in production, and of increased bargaining power 
on agricultural markets. 
Fig. 2: Sharing labor-intensive tasks with rela-
tives and friends 
Source: Picture by the author. 
The variable and flexible collective practices just 
described clearly do not correspond to the narrow 
definition of cooperatives as formalized service co-
operatives. Moreover, since farmers often engage 
in some forms of collective production even when 
they are part of a formal service cooperative 
(Lerman 2013; Sabates-Wheeler 2007), few of the 
existing cooperatives can be accepted as “true” co-
operatives according to the definition advanced by 
analysts and development actors. Hence comes the 
idea of failure. Furthermore, in their statements, 
analysts and development actors usually consider 
only cooperation practices happening within for-
mal institutions (i.e. within registered coopera-
tives). They thus ignore the existing practices of in-
formal cooperation here. What is more striking and 
more significant is that farmers themselves down-
play the value of informal cooperation when they 
state that today they conduct all their agricultural 
activities individually – even if in their everyday 
lives they are deeply intertwined in reciprocity and 
solidarity networks with their relatives, friends 
and neighbors. 4 
The biases of the narrative are even deeper than 
this. Comparing it with the evidence of widespread 
cooperation practices in rural Kyrgyzstan from a 
postdevelopment and postcapitalist perspective 
reveals that this narrative is rooted in a hegemonic 
discourse about development and the economy. 
4 It is important to note that the fact that farmers downplay 
the importance of informal cooperation in their interactions 
with the researcher does not necessarily imply that they do 
not value these practices. It does suggest, however, that 
farmers do not actively value them when confronted with a 
The idea that cooperatives have failed is con-
structed in relation to a limited definition of suc-
cess, which in turn is defined in relation to a limited 
definition of development and of what actually con-
stitutes the economy. First, the model of service co-
operatives promoted by analysts and development 
agencies implicitly considers only a specific kind of 
economic activity as relevant: namely the produc-
tion of cash crops for marketing. Service coopera-
tives are in fact supposed to support farmer-entre-
preneurs to expand their private production and 
improve its marketing. This vision fails to take into 
account that an important part of agricultural pro-
duction in Kyrgyzstani villages is used for private 
consumption within households or as exchange 
goods within relations of reciprocity (Light 2015). 
Secondly, the reactions of disorientation by villag-
ers and governmental actors to my questions re-
ported above suggest that many of them really lack 
knowledge about the different cooperative models 
as defined by scholars. However, this represents 
only one specific type of knowledge among many 
others. Our misunderstanding suggests that the 
distinction between different types of formal coop-
eratives is a distinction that does not make much 
sense for local actors, in a context where the major-
ity of agricultural activities – and of collective prac-
tices – are not formalized. Who and what activities 
are formally part of a cooperative seems less rele-
vant for farmers than knowing who is involved in a 
specific activity and who is part of his/her personal 
networks. The dominant narrative in fact privi-
leges a specific form of knowledge, while devaluing 
other local forms. 
Finally, the model of the cooperative promoted by 
international agencies in Kyrgyzstan postulates a 
specific teleology that assumes a specific kind of 
modernity as the goal of “development” or “pro-
gress”. As noted above for the developmentalist 
discourse, this modernity corresponds to the ideal 
of Western market economies and liberal democra-
cies. Service cooperatives here represent a tool to 
support the establishment of private, market-ori-
ented cash cropping, to foster the emergence of a 
new class of farmer-entrepreneurs within a liberal-
ized market economy (for a similar argument on 
civil society promotion in Central Asia, see 
Babajanian et al. 2005). If the goal is this – and not 
particular kind of interlocutor – in this case a European re-
searcher who can be easily confused with a typical Western 
development worker (see discussion in Cima 2020:215–
233). 
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broader notions of food security and livelihoods – 
then only service cooperatives are viable tools, but 
not other forms of cooperatives or cooperation. 
The consequence of all these biases is not only that 
if measured against such a narrow definition of 
success, the assessment of failure of local coopera-
tives is almost inevitable; the narrative of failed co-
operatives also has broader symbolic, affective and 
material consequences. It upholds a hierarchy of 
knowledge and experience: it values only one spe-
cific type of them while dismissing others as irrele-
vant, or even stigmatizes them as the source of psy-
chological attitudes that are considered the cause 
of failure (Gardner, Lerman 2006). It therefore re-
inforces the binaries of the developmentalist dis-
course, defining “who knows” and “who doesn’t”, 
who is “developed” and who is “undeveloped”. 
These binaries are part of a process of othering that 
attributes to subjects either a positive fullness or a 
negative lack (Gibson-Graham 2003). Kyrgyzstani 
villagers cannot but identify with the negative ele-
ment of these binaries, with the related sense of in-
adequacy and hopelessness. The idea of a “Soviet 
legacy” even reinforces this negative position: 
since a universal and generalized legacy is consid-
ered to be the cause of people’s attitudes, these at-
titudes appear structural and almost impossible to 
change. Even villagers themselves blame their So-
viet experience for their own laziness and passiv-
ity: in this way, agency is completely removed from 
local subjects, who cannot but feel powerless.5 
Because the dominant narrative is blind in these re-
gards, it fails to identify existing practices of coop-
eration and relations of reciprocity that already 
contribute to villagers’ livelihoods and that could 
represent a potential starting point for expanding 
effective collective activities, regardless of whether 
these are formalized or not. At the same time, since 
such practices are rendered invisible, the power re-
lations and the inequalities they constitute (such as 
the burden of reciprocity practices on women and 
their exclusion from decision-making within 
households) are difficult to identify and tackle. In 
the end, because of the widespread idea that coop-
erative initiatives are deemed to be failing in Kyr-
gyzstan, several donors have already withdrawn 
support from cooperatives in the country, leaving 
behind them a fragmented legislative landscape 
(Beishenaly, Namazova 2012) and vague govern-
mental policies that can constitute an obstacle for 
5  It is important to note that this does not mean that they 
are powerless. I observed several forms of creative 
the current activities of formalized cooperatives, 
and that fail to support existing collective activities 
that are essential to farmers’ livelihoods and food 
security. 
Conclusion: towards alternative represen-
tations of cooperatives and cooperation 
In this paper, I deconstructed the narrative of failed 
cooperatives in Kyrgyzstan. My analysis revealed 
that this narrative is based on the assumption that 
only formal service cooperatives are “true” cooper-
atives and that only the knowledge and experience 
linked to the establishment of service cooperatives 
in Western market economies are relevant. All the 
rest is dismissed as “improper”, as unwanted rem-
nants from the past that hampers the unwinding of 
a future that is normatively directed towards West-
ern capitalist modernity as an ideal goal. The nar-
row and limited definition of success that is availa-
ble within this discourse makes a judgement of fail-
ure almost inevitable. 
Building on the reflections of postdevelopment and 
postcapitalist scholars, I showed that this narrative 
is inscribed in a broader hegemonic discourse on 
development and the economy that reproduces a 
polarization between developed and undeveloped, 
reinforcing negative feelings of failure and inade-
quacy and devaluing alternative local experience 
and knowledge. These mechanisms are even 
stronger in postsocialist countries, where the lega-
cies of the socialist past are considered to be immu-
table structural elements that trap entire popula-
tions in powerlessness and hopelessness. 
It is important to underline that my aim here is not 
to reject the model of service cooperatives in favor 
of the model of production cooperatives or other 
forms of cooperation. I rather want to emphasize 
the consequences of embracing one model exclu-
sively while stigmatizing and dismissing other ex-
isting or possible models and practices. In order to 
avoid the negative effects of biased narratives, I 
suggest embracing a postcapitalist approach as 
proposed by Gibson-Graham (2006a). This would 
allow scholars to open our attention to the plurality 
of local practices, knowledge and experience, while 
radically refusing the generalizations and essen-
tializations linked to the identification of fixed 
structural legacies and determined path-depend-
encies. I have briefly hinted in this paper at some of 
contestation and resistance, even if not always intentional 
and explicit (see Cima 2020). 
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the practices and relations that are rendered invis-
ible by the dominant narrative: these are in partic-
ular informal practices of cooperation among farm-
ers, including relationships of reciprocity within 
networks of relatives and friends. Identifying and 
making visible such practices and relations is a first 
step towards more positive representations that 
can nurture hope and possibility, and inform policy 
measures that are more sensitive to and more sup-
portive of local forms of cooperation. 
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Stakeholder-based knowledge mapping for re-establishing agroforestry 
systems in Central Asia 
Michael Spies, Martin Welp 
The existing land use policies in Central Asia are not well prepared to tackle current and fu-
ture risks related to climate change, soil degradation, and increasing global and domestic de-
mand for food, fiber, and biomass. In post-socialist countries with rather short traditions of 
state-led democracy, it is particularly relevant to strengthen the role of civil society and to test 
and experiment with participatory methods to increase the fairness, acceptance and effective-
ness of policies for sustainable land use. As part of a collaborative project on agroforestry for 
livelihood improvement in Central Asia, we have developed a participatory method to formal-
ize local and external expert knowledge as a means to inform strategy development for the 
wider adoption and re-establishment of agroforestry systems. In a sequence of collecting, vis-
ualizing, processing and feeding results back to local experts, our approach aimed at co-
creating a semi-quantitative systemic knowledge map. Inspired by the MARISCO-methodology, 
this map included different agroforestry practices, related ecosystem services, as well as fac-
tors contributing to or hindering the adoption of agroforestry practices. This paper outlines 
our systemic approach of formalizing knowledge from diverse stakeholders, provides a brief 
stepwise description of our developed methodology, and discusses its wider applicability. 
Introduction 
Rural areas in Central Asia are facing several envi-
ronmental and socioeconomic problems. Climate 
change is impacting water availability; salinization 
and soil erosion threaten the basis of agriculture; 
and meagre rural livelihood opportunities are 
driving rural-urban migration and out-migration 
(Kienzler et al. 2012; Lioubimtseva, Henebry 
2009; Sagynbekova 2017). 
Empowering local people through participatory 
processes and bringing local concerns into the 
policy processes in relation to both environmental 
and social issues was a prime objective of the eA-
GROFORST project (Ernährungssicherheit und 
Verbesserung der Existenzgrundlage durch Agro-
forstsysteme; 2017–2019). The project was im-
plemented by Eberswalde University for Sustain-
able Development (HNEE) in cooperation with 
World Agroforestry (ICRAF; previously known as 
World Agroforestry Centre) in Bishkek and sever-
al other Central Asian partners. As an outcome of 
the project, this paper describes a deliberative 
process to bring together and formalize local and 
scientific knowledge through qualitative model-
ling, focusing on the potentials and inhibiting fac-
tors to (re-)establish agroforestry systems suita-
ble for the Central Asian context – especially the 
(formerly) widely applied system of tree shelter-
belts. 
The paper has two main objectives: (a) Proposing 
and describing a method of knowledge mapping 
that was developed through dialogues with di-
verse stakeholders; and (b) to discuss our experi-
ences and how such methods can be used for 
strategy formulation and testing. We aim at outlin-
ing a holistic methodological framework to inform 
practical and policy decisions related to agrofor-
estry implementation – a topic requiring interdis-
ciplinary and cross-sectoral solutions. To our 
knowledge, participatory approaches combined 
with systemic decision support frameworks have 
rarely been applied in the context of environmen-
tal issues in Central Asia (see also Giffen et al. 
2005). Despite the interest in public participation 
and stakeholder dialogues by many actors, such as 
NGOs or international donors (Jansky, Pachova 
2006), deliberative dialogues with relevant stake-
holders are not routinely applied in environmen-
tal and development planning and decision-
making. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
the newly formed independent Central Asian re-
publics established new governance systems and 
institutional frameworks: to some extent, bottom-
up forms of natural resources management with 
more direct control by local resource users were 
also promoted, such as community management 
of grazing land (pasture committees) or local wa-
ter user groups for irrigation (e.g. Crewett 2015; 
Sehring 2020). However, such institutional ar-
rangements are often threatened by the persis-
tence of top-down decision-making that some 
authors regard as part of the Soviet heritage 
(Barrett et al. 2017; Sehring 2020). Despite – or 
rather, because of – these challenges, there is a 
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need for participatory tools and methods which 
can confront or at least complement state-led de-
cision-making. Moreover, bringing together differ-
ent knowledge bases is important as many former 
knowledge systems have collapsed with the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union (Toleubayev et al. 
2010). In the agricultural sector, de-
collectivization went along with a loss of technical 
expertise among newly created small farms. On 
the other hand, new knowledge systems have 
emerged: farmers innovate and constantly adapt 
their practices and exchange their experiences 
with each other, while also taking advantage of 
non-local sources of information (Hornidge et al. 
2016). Their ‘local’ knowledge must therefore be 
regarded as ‘expert’ knowledge that needs to be 
taken seriously in policy making or strategy de-
velopment. Thus, there is a need to facilitate de-
liberative processes that bring together local and 
non-local (e.g. scientific) knowledge and view-
points without postulating that one perspective is 
more ‘valid’ than the other (see e.g. Roue, 
Nakashima 2018). 
One challenge of deliberative processes is how to 
formalize knowledge and insights that are gained 
through dialogues with and between diverse 
stakeholders. There is a range of approaches from 
visualization of factors to quantitative modelling 
of complex systems. One such approach is 
MARISCO (adaptive MAnagement of vulnerability 
and RISk at COnservation sites; see Ibisch, Hobson 
2014) developed at the Centre for Econics1  and 
Ecosystem Management associated with the 
HNEE. MARISCO was developed as a participatory 
tool to assess threats and risks to ecosystems and 
human well-being under changing environmental 
and socio-cultural conditions and to develop suit-
able management strategies and systemic man-
agement plans. It has been applied in various cul-
tural settings initially in protected areas, but later 
also in regional development planning. A more 
formal approach is the application of Bayesian 
Belief Networks, which is essentially a depiction of 
(probable) interactions between variables, based 
on probabilities estimated by (local or external) 
experts (Welp et al. 2006). This approach has 
been applied e.g. in the context of dust protection 
in the oasis cities of northwest China on the fringe 
1 The concept of econics refers to the inspiration from and 
“mimicking of ecological system dynamics and function-
ing” to improve ecosystem management and make socio-
economic resource use systems more sustainable (see 
www.centreforeconics.org). 
of the Taklamakan desert involving local experts 
(Frank et al. 2014). In group model building, cli-
ents or stakeholders are closely involved in a sys-
tem dynamics model-building process (Vennix 
1999). This approach is well suited for depicting 
and collectively (with the help of a modeler or 
modelling team) making sense of complex human-
nature interactions to solve a (possibly fuzzy and 
ill-defined) problem related e.g. to natural re-
source management. When guided by a skilled and 
experienced facilitator, these approaches can be 
used to bring together the knowledge bases of ‘lay’ 
people, decision-makers and local and external 
experts in various fields. Focusing on the topic of 
agroforestry in Central Asia, and drawing on se-
lected tools from MARISCO, in the following we 
present our qualitative modelling approach to 
formalize the knowledge of a diversity of stake-
holders – farmers, scientists, state representa-
tives, and NGO workers – as an information basis 
for decision-making. 
Agroforestry in Central Asia 
Agroforestry in Central Asia typically takes the 
form of small plantations and shelterbelts. Agro-
forestry systems are mainly based on fast growing 
trees (e.g. poplar, mulberry) and are promoted by 
NGO and international actors such as World Agro-
forestry (ICRAF) as key to reduce water consump-
tion of agricultural fields and to increase the pro-
duction of domestic timber and fuel wood and 
thus reduce the pressure on forests. In the context 
of this paper, we use the term agroforestry for any 
kind of combination of growing trees and agricul-
tural production. Typical for the agriculturally 
dominated plains of Central Asia are windbreaks 
or shelterbelts (see Fig. 1), small woodlots and 
small and medium sized plantations (see Fig. 2). 
During Soviet times, shelterbelts were widely 
applied and managed by public bodies. In the 
1990s a big share of these plantations was cut 
down for fuel wood, as there was a shortage in 
energy supply – oil, gas and coal were delivered 
less efficiently and reliably than in Soviet times 
(Thevs et al. 2017). Shelterbelts provide several 
ecosystem services which are valued differently 
by different actors. Local farmers put emphasis on 
provisioning services such as construction mate-
rial and fuel wood (Ruppert et al. 2020), while 
from an environmental point of view larger-scale 
regulating services are more important. Among 
them, water related effects are essential in the 
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arid regions of Central Asia. Due to reduced wind 
speeds, water consumption of agricultural fields is 
lower than on fields without such protection 
(Thevs et al. 2019). 
Fig. 1: Poplar shelterbelt in Bazar-Korgon Dis-
trict, southern Kyrgyzstan. Shelterbelts can pro-
vide valuable ecosystem services such as protection 
from erosion and reduced evapotranspiration on 
arable land. However, as highlighted by farmers 
during local workshops, key barriers for planting 
shelterbelts are the small field sizes and potential 
conflicts with neighboring landowners, as shading of 
trees negatively affects yields of adjacent crops.    
Source: Photograph taken by Spies, March 2018. 
Developing a systemic knowledge map for 
promoting agroforestry systems in Central 
Asia 
As part of the eAGROFORST project, knowledge of 
different stakeholder groups was formalized in 
terms of a knowledge map – or ‘decision support 
model’ – that maps out the manifold factors rele-
vant for the wider adoption and re-establishment 
of agroforestry systems. The stakeholders that 
were involved in different phases of the project 
included farmers, local opinion leaders (such as 
teachers or elder people), representatives of graz-
ing committees, extension workers, researchers, 
local politicians and representatives of ministries. 
The approach was strongly inspired by the above-
mentioned MARISCO method, but also entailed 
some key differences. MARISCO has a wider scope 
and includes a systemic analysis of ecosystems, 
their stresses and threats, and uses this detailed 
analysis as the basis for developing strategies to 
deal with and prevent ecosystem stresses and 
threats. Our method, in turn, brings one type of 
‘strategy’ for addressing social-ecological stresses 
or threats to the forefront of analysis: the imple-
mentation and expansion of agroforestry systems. 
Thus, while we frame the expansion of agroforest-
ry systems as a target, our method aims to identify 
and evaluate the manifold challenges related to 
this goal and to identify more specific measures 
and leverage points. While our method is less 
complex and thus applicable with less effort than 
MARISCO, it can only be applied when the general 
means (in our case, the expansion of agroforestry 
systems) to address environmental or socio-
ecological problems is already defined. Ideally, to 
make the process fully participatory (as in 
MARISCO), the stakeholders should already be 
involved in two preceding steps: (a) analyzing 
(environmental) problems, and (b) identifying and 
prioritizing the strategic solution(s) to be scruti-
nized further. In our case, the focus on agroforest-
ry was already defined by the project, the underly-
ing assumption being that agroforestry has posi-
tive social and ecological outcomes as supported 
by a large body of literature (Thevs et al. 2017; 
Thevs et al. 2019). However, a central part of our 
methodology (see Fig. 3, Steps 2 and 3) is the criti-
cal re-evaluation of this assumption by the stake-
holders. Furthermore, we included an optional 
step (Fig. 3, Step 0) to contextualize the (possibly 
rather limited) role that agroforestry can play in 
addressing wider problems of current land use 
systems. Generally, it is important that all partici-
pating actors are clear about the degrees of free-
dom with regard to problem framing and objec-
tives and that expectation management is taken 
seriously: the scope of the method and its possible 
outcomes need to be communicated and agreed 
upon at the beginning. 
Our endeavor to develop a decision support model 
on agroforestry in Central Asia served two pur-
poses: first, the creation of a more general model – 
or systemic knowledge map – to support the de-
velopment of strategies for promoting agroforest-
ry in the Central Asian context; and second, the 
development and testing of a participatory meth-
od of knowledge mapping and strategy develop-
ment that can be applied in different regional con-
texts on various levels of scale. In this paper, we 
focus on the second aspect by providing a step-
wise description of our methodology and discuss-
ing its wider applicability. 
The methods and steps we followed to create the 
model can be described in three general phases: 
(1) local stakeholder workshops and additional
data collection, (2) collection of additional expert
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knowledge and drafting of a first conceptual mod-
el, and (3) a joint expert workshop to re-evaluate 
and modify the model and to apply a systematic 
rating of its various elements. 
Fig. 2: Mixed fruit orchard with intercropping in 
Bazar-Korgon District, southern Kyrgyzstan. 
Combining fruit production with arable farming can 
provide significant economic benefits. However, 
local workshop participants report various barriers 
to implementing such practices, such as legal re-
strictions for planting trees and a lack of information 
on appropriate design and management techniques. 
Source: Photograph taken by Spies, March 2018. 
Phase 1 
The first phase included a series of local work-
shops complemented by literature review and 
explorative field research over the course of the 
year 2018. A total of four one-day workshops 
were conducted with farmers, local agricultural 
extension workers, and members of local civil 
society groups in rural Kyrgyzstan (Bazar-Korgon 
and Moskva District) and Kazakhstan (Qurday and 
Enbekshikazakh District). The aim of the local 
workshops was to gain a better understanding of 
the challenges and opportunities related to agro-
forestry and of the potentials for expanding these 
systems from the perspectives of land users. The 
number of participants varied between 21 and 28 
in Kyrgyzstan and between 8 and 20 in Kazakh-
stan (excluding workshop facilitators). The work-
shop in Qurday District had to be relocated on 
short notice and postponed by one day due to 
unforeseen bureaucratic barriers. As a result, only 
8 of about 20 invited participants could attend. In 
Kazakhstan, the participants were selected with 
the help of two Kazakhstani research colleagues 
(from Kazakh National Agrarian University and Al-
Farabi Kazakh National University) with personal 
contacts in the villages. In Kyrgyzstan, colleagues 
from ICRAF and close collaborators from the 
communities, among others related to local gov-
ernance bodies (ayil okmotu) helped selecting the 
participants. Most of the participants were farm-
ers that held small or medium sized farms. In two 
of four workshops (Moskva and Enbekshikazakh 
District) a more or less equal number of men and 
women participated, the other two workshops 
(Bazar-Korgon and Qurday District) were strongly 
male-dominated. The workshop facilitators in-
cluded the two authors of this paper, ICRAF staff, 
and in part also Master students from HNEE and 
researchers from partner Universities in Kazakh-
stan. As requested by our local collaborators and 
workshop participants, the workshop program 
included a presentation and discussion of agrofor-
estry-related research conducted by the facilita-
tors (mainly ICRAF). 
The workshops were structured into three parts: a 
presentation of the project and recent agroforest-
ry-related research, an introductory mapping 
exercise on problems of current farming systems, 
and a moderated dialogue on opportunities and 
challenges related to agroforestry implementa-
tion. The stakeholder dialogues were organized 
using the World Café methodology (Steier et al. 
2015) with smaller plenary and larger group ses-
sions. Results were visualized by the participants 
with posters, moderation cards and colored stick-
ers to highlight priorities. The participants identi-
fied a number of challenges and opportunities 
related to institutional, legal, social, and economic 
aspects. Among others, farmers highlighted the 
provision of additional timber and fruits as a ben-
efit of agroforestry, as well as other ecosystem 
services such as clean air and an increase in vege-
tation and vegetation diversity. Identified chal-
lenges were manifold. Workshop participants in 
Kyrgyzstan mentioned legal restrictions to plant 
trees on arable land as an important obstacle, 
despite a recently amended law that allows for 
“protective afforestation” (Ruppert et al. 2020). In 
the workshops in Kazakhstan, no such problems 
were reported by farmers. A challenge commonly 
reported in all workshops was the lack of infor-
mation on agroforestry practices, for instance 
regarding the appropriate design of and selection 
of trees for shelterbelts. Other commonly identi-
fied problems in both countries were free-grazing 
livestock that damage newly planted trees, as well 
as a general lack of governmental support in the 
form of advisory services, provision of tree sap-
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lings, and access to credit (e.g. for protective fenc-
ing of trees). In Kyrgyzstan, participants also high-
lighted the small size of land holdings and poten-
tial conflicts with neighbors as important barriers, 
since crop yields on arable land are negatively 
affected by shading of trees. 
In addition to these workshops, information was 
collected by the two authors through exploratory 
interviews with farmers and local experts during 
field trips in Kazakhstan (Qurday Region), Uzbeki-
stan (Tashkent Region) and Kyrgyzstan (Jalal-
Abad and Chuy Region). Moreover, literature re-
view and the supervision of empirical research 
conducted by HNEE Master students in Uzbeki-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan yielded addi-
tional insights.2 
2 In Uzbekistan: Dilfuza Yuldasheva (2019): The challenges 
and opportunities of agroforestry implementation in Uz-
bekistan from different stakeholders’ perception; In Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Maren Krütten (2019): Agrofor-
estry in the Almaty region in Kazakhstan – The potential 
value of shelterbelt establishment for livelihood improve-
ment and local farmers’ perception of shelterbelt systems; 
Phase 2 
The next working phase was dedicated to catego-
rizing and structuring the insights from the local 
workshops and additional data collection to de-
velop a first draft of the conceptual model (see Fig 
3). After outlining the general structure shown in 
Fig. 3, questions were sent by email to selected 
scientists, (NGO-) practitioners and policy makers 
in Central Asia who were invited for the ‘expert’ 
workshop to be conducted in Phase 3. The ques-
tions were directly related to four of the five ele-
ment types shown in Fig. 3: 
What types of agroforestry systems exist in
your country?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of
these systems (for farmers, the environment,
etc.)?
Daniel Ruppert (2019): Farmers’ perceptions of benefits 
and detriments of shelterbelts: The case of rural Kyrgyz-
stan – A comparable analysis of the regions Issyk Kul and 
Jalal Abad. 
Fig. 3: General structure of the systemic knowledge map on agroforestry (AF) implementation in Cen-
tral Asia.  The steps indicated in brackets refer to the recommended order in which the different element 
types (illustrated with colored boxes) shall be mapped. Arrows indicate the main causal linkages, not the 
order of steps for mapping the different element types. To manage expectations and put into perspective the 
problem-solving capacity of agroforestry, we recommend a first optional Step 0 “problems of current land 
use systems” before beginning with the targeted knowledge mapping of agroforestry implementation. After 
this optional step, we find it most intuitive to start with mapping the types of agroforestry systems (Step 1), 
before mapping their effects (Steps 2 and 3) and the factors affecting their implementation (Step 4). Steps 5 
and 6 (rating of individual elements and identification of causal links) are not shown in the figure. 
Source: Authors‘ design. 
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What factors affect the implementation of ag-
roforestry systems in your country (e.g. insti-
tutional, economic, social factors)?
Based on the answers we received and the 
knowledge collected in Phase 1, we prepared a 
first knowledge map outlining the types of agro-
forestry systems, their positive and negative ef-
fects on current land use systems, as well as the 
manifold factors influencing their implementation 
or adoption by farmers. 
Phase 3 
Finally, we conducted a workshop at HNEE in 
Eberswalde, Germany with selected agroforestry 
experts from Central Asia to evaluate and refine 
the prepared knowledge map and to conduct a 
detailed rating of its diverse elements. A total of 
ten experts from four Central Asian countries par-
ticipated: Kyrgyzstan (2 scientists/NGO workers, 
1 policy maker), Kazakhstan (3 scientists), Uzbek-
istan (1 scientist, 1 policy maker), and Tajikistan 
(1 NGO worker, 1 postgraduate student and expe-
rienced NGO worker). In this phase, no local land 
users were present, but their knowledge and opin-
ions gathered in the local workshops in Phase 1 
fed into the pre-structured knowledge map. The 
two policy makers were based in the agricultural 
ministries of their respective home countries. 
While Tajikistan was not originally included in the 
eAGROFORST project, we decided to still invite 
two experts from the country in order to broaden 
the scope of the decision support model to four of 
five (post-Soviet) Central Asian countries. 
Fig. 3 shows the generic model outlining the dif-
ferent types of model elements and their positive 
and negative interrelations. The model is relative-
ly straightforward and designed to be used as a 
generic structure or template to create a more 
detailed knowledge map. While we tested this 
model in the context of an expert workshop to 
bring together knowledge from four different Cen-
tral Asian countries, the method is designed to be 
applicable in more local, participatory workshops 
with land users and other relevant stakeholders 
who contribute with their knowledge and exper-
tise from diverse standpoints. Experiences with 
MARISCO have shown that significantly more 
complex knowledge mapping exercises are possi-
ble with local stakeholders regardless of their 
educational background, as long as they have suf-
ficient knowledge of their environment and local 
resource use systems (see Schick et al. 
2018).Inspired by MARISCO, the element types in 
Fig. 3 represent different consecutive steps in the 
knowledge mapping exercise, with each step in-
volving a phase of brainstorming to identify ele-
ments and writing them on colored moderation 
cards, before posting and clustering the elements 
on a large wall display (see Fig. 4). While the steps 
can be followed in different orders, we found it 
most meaningful to apply them as indicated by the 
numbers in brackets in Fig. 3. As an optional, but 
highly recommended step, we propose to begin 
with a problem mapping of current farming sys-
tems (Step 0). This step makes sense in order to 
put into perspective the potential of agroforestry 
to alleviate existing problems. The next four steps 
are mandatory: a mapping of the types of agrofor-
estry systems found in or relevant for the target 
region (Step 1), their positive and negative effects 
(Steps 2 and 3), and the various factors influenc-
ing their implementation (Step 4). 
Fig. 4: Evaluation of the knowledge map on agro-
forestry in Central Asia during an expert work-
shop in Eberswalde, Germany. 
Source: Photograph taken by Spies, March 2019. 
This process of knowledge mapping can be very 
time-consuming, but may be shortened by prepar-
ing a first model draft based on information col-
lected (preferably from the workshop partici-
pants) prior to the workshop. In our case, many of 
the moderation cards were already prepared be-
fore the workshop and pre-structured on the wall 
display. Half a day was sufficient for the partici-
pants to evaluate and restructure the conceptual 
model and to add and remove elements. The re-
sultant knowledge map includes a total of 107 
elements – 22 problems of farming systems, 18 
different types of agroforestry systems, 22 posi-
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tive and 15 negative effects, as well as 30 factors 
influencing their implementation.3 
After identifying, mapping and clustering the man-
ifold elements, two more steps are necessary to 
complete the knowledge map (not represented in 
Fig. 3): the rating of elements (Step 5) and the 
identification of causal links (Step 6). Rating is a 
crucial step to identify priority issues for strategy 
development. Furthermore, the rating results can 
also indicate new research questions that need to 
be tackled by scientists. The rating is ideally done 
by the same participants who built the model, but 
can also be conducted in separate rounds by dif-
ferent groups of stakeholders to get a more di-
verse picture. We developed several rating criteria 
for each type of element, as is done in MARISCO. 
For selected element types, we asked the partici-
pants to rate each element only for their respec-
tive country. A rating scale from 1 to 4 was used 
for each criterion, represented by the colors dark 
green, light green, yellow, and red (see Tab. 1). 
The following rating criteria were defined: 
3 The first model draft, in turn, included 96 elements: 13 
problems of farming systems, 13 types of agroforestry 
systems, 24 positive and 15 negative effects, and 31 fac-
tors. 
Problems of current farming systems: rating of
(a) criticality4 and (b) trend of change in criti-
cality in the respective country;
Types of agroforestry systems: rating of (a)
prevalence and (b) potential for expansion in
the respective country;
Negative and positive effects of agroforestry
systems: rating of (a) probability of and (b)
knowledge on the respective effect (not coun-
try-specific);
Factors: country-specific rating of (a) true-
ness5, i.e. agreement with the validity of the
argument, (b) criticality for agroforestry im-
plementation, (c) manageability, and (d)
knowledge.
4 The term is adopted from MARISCO where it refers to the 
“perceived importance” of an element (a factor, a threat, a 
stress, etc.) “for the state of vulnerability of a biodiversity 
object” (Ibisch, Hobson 2014:100). In our case, criticality 
can be understood as (a) the perceived importance of a 
‘problem’ for the state of vulnerability of current farming 
systems, and (b) the perceived importance of a ‘factor’ in 
affecting agroforestry implementation.   
5 ‘Trueness’ describes the perceived degree to which a 
factor is considered to be ‘true’. Trueness can be evaluated 
in terms of probabilities (i.e. a factor is 80% likely to be 
true). In our case, a simple score of 1 to 4 (‘agree’, ‘rather 
agree’, ‘rather disagree’, ‘disagree’) is applied. 




















The factor can be 
managed well with 
available resources 
 
The factor could be 
managed well, if 
more resources were 
available 
 
Even with more 
resources it would be 
difficult to manage 
 





We understand the 
factor very well 
 
We understand the 
factor more or less 
 
We do not  
understand the  
factor, but others 
probably know more 
 
The factor is barely  
understood by anyone 
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For each element type, a rating table was pre-
pared and printed on posters to guide the partici-
pants in their rating decisions (see Tab. 1 and Fig. 
5). Due to time constraints, the rating of the ele-
ment type ‘problems of current farming systems’ 
was skipped during the workshop. 
After the rating of elements, the final step of build-
ing the knowledge map is the identification of the 
causal links between individual model elements. 
The main causal relations are already outlined in 
the model structure shown in Fig. 3, but to devel-
op a more precise decision support model, re-
finements are necessary. For instance, certain 
factors (e.g. access to fruit and vegetable markets) 
may influence the adoption of only one type of 
agroforestry system (e.g. orchards with intercrop-
ping). This step can be done by the participants 
drawing arrows between element cards on the 
wall display, or at a later stage by individual ex-
perts or the workshop hosts based on educated 
guesses while digitizing the model with the ap-
propriate visualization software. When the identi-
fication of causal connections is done by individu-
al experts or the workshop hosts themselves, the 
resultant model should be shared with the work-
shop participants for review. 
The knowledge map as decision support 
for strategy development 
When the above-mentioned steps have been com-
pleted and the systemic knowledge map has been 
built, it can be used in a similar way as MARISCO 
for identifying leverage points and developing 
strategies for intervention. For this purpose, the 
rating of factors is crucial: if ‘trueness’ of a factor 
is rated low (yellow or red), and its criticality and 
manageability are rated high (dark or light green), 
the factor should be given high priority in the de-
velopment of strategies – but only if causal con-
nections to relevant agroforestry systems (those 
with potential for expansion) are given.6 
During the expert workshop in Eberswalde, a 
number of intervention strategies were identified, 
ranging from establishing agroforestry demon-
6 The MARISCO methodology provides a number of tools to 
prioritize factors and to develop, prioritize and evaluate 
intervention strategies that can be put into use in a similar 
way here (see Ibisch, Hobson 2014): a method of ‘map-
ping’ selected strategies into the model to the factors it 
addresses; the creation of ‘results webs’ to identify those 
elements (types of agroforestry systems, their positive and 
negative effects on current farming systems) it addresses 
and those it neglects; and a systematic rating of strategies 
according to criteria of effectiveness, outreach, and feasi-
bility, among others. 
Fig. 5: Selected factors from the digitized knowledge map on agroforestry in Central Asia. Arrows con-
necting to other elements not shown in the snippet have been removed. Note that in order to ensure con-
sistent rating results, factors must always be formulated in positive terms (e.g. ‘transparent enforcement of 
land use regulations’ rather than ‘untransparent enforcement of land use regulations’). The colored square 
boxes indicate the rating results per country (in columns) – ‘trueness’ in row 1, ‘criticality’ in row 2, and 
‘manageability’ in row 3. The rating results for ‘knowledge’ are not shown. 
Source: Modified extract from unpublished model by authors. 
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stration plots to communizing a small percentage 
of farmland to establish publicly managed shel-
terbelts. However, the development and evalua-
tion of strategies was not the prime objective of 
the workshop, since the geographical scope of the 
workshop – covering four countries with very 
different political systems and diverse agro-
climatic zones – is too broad for formulating tar-
geted practical and policy interventions. The aim 
was to test a structured methodology of formaliz-
ing knowledge of diverse stakeholders, with the 
intended side effect of sensitizing the invited ex-
perts and decision-makers to participatory and 
systemic approaches. While our method of creat-
ing a systemic knowledge map differs considera-
bly from the steps of the MARISCO methodology, 
subsequent steps of strategy development and 
evaluation as outlined in detail in the MARISCO 
guidebook (Ibisch, Hobson 2014:126ff.) could be 
applied in a similar way here and need no further 
elaboration. Both methods emphasize (a) that 
strategies must be developed on the basis of a 
holistic, systematic mapping and evaluation of all 
relevant factors, and that (b) all relevant actors 
and stakeholders should be represented from the 
very beginning in order not to overlook important 
factors and to avoid unintended side effects. 
Conclusion 
The experiences from our exercise have shown 
that participatory knowledge maps that bring 
together insights from and perspectives of differ-
ent stakeholders can serve as a useful qualitative 
modelling tool. This tool enables collaborative 
identification of crucial factors and leverage 
points to develop strategies and policies for sus-
tainable land use. The method we developed can 
be applied on various geographical scales from the 
local to the international level – or, as in our case, 
on several nested levels (local, national and inter-
national) in a comparative situational analysis of 
four Central Asian countries with common geo-
graphical conditions and similarities related to 
historical path dependencies. The knowledge map 
developed during our final project workshop was 
digitized and shared with the participants as a tool 
for further analysis and for informing decision-
making and policy formulation in their respective 
home countries. Immediate feedback on the 
method by the workshop participants was gener-
ally positive, only the relatively high amount of 
time required was criticized. However, in a more 
local workshop setting, the complexity of the 
model and thus the time requirement for the dif-
ferent steps would likely be reduced. The model 
jointly developed in Eberswalde was used by 
ICRAF in subsequent expert workshops on agro-
forestry in Kyrgyzstan to communicate our project 
results. 
We developed this method of systemic knowledge 
mapping for the case of agroforestry implementa-
tion and expansion in Central Asia, but the method 
can well be applied in different regional contexts 
and other fields of sustainable land use practices 
such as conservation agriculture, permaculture, 
remediation of contaminated lands or forest and 
ecosystem restoration. In a Central Asian context, 
where the cumulative improvement of knowledge 
systems was partly interrupted both in academia 
and at the level of on-farm decision-making by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent crises 
caused by neoliberal reforms, bringing together 
knowledge from different actors is particularly 
important. Moreover, agroforestry as a field of 
practice and scholarly discipline requires an in-
terdisciplinary approach that involves experts 
from diverse fields including agriculture, forestry, 
hydrology, climate and energy. The tools devel-
oped at the Centre for Econics and Ecosystem 
Management are subject to further development 
(including a MARISCO software) and new fields of 
application are explored (such as urban environ-
ments). Further documentation on the delibera-
tive processes outlined in this paper are to be 
made publicly available in form of text-based 
guidelines and videos. 
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Common pool resources, collaborative action, and local knowledge 
 in High Asia 
Andrei Dörre 
By means of a micro-level study conducted in the arid Western Pamirs of Tajikistan, it will be 
shown how self-organized management practices, collaborative action, and pragmatic tech-
nical solutions fed by local knowledge contribute to addressing the spatiotemporally uneven 
water supply for irrigation. The findings reveal that local-specific water management and irri-
gation arrangements prove to be essential not only for local agriculture and food production, 
but also a means of social organization and a central instrument for the equitable utilization of 
locally available natural resources, along with balancing interests within the community. The 
study also shows how collaborative resource use and management contribute to community 
cohesion and individual survival in a society that is struggling with manifold social and ecolog-
ical challenges. The empirically based insights contribute to a better understanding of how so-
cial and ecological challenges related to societal transitions and global change can be tackled 
‘from below.’ 
Introduction 
In the course of the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, societal disruptions accompanied by so-
cio-economic upheavals, such as the liquidation of 
numerous state enterprises, caused aggravated liv-
ing conditions in the newly independent states of 
Central Asia. These were the same nations that 
were formerly among the poorest of the Soviet Re-
publics, receiving substantial economic support 
from the political center. Many people lost their 
jobs and incomes during the transition from a com-
mand economy to a market economy, including in 
the agricultural sector. Simultaneously, the new 
states radically cut the provision of social services 
(Anderson, Pomfret 2003; Dudwick et al. 2003). In 
the countryside, manifold additional challenges 
such as limited market integration and monetary 
incomes lower than the national average exacer-
bated the already existing difficulties for making a 
living. The newly gained sovereignty was, there-
fore, perceived by many people as a ‘burden of im-
posed independence‘ (Mangott 1996). 
Against the background of the collapse of the Soviet 
economic system and the end of command struc-
tures strongly intervening in local affairs and new 
state institutions that were often incapable and un-
accountable in terms of providing effective admin-
istrative services, reliable social support, and effi-
cient resource management performances, the in-
creased uncertainty raised the people’s need to 
mobilize all resources and assets to ensure their 
own survival. Following the French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and the sustainable liveli-
hoods approach of the British Department for In-
ternational Development (DFID 1999), such assets 
can be categorized into different classes: human 
(e.g. knowledge, skills, and physical capability), so-
cial (e.g. social networks, relationships of trust, 
memberships, and affiliations), and material (e.g. 
natural resources such as land, water, and forests 
and infrastructure like irrigation canals and agri-
cultural equipment), as well as financial (e.g. sav-
ings, income, and access to loans) capital. 
This paper argues that human, cultural, and social 
capital purposefully mobilized and deployed at the 
local level are fundamental prerequisites for access 
to natural resources, as well as their management 
and utilization. Popularized by the American an-
thropologist Clifford Geertz (1983), the concept of 
local knowledge can be seen both as a specific kind 
of cultural or human capital and an inventory of 
spatial-historically bounded knowledge whose fea-
tures are shaped by the socio-ecological conditions 
of the respective locality and the daily practices of 
its inhabitants. According to Mistry (2009), local 
knowledge is characterized, amongst other things, 
as follows: i) it cannot be transferred easily to an-
other location because it is context specific; ii) it is 
generally transferred orally, as well as through 
demonstration, observation, and imitation; iii) in-
stead of being static, local knowledge changes over 
time through adaptation to novel situations, exper-
imentation, and learning; iv) local knowledge is 
widely shared and this enables long-term applica-
tion and an intergenerational transfer of local 
knowledge; and, finally, v) local knowledge 
emerges from people’s daily performances and in-
teractions within different life spheres that inter-
sect one other and, therefore, has to be seen as a 
holistic body of knowledge. 
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Environmental, cultural, and social local 
knowledge represents the most substantial part of 
customized approaches for the management and 
utilization of natural resources, as well as the oper-
ation of the related infrastructure. Common deci-
sion-making, instead, is the process of creating the 
institutional framework for such arrangements of 
collaborative action. Accordingly, these local-spe-
cific arrangements encompass the aspects of deci-
sion-making, shared local knowledge, infrastruc-
tural components, and practices executed by actors 
on the ground. They go beyond immediate re-
source-related issues and have the potential of be-
ing effective means of social organization and equi-
table instruments to balance interests within a 
community. Therefore, local knowledge became in-
creasingly popular in the development discourse in 
the course of the Earth Summit 1992 and after the 
frequent failures of blueprint top-down 
development measures. Local knowledge-in-
formed development strategies that take into con-
sideration local interests, experiences, discourses, 
and practices were expected to produce more effi-
cient and locality-specific responses to environ-
mental and societal challenges on the ground and 
to simultaneously empower the respective com-
munity (Barnes 2009; Berger, Luckmann 1967; 
Briggs, Sharp 2004). 
This paper centers its attention on the issue of local 
knowledge-based collaborative water manage-
ment and irrigation approaches in rural Central 
Asia using an example from the arid Western Pa-
mirs located in Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakh-
shan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO and Gorno-Ba-
dakhshan for short; see Fig. 1). Local knowledge-
based management and operation of scarce water 
resources and irrigation infrastructure for agricul-
tural food production are especially significant in 
Fig. 1: The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan 
Source: Dörre (2020) based on Jarvis et al. (2008). 
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this high mountain region due to the tense food 
supply situation caused by multiple societal and 
environmental factors. After outlining the food 
supply-related context of the research area, this pa-
per introduces a local case study from the Wakhan 
Valley at the upper Panj River. I show how, against 
the absence of a superior body governing local wa-
ter issues, sophisticated local knowledge-informed 
practices and pragmatic organizational solutions 
contribute to addressing the problem of uneven 
and irregular spatiotemporal water supply for irri-
gation purposes. After presenting the natural and 
infrastructural components of the water supply 
and irrigation system of Shirgin Village, I will intro-
duce water management and irrigation-related lo-
cal knowledge, as well as decision-making bodies 
and processes. These empirically based insights 
will contribute to a better understanding of how 
social and ecological problems related to societal 
transitions and global change can be tackled ‘from 
below.’ 
Food supply in the Western Pamirs 
The post-Soviet economic decline and societal dis-
integration described above were particularly 
prevalent in Tajikistan, where, in the course of a 
cruel civil war (1992–1997) accompanied by tre-
mendous human and material losses, the socio-
economic vulnerability of many people increased 
remarkably (Gomart 2003; Lynch 2001). During 
the war, the reliable food supply came under threat 
in remote rural areas such as the Western Pamirs. 
The collapse of the national supply network, bad 
harvests, and a blockade by government forces in 
1992–1993 led to a severe famine that struck the 
vast majority of the population. For years, nearly all 
inhabitants relied on humanitarian assistance of-
fered by the Aga Khan Foundation’s Pamir Relief 
and Development Program and other organiza-
tions, which delivered staple food products like 
flour, oil, and sugar (Bliss, Mamadsaidov 1998; 
Kreutzmann 1996; Sherbut et al. 2015). 
Gorno-Badakhshan’s food supply system structur-
ally rests on two pillars: local agricultural produc-
tion and food imports. Local agricultural produc-
tion is limited by the terrain and altitude of the 
mountainous environment. This economic activity 
is predominantly pursued at the household level by 
local farmers. Due to the environmental con-
straints of the cold and arid high mountain desert, 
the mainly Sunni Kyrgyz population of the eastern 
plateau-like part of the GBAO, corresponding to the 
nokhiya (district) of Murghab, mainly practices mo-
bile animal husbandry utilizing vast pasture areas. 
The Western Pamirs, including the districts of Dar-
voz, Vanj, Rushon, Shugnon, Roshtqal’a, and Ishko-
shim, are predominantly inhabited by farmers be-
longing to the Isma’ili branch of Shi’a Islam. They 
pursue an approach called mixed or combined 
mountain agriculture. This strategy combines the 
use of small land plots for food and fodder cultiva-
tion, located mostly on plain debris cones and allu-
vial fans at the bottom of deep narrow valleys close 
to the farmers’ residential centers, with animal 
husbandry that utilizes distant seasonal pastures 
located at higher elevations. Due to the annual pre-
cipitation being lower than the agro-ecological 
threshold of 250 mm, this kind of land cultivation 
is highly dependent on irrigation (Bobrinskii 1908; 
Kreutzmann 2012, 2015; Mukhiddinov 1975; 
Zarubin 1935). Land plots suitable for cultivation 
in terms of flatness, soil properties, water availabil-
ity, and other characteristics are scarce due to the 
challenging conditions of the arid and steep moun-
tainous environment. According to the Statistical 
Agency of Tajikistan in the GBAO (AO PJT VMKB 
2016) only 12,245 ha of cultivated land existed in 
Gorno-Badakhshan in 2015 for approximately 
216,900 inhabitants, almost all of which require ir-
rigation. This corresponds to less than 0.06 ha per 
capita, 60 percent of the national average (AO PJT 
2017). 
Land scarcity is one of the factors for why local ag-
ricultural production covers Gorno-Badakhshan’s 
food demand only partially. Until today, the provi-
sion of externally produced staple foods and gro-
ceries is essential (Baranov 1936; Bliss, 
Mamadsaidov 1998; Breu et al. 2003; Kreutzmann 
1996, 2003; MSDSP 2004). These imports repre-
sent the second pillar of the food supply system of 
Gorno-Badakhshan. The challenging food supply 
situation in the GBAO is also the product of envi-
ronmental factors. One is the difficult accessibility 
of the region. Natural hazards like rockfalls and 
other gravitational mass movements pose a contin-
uous threat to the few existing roads connecting 
Gorno-Badakhshan with the main agricultural ar-
eas and economic centers of the country (Kayumov 
2011; Muccione, Fiddes 2019; Fig. 2). As a result of 
global climate change effects with glacier retreat 
and the thawing of permafrost in the high moun-
tains, an increase in such events in terms of fre-
quency and magnitude is likely (Mannig et al. 
2018). Additionally, clouds and quickly shifting 




Fig. 2: A truck with imported goods from China 
masters a difficult passage of the road connecting 
the GBAO with the Western parts of Tajikistan. 
Source: Photograph taken by Dörre, March 2018. 
regular flight operations between the country’s 
capital of Dushanbe and Gorno-Badakhshan’s main 
airstrip in Khorog, the administrative center of the 
GBAO. After Tajikistan’s national airline suspended 
its flights between the two cities in October 2016 
and went bankrupt in 2017, PACTEC International, 
a humanitarian non-governmental organization 
registered in Switzerland, has offered expensive 
and irregular flights connecting Dushanbe and 
Khorog. In June 2020, Tajik Air began to serve this 
connection according to Asia-Plus, a Tajikistan-
based media group (ASIA-Plus 2020). 
Since 2002, three markets located on the border 
between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, locally known 
as ‘Afghan-Bazary,’ have been built with support 
from international donor organizations in order to 
facilitate small-scale trade between the communi-
ties on both sides of the border (Fig. 3). 
These duty-free markets are intended to provide 
individual producers, intermediaries, and, in par-
ticular, local customers with the opportunity to 
earn an income and access products that are 
cheaper or unavailable in their own country. The 
portfolio of traded goods includes agricultural 
products and unprocessed and processed foods, as 
well as consumption goods including non-food 
commodities such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, and 
construction materials. Even if these markets have 
a certain importance to the respective local trans-
boundary economies, they cannot be counted as re-
liable institutions for securing the food supply for 
the region. This is because these markets are char-
acterized by small trade turnover and are repeat-
edly closed for longer periods, officially, due to the 
politically insecure situation in Afghanistan’s 
north-eastern Badakhshan Province (Barrat 2016; 
EU-BOMNAF 2015; Kreutzmann 2017; Levi-
Sanchez 2017; Price, Hakimi 2019).  
The de-facto closed border to Afghanistan, the poor 
quality and vulnerability of the road network, in-
ternational trade directed mainly to the capital, and 
the lack of local opportunities to create direct rev-
enues from the import of products delivered from 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China present serious obstacles 
for Gorno-Badakhshan’s external exchange rela-
tions and its integration into both the national and 
international markets (Dörre 2018; 
Safarmamadova et al. 2020). These conditions cul-
minate in a fragile and cost-intensive accessibility 
to the region. High transportation costs contribute 
to prices for food, fertilizer, fuel, and agricultural 
equipment, which are higher than in other regions 
of the country. 
 
Fig. 3: Lively market activities at the cross-bor-
der market between Ishkoshim (Tajikistan) and 
Sultan Ishkashim (Afghanistan). 
The placard at the Tem cross-border market on the 
outskirts of Khorog depicted in the upper right cor-
ner of this figure notes that the project was realized 
with German financial support and implemented by 
the Aga Khan Foundation, with support from the 
Governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 
Source: Photographs taken by Dörre, May 2015 and March 
2018. 
For more than 51 percent of the GBAO’s popula-
tion, monetary incomes lower than the national 
poverty line for monthly consumption (in 2015-
2016, Tajik Somoni (TJS) 162 per capita, which cor-
responds to ca. USD 20) hamper access to these im-
ported products (ADB 2016). At the end of 2019, 
the average national wholesale price per kilogram 
of wheat (the most important staple food in the re-
gion), potato, and milk was TJS 2.21 (USD 0.23), TJS 
2.42 (USD 0.25), and TJS 2.97 (USD 0.30), respec-
tively. The average wholesale prices in the GBAO, 
however, were TJS 3.33 (US$ 0.34), TJS 3.25 (USD 
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0.33), and TJS 4.60 (USD 0.47), respectively ( SA 
PRT 2020; Fig. 4). 
Recent price increases seen during the Covid-19 
pandemic underline the strong dependence of 
Gorno-Badakhshan’s food system on external sup-
ply and conditions (WFP 2020). Against this back-
ground, the importance of local water management 
and irrigation agriculture for local food production 
cannot be overstated. 
Local case study: Water management and 
irrigation in Shirgin Village 
Nearly 50 years ago, the anthropologist Robert 
Netting pointed out that scarcely anybody beyond 
the respective villages knows anything about the 
collaborative irrigation arrangements of the village 
Törbel in the Swiss Alps (1974). I argue that even 
today, knowledge about concrete designs of com-
mon pool resource (CPR) management and usage 
arrangements is still weak. I apply Ostrom’s (2008) 
understanding that CPRs are „sufficiently large 
[systems] that it is difficult, but not impossible, to 
define recognized users and exclude other users al-
together. […] each person’s use of such resources 
subtracts benefits that others might enjoy” 
(Ostrom 2008:11). The lack of knowledge about 
CPRs is lamentable since such arrangements have 
a great potential for dealing with the multiple cri-
ses related to social upheavals and global change 
the world is experiencing. 
By means of a local case study from the western 
part of Gorno-Badakhshan, it will be shown how 
self-organized management practices, collabora-
tive action, and pragmatic technical solutions fed 
by local knowledge have contributed to addressing 
the spatiotemporally uneven water supply for irri-
gation. The research shows that local-specific wa-
ter management and irrigation arrangements 
prove to be not only an essential basis for local 
agriculture and food production, but also act as a 
means of social organization and are a central in-
strument for balancing interests within a commu-
nity. 
The inhabitants of the western Pamirs have long-
standing experiences in cultivation based on 
proven water management skills and irrigation 
practices. Historically, thanks to local-specific re-
source-related knowledge, rules, and practices, a 
remarkable share of the food products consumed 
was produced locally. The valley of the upper Panj 
River is a demonstrative example. While the land 
parcels were irrigated by water coming from the 
main river and its tributaries, the related infra-
structure was constructed and maintained by the 
communities (Andreev, Polovcev 1911; Bobrinskii 
1908; Kreutzmann 2015; Mukhiddinov 1975; 
Olufsen 1904). During the Soviet era, the agricul-
tural sector of Gorno-Badakhshan was radically re-
structured. The nomadic pastoralists in the eastern 
Pamirs were forced to settle and the individual 
farmsteads in the western Pamirs compulsory col-
lectivized. Subsequentially, the means of produc-
tion were nationalized and most collective farms 
were conjoined into state farms. Starting in the 
1960s, the agricultural production in the western 
Pamirs was converted from subsistence farming to 
the production of fodder and livestock. Staple food 
and groceries were now imported from other parts 
of the country (Dörre 2020; Kreutzmann 2015). Af-
ter the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the agricul-
tural knowledge and experiences accumulated 
Fig. 4: Evolution of average wholesale prices in TJS for selected food products in Gorno-Badakhshan 
and the national level from the beginning of 2009 to the middle of the year 2020 (quarterly figures). 
Due to a lack of data, there are gaps in the graph. 
Draft: Dörre (2020) based on AS PRT (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019); SA PRT (2020) 
Andrei Dörre 
54 
over time proved to be highly valuable for adapting 
to the new era with all its challenges. 
The data for the following case study was gathered 
by the author during field stays in Shirgin Village in 
the spring of 2015, the summer of 2016, and the 
summer of 2018, as well as by Chorshanbe 
Goibnazarov, local resident, Assistant Professor of 
Cultural Studies at the University of Central Asia, 
and co-author of a paper published by Dörre and 
Goibnazarov (2018) in the summer of 2015. The 
village of Shirgin is situated on a hillside at an ele-
vation of approximately 3,000 m in the Wakhan 
Valley on the right bank of the upper Panj River. In 
administrative terms, Shirgin belongs to the jamoat 
(municipality) of Vrang, being part of Ishkoshim 
Nokhiya (Fig. 5). With approximately 900 inhabit-
ants living in around 100 households, Shirgin is of 
medium size compared to other settlements in the 
district (SA PRT 2016). 
Information on environmental conditions, water 
management, and irrigation arrangements were 
collected from knowledgeable people involved in 
these issues and representatives of the local 
administration. Representatives of local house-
holds explained their daily activities around the is-
sue of securing their food supply. Site inspections 
accompanied by local guides were combined with 
a mapping of the water supply and irrigation infra-
structure, as well as observations of irrigation 
practices. Finally, following an oral history ap-
proach, local elders were interviewed about their 
experiences and memories regarding water supply 
and irrigation in the past and how this knowledge 
is currently applied. The names of interview part-
ners have been changed to ensure anonymity. 
Several reasons make this remote village an appro-
priate case for the study of local-specific water 
management and irrigation arrangements. First, 
the village is exposed to several economic chal-
lenges concerning the food supply. The road to 
Khorog is prone to avalanches and landslides 
(ASIA-Plus 2017). This poses a threat to the secure 
provision of external goods. Second, the prices of 
staple foods offered in the few shops of the village 
are higher than in Khorog. In August 2016, for in-
stance, the retail price for a 50 kg bag of wheat flour 
Fig. 5: Location of Shirgin Village (underlined in red) within the Ishkoshim Nokhiya. 
The Panj River forms the Tajik-Afghan border, which, for the sake of clarity, has not been explicitly de-
marcated in the map. 
Source: Dörre (2020) based on GUGK (1987); Jarvis et al. (2008); OSM (2017). 
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was TJS 170 (ca. USD 21.60) and pulses, an im-
portant protein source in the local cuisine, were 
available for TJS 8-10 (ca. USD 1.15) per kg. Third, 
the few existing jobs, limited to the school, a kin-
dergarten, and a tiny clinic, are structurally under-
paid. A teacher’s monthly salary is around only TJS 
450 (ca. USD 57). Fourth, there is a lack of water 
sources within the settlement limits and the inhab-
itants experience water scarcity during the vegeta-
tion period due to the arid climate (T1 2016; LTH 
2016; SK 2016). Therefore, subsistence-oriented 
cultivation based on irrigation, supplemented by 
animal husbandry, is crucial for Shirgin’s popula-
tion. At the same time, cultivation is restricted by 
the small area of suitable land plots. With 111 ha of 
irrigated cropland and orchards covering 25 ha in 
total, only a bit more than one ha of arable land and 
less than 0.25 ha of orchards are, on average, at 
each household’s disposal (ADC et al. 2013). 
Shirgin’s water supply and irrigation system 
The lack of suitable water sources within the vil-
lage limits, water scarcity during the vegetation pe-
riod, the location on a comparatively steep slope, 
and the spatial extent of the village require an arti-
ficial water delivery and spatial distribution sys-
tem consisting of canal heads tapping natural wa-
ter sources, canals leading the water to the village, 
and locks to distribute the water as needed. Over 
time, Shirgin’s population has developed proven 
local knowledge-informed technical solutions and 
sophisticated management practices to address the 
irrigation water supply problem. According to local 
respondents, the present irrigation infrastructure 
is based on historical construction executed by the 
local population in the 19th century under the 
guidance of the Isma’ili religious leader Said Abdu-
rakhmon, with support from Russian border 
guards in the early 20th century, and, finally, under 
Soviet rule. In socialist times, the canal system was 
used mainly for the irrigation of lands belonging 
first to a collective farm, which was transformed 
into a state farm in 1977, as well as for privately 
used ‘kitchen gardens’ and orchards near the farm-
steads (Kreutzmann 1996; Monogarova 1972). In 
that time, the infrastructure was maintained at the 
expense of the collective and state farm. The state 
farm was transferred in 1996 back into a collective 
farm, and, finally, to a so-called khojagii dekhqoni 
(Farmers association), assembling most of the 
farmsteads of the three villages of Shirgin, Nizhgar, 
and Drizh together (Fig. 6). Since then, the farmers 
have had to organize the supply and distribution of 
irrigation water by themselves, as well as taking re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of the irrigation 
infrastructure. 
Water tapping and water supply infrastructure 
Four main canals with different characteristics lead 
irrigation water from diverse natural sources to 
the agricultural lands used by Shirgin’s inhabitants. 
These are, from west to east: Pushti Bakhor, 
Shgardwod, Pirwod, and Wodgash canals (Fig. 6). 
The Pirwod (‘canal of the Pir’) is regarded as the 
oldest canal of Shirgin, stemming from the 19th 
century. According to local legend, an Ismai’li reli-
gious leader living in the Qala (castle or fortified 
farmstead) of Shirgin initiated and guided the con-
struction of the approximately six-kilometer-long 
structure. The canal head taps a snow and glacier-
fed creek at an elevation of approximately 4,000 m 
and channels the water via a flagstone-lined con-
struction using the natural gradient a steep cliff lo-
cated just north of the village. Here, the canal water 
creates an artificial waterfall. The steep fall enables 
comparatively flat canals to be used on the rest of 
the course and, thus, prevents erosion from the 
rapid inflow of water (WM 2015, 2016). After the 
waterfall, another canal structure leads the water 
into Shirgin’s distribution system (Fig. 6). Due to 
the altitude of the source, Pirwod works only tem-
porarily from June until September. The rest of the 
year the canal head is blocked by ice. If the weather 
turns cold, windy, and cloudy, the canal head can 
even freeze in summer. Such situations quickly 
lead to less irrigation water being available in the 
canal (LTH 2016; WM 2016). 
Another historical canal is the shorter Wodgash 
(‘canal’s mouth’), which starts at a snow-fed natu-
ral pool located approximately two kilometers to 
the northeast of the village center at an elevation of 
3,350 m. From late April to June, the Wodgash pro-
vides water to a couple of homesteads and land 
plots located in the eastern part of the village. In 
times of high discharge, a nearby subordinate canal 
takes on the water surplus and carries it to the con-
sumers. This solution is important for two reasons: 
the farmers receive more water at the beginning of 
the cultivation period and it reduces the risk of 
mudflows initiated by the steep Wodgash by taking 
water out of this channel. When all the snow feed-
ing the pool is melted, the water level of the pool 
sinks, and the pool cannot be tapped any more. In 
June, the Wodgash dries out. If the snow feeding the 
pool does not melt due to cold, cloudy, or windy 
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weather, the canal can fall dry even in April or May 
(LG 2016; LKE 2015; T1 2016). 
When the Russian Empire occupied the Pamirs at 
the end of the 19th century, the Pirwod and 
Wodgash canals were unable to provide enough 
water for Shirgin’s growing population. In the 
course of the following years, a search for new 
water sources was undertaken and a tributary of 
the Drizh Creek, located approximately five kilome-
ters to the west, was identified at an elevation of 
3,400 m. The challenging task of digging the canal 
into the rocky surface was completed with support 
from the Russian border guards stationed at the 
nearby Langar Kikhn Post. In the early 20th cen-
tury, the Shgardwod (‘straight canal’) project 
Fig. 6: Spatial overview of the water supply system of Shirgin Village 
Source: Dörre (2018) based on Jarvis et al. (2008); OSM (2017). 
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characterized by several masoned and long con-
creted sections was finished. The canal works from 
April through October. The Shgardwod and Pirwod 
canals are today regarded as Shirgin’s main water 
lines (LTH 2016; T1 2016; T2 2015; WM 2016). 
Finally, the fields of Pushti Bakhor (‘delayed 
spring’), located five kilometers outside of Shirgin 
to the west at 3,300 m elevation, were also devel-
oped in pre-Soviet times for the cultivation of fod-
der crops (Fig. 6). During this land acquisition pro-
ject, a canal with the same name fed from the Drizh 
Creek and delivering the water to the fields of 
Pushti Bakhor was built, as well as a couple of sheep 
stables (FKS 2016; LTH 2016; Mirzo 2010). Today, 
local herders use the area as a summer pasture for 
sheep and goats, as well as for cattle (S1 2016). 
Water distribution infrastructure 
Within the limits of Shirgin, six secondary canals 
run through the neighborhoods to distribute the ir-
rigation water. They are usually locked and can 
only be opened according to commonly defined 
schedules. Hundreds of tertiary canals branch off 
towards clusters of cultivated fields, garden plots, 
and orchards. The final stage of the irrigation sys-
tem are tiny channels established in the fields, gar-
dens, and orchards. These furrow-shaped water 
lines can be locked or blocked with small barrages 
made of stones, iron sheets, branches, wool, tex-
tiles, and animal hides that can be removed quickly 
and easily on demand. 
Water management and irrigation practices 
To gain a systematic understanding, the study of lo-
cal-specific water management and irrigation ar-
rangements can be differentiated by looking specif-
ically at the three levels of decision-making, the in-
volved actors, and the practices executed by them. 
As a superior institution governing local water is-
sues does not exist, Shirgin’s central decision-mak-
ing body is the village assembly that gathers every 
year briefly before or during the celebration of Sho-
gun (also known as the Persian New Year, Nawruz), 
the vernal equinox on March 21. At this occasion, 
the assembly elects the  (‘water master’). 
This, usually male, person is responsible for secur-
ing the water supply through supervising the three 
main canals. In case the  identifies damages 
or other problems with the infrastructure during 
his daily inspections, an Ashar (‘collective work’) is 
assembled. These collaborative activities are not 
only devoted to maintenance and repair work on 
irrigation infrastructures but also costly construc-
tion projects. The deliberate pooling of resources 
minimizes individual costs and enables each party 
involved to gain a greater advantage from the us-
age of commonly shared infrastructure than would 
being possible to maintain through individual ef-
forts alone. Depending on the scope of work, each 
household of a neighborhood, or the entire village, 
sends a volunteer to participate in the work that 
usually takes between two and three days. As cen-
tury-long experience has shown, most damage oc-
curs in the winter, and must be repaired before the 
start of the irrigation period (T1 2016; WM 2015, 
2016; Dörre 2020). 
The maintenance regime for the Shgardwod canal 
is organized pragmatically. The community agrees 
that each household is responsible for a specific 
section of the canal and must conduct small clean-
ing, maintenance, and repair jobs to secure the 
functionality of the canal. Bigger damages require 
calling an Ashar (LG 2016; S2 2015; T1 2016). An-
other duty of the  is the creation of irrigation 
schedules adapted to different stages of the cultiva-
tion period and the amount of available water. 
These schedules must also be agreed to by the lead-
ers of the community such as the head of the village 
and the representatives of the neighborhoods, as 
well as the village assembly. The schedules will be 
briefly delineated below. 
For several years, the same experienced man has 
occupied the position of the water master (T1 
2016; WM 2015, 2016). This circumstance shows 
that the community seems to be satisfied with his 
work and trusts the assessments of the . It 
also indicates the importance of accumulated 
knowledge, experience, and mutual trust for the 
successful management and usage of Shirgin’s 
common irrigation system. 
According to the flow of the water, the so-called 
Sardorkhoi-Dekhqonon (‘heads of farmers’) are one 
management level below the . They are re-
sponsible for the supervision and proper handling 
of the locks blocking the secondary canals, as well 
as for the condition of the canals themselves. Each 
canal has four heads that take turns and represent 
a different subgroup of up to ten farmers using the 
same canal. These subgroups are composed of 
farmers who cultivate neighboring fields irrigated 
from the same canal. Often, but not necessarily, 
they are immediate neighbors. The heads of farm-
ers are elected by their group and are responsible 
for irrigation practices according to the agreed 
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schedules (T1 2016; WM 2015, 2016). Within these 
subgroups, the water division is organized by the 
members themselves. They continuously negotiate 
the time and duration of their irrigation slot, and 
open and close the locks in accordance with the es-
tablished agreements. These arrangements are 
highly flexible, to quickly address shifting condi-
tions. After the village assembly, the water master, 
the heads of farmers and the canal subgroups, indi-
vidual farmers independently handling the water 
distribution on their wundr (‘land plots’) are the 
fifth and final tier of Shirgin’s water management 
and irrigation arrangement (Dörre, Goibnazarov 
2018). 
Finally, the irrigation schedules are adapted to dif-
ferent scenarios, in terms of two different stages of 
the cultivation period and the amount of available 
water (T1 2016; WM 2016). One schedule is used 
during the beginning of the cultivation period from 
the middle of April until mid-May in years with a 
normal water supply. All households are divided 
into two main groups, each consisting of six sub-
groups of up to ten households. The six subgroups 
belonging to the first main group are entitled to ir-
rigate their fields on even dates, the second main 
group on odd dates. The irrigation entitlement of a 
group comprises a day irrigation round lasting 
from 7am to 7pm, and a night irrigation round last-
ing from 7pm until 7am of the next morning. Ac-
cordingly, every subgroup has the right to irrigate 
their fields for around two hours during the day 
and two hours during the night. The water distri-
bution within the subgroup is negotiated by its 
members. This schedule is publicly displayed to 
Fig. 1: Agricultural areas and neighborhoods of Shirgin Village. 
The numbers in brackets behind the area/neighborhood names refer to the day of the week when the re-
spective area / neighborhood receives irrigation water according to schedule 2 (1. Monday, 2. Tuesday, 3. 
Wednesday, etc.). 
Source: Dörre (2020) based on Jarvis et al. (2008); OSM (2017). 
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create transparency and the possibility for people 
to check and control (Dörre, Goibnazarov 2018). 
In years without water scarcity, a second schedule 
is used from the middle of May until the harvest of 
legumes in August. For organizational purposes, 
Shirgin is divided into several neighborhoods and 
agricultural areas. These neighborhoods and areas 
receive irrigation rights valid for one specific day of 
the week. Both the inhabitants of the respective 
neighborhoods and farmers of the respective areas 
organize the water distribution by themselves 
(Fig. 7). 
In years with water scarcity, which is the common 
case, a third schedule is used for the same cultiva-
tion period, as in schedule 2. Instead of whole 
neighborhoods, canal-specific subgroups receive 
24-hour long irrigation rights and have to negotiate 
the water distribution within their group. In case 
the water shortage is severe, the time slot for irri-
gation can be shortened. After the last field harvest 
has taken place in the middle or the end of August, 
a fourth irrigation regime is applied to irrigate rem-
nant potato and vegetable beds and small legume 
sowings adjacent to farmsteads. At this time, the 
water demand is low and rules regulating the use 
of irrigation water are not necessary anymore. 
Every farmer can use as much water as needed and 
available. 
Conclusion 
The strength of the Shirgin community lies, in part, 
in the robust water management and irrigation-re-
lated local knowledge. This body of knowledge 
comprises a rich expertise on the environmental 
conditions of the surroundings of the village, its 
historical heritage, the detailed characteristics of 
the community and the place, as well as the long-
term personal experiences of the responsible man-
agers and individual farmers. Additionally, social 
assets like mutual dependency, neighborly help, 
and cooperation seem to be characteristics of the 
relations between the different tiers of Shirgin’s 
water management and irrigation regimes. The ar-
rangement has proven to be effective since the in-
habitants collaborate with each other, share labor, 
time, and other costs and have managed to solve 
conflicts over irrigation water without involving 
external state actors. These assets promote a kind 
of micro-scale ‘hydrosolidarity’ (Falkenmark 
1999:360) among the local farmers. Together, 
these features lead to a reduction in individual 
risks and living costs, as well as a decrease in free-
riding, if not its full eradication, through social con-
trol. The presented case study exemplifies crucial 
aspects of community-based resource use and 
management including collaborative action, bur-
den sharing, and the division of management re-
sponsibilities among many stakeholders. It also 
provides an example of human, cultural, and social 
assets becoming key factors for the equitable utili-
zation of locally available natural resources, as well 
as individual survival in a society that is struggling 
with manifold challenges related to ongoing socio-
ecological challenges. Even though it is primarily 
male farmers who are involved in Shirgin’s irriga-
tion water management arrangement, the term of 
equity seems to be appropriate to describe its char-
acteristics, focusing on equity at the household 
level, since male farmers do not use water for 
themselves alone, but on behalf of their house-
holds. Thus, first, the male farmers represent entire 
households including persons of all genders and 
ages, and second, all households active in agricul-
ture are involved in the irrigation arrangement. Fi-
nally, this research supports the assumption that 
local knowledge-based joint approaches for the 
management of common pool resources have the 
potential to be not only a basis for equitable re-
source utilization but can also be a central instru-
ment for balancing interests within a community 
and a means of social organization. The presented 
and empirically based insights contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of how social and ecological 
challenges related to societal transitions and global 
change can be tackled ‘from below,’ even if the pre-
sented case is specific and cannot be one-to-one 
transferred to other spatiotemporal contexts. 
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The second life of the Monotown: Questioning narratives of failed Soviet 
urban modernity in contemporary Kazakhstan 
Tabea Rohner 
Monotowns, urban settlements whose economies are dominated by a single enterprise or indus-
try, were key elements of the Soviet Union’s project of achieving socio-technological progress 
through industrialization and urbanization – and flagships of socialist modernity. After the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, these towns have become known to an international public as prob-
lematic entities, characterized by crumbling infrastructures, socioeconomic precarity and envi-
ronmental pollution. Monotowns’ current challenges are commonly regarded in the media and 
academic studies as rooted in the Soviet past, with its legacy of urban and industrial misdevel-
opment. Accordingly, the solutions proposed to solve the ‘monotown problem’ aim at overcom-
ing this legacy by subscribing to certain types of (‘Western’) models of urbanization and eco-
nomic development. In this paper, I challenge the specific teleology implicated by these devel-
opment models by drawing attention to alternative framings of monotowns’ trajectories, par-
ticularly those arising from the lived experience of local residents. Using the case of the mono-
town Tekeli in Kazakhstan, where improvements in the social, economic and environmental 
spheres have recently been taking place, I question widespread narratives of failure and misfor-
tune and, thus, aim to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of postindustrialization and 
urbanization processes in Central Asia. 
Introduction 
‘Monotown’ is the translation of the Russian 
monogorod and designates an urban settlement in 
the former Soviet space, the economy and social life 
of which are dominated by a single industry or en-
terprise – a so-called ‘town-forming enterprise’. 
These towns were key elements of gigantic state-
led modernization projects that were designed and 
implemented in response to a perceived lack of in-
dustrialization and urbanization in the Soviet Un-
ion (Collier 2011; Crawford 2018; Strange 2019). 
The first monotown prototypes began to emerge 
around the 1930s, typically in places where geolo-
gists had located valuable mineral deposits on ex-
tended expeditions sponsored by the Tsarist Em-
pire in the 19th and early 20th century. In most 
cases, these were far-flung sites with little prior in-
habitation, and, therefore, the towns were basically 
created from scratch. This entailed the creation of 
a complete set of amenities for the workers and 
their families, who were relocated there from more 
densely populated areas (Strange 2019). Many of 
the necessities of life – food, fuel, building materials 
– were transported sometimes thousands of kilo-
meters from the nearest source to these remote
outposts (Alexander, Buchli 2007).
The key actor in planning and construction activi-
ties was the state-owned town-forming enterprise, 
which was typically in charge of providing, for ex-
ample, housing, social institutions, entertainment, 
food, road networks, sanitation infrastructure and 
central heating (Junussova, Beimisheva 2020; 
Strange 2019). Most mining towns in Soviet Ka-
zakhstan experienced fast growth during the Sec-
ond World War, when industries were relocated 
from the north to the south and the west to the east 
of the Soviet Union. After the war, industrial and 
city-building activities continued expanding and 
the young single-industry towns became flagships 
of socialist modernity – productive, wealthy, or-
derly and well-equipped with cultural facilities 
(see Fig.1 for an overview of Kazakhstan’s mono-
towns). In addition to that, they benefitted from the 
centrally organized direct supply of consumer 
goods and labor resources from Moscow (Collier 
2011; Junussova, Beimisheva 2020; Nasritdinov 
2012). 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the stop 
of subsidies from Moscow, many town-forming en-
terprises were closed, or down-sized, and count-
less workers lost their jobs and saw themselves 
forced to leave the towns (Nasritdinov 2012; 
Strange 2019; UNDP 2019). The key characteristics 
of the monotown model, namely their specific sup-
ply and distribution networks and the close inter-
twining of civic and cultural life with the economic 
logic of urban space, posed serious problems after 
the demise of the Soviet Union. As the town-form-
ing enterprises typically funded, built and main-
tained all urban infrastructure, the economic prob-
lems of these enterprises quickly 
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spilled over to other spheres of urban life. The re-
sult was a decrease of the quality of housing and 
leisure, health and other amenities (Junussova, 
Beimisheva 2020; Kryukova et al. 2015). Many of 
these towns became „desolate monuments to So-
viet engineering feats in establishing such out-
posts“ (Alexander, Buchli 2007:10). 
The phenomenon of the depressed post-Soviet 
monotown that struggles with crumbling urban in-
frastructures, high unemployment rates, environ-
mental pollution and ageing communities has be-
come known to a broad, international public 
through media coverage and scientific studies. The 
shift away from the concerns that monotowns em-
bodied – the centrally planned construction of set-
tlements around remotely located industrial enter-
prises – and their potential of social unrest growing 
out of precarious socioeconomic conditions, have 
turned monotowns into epitomes of failed Soviet 
urban modernity, according to common media and 
academic narratives. 
I acquired first-hand knowledge of the considera-
ble challenges that inhabitants of a monotown in 
contemporary capitalism are facing during my eth-
nographic fieldwork in the monotown Tekeli in 
Southeast Kazakhstan that lasted fourteen months 
between 2017 and 2019: High unemployment 
rates, precarious working conditions, poor condi-
tions of roads, outmigration of young people, mis-
allocation of government funds, poor drinking wa-
ter quality, high levels of water, soil toxicity and de-
caying buildings inter alia (Fig.2 shows typical 
signs of decay). However, the interpretative frame-
work within which they evaluated this lamentable 
situation differed from the common media and sci-
entific framing. In most of my interlocutors’ view, it 
is not the Soviet past, the inherited „nonmarket in-
dustrial structure“ along with its „legacy of misde-
velopment and mislocation for production and 
population“ that is the major cause of contempo-
rary problems (Gaddy, Ickes 2011:165). In contrast 
to many media and academic accounts, my inter-
locutors saw the legacy of Soviet urban modernity 
Fig. 1: Kazakhstan’s monotowns including the functional type of their respective town-forming 
enterprises 
Source: Figure compiled by Leonie Rohner and the author based on Maymurunova (2019). 
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as an asset rather than a disadvantage: Most Soviet-
era multistory buildings are still habitable and 
many other elements of the built urban environ-
ment of that era, such as heating systems and 
power plants, are functional – although in need of 
maintenance. Instead, my interlocutors pointed out 
that current inadequacies of the municipal govern-
ment are the major problem source, as well as the 
disadvantageous privatization of firms and com-
munal services, their community’s position within 
the global economy and a general climate of decline 
of moral standards. 
Fig. 2: Decaying Soviet-era buildings at the ent-
rance to the abandoned shafts of the lead-zinc 
mine in the Kazakhstani monotown Tekeli 
Source: Picture by the author. 
In this paper, I use the discrepancy between media 
and scientific accounts, on the one hand, and that 
by ordinary residents of the Kazakhstani mono-
town Tekeli, on the other, as a starting point to 
question dominant narratives about monotowns’ 
trajectories as a story of the failure of Soviet urban 
modernity. I will do this in two steps. Firstly, I will 
lay bare by scrutinizing the underlying premises of 
the media and scientific narratives that these nar-
ratives position monotowns and their residents in 
a specific hierarchy of value and a teleological tem-
poral framework. It is only within this specific 
framework, which sets urbanization patterns in the 
liberal ‘West’ as the desirable endpoint of mono-
towns’ future trajectories, that the towns and their 
residents appear as problematic remnants of the 
past. Thus, the narrative of failed Soviet urban mo-
dernity turns out to be a situated and particular 
1 The “Fourth Industrial Revolution” is commonly defined 
as the progressing blurring of the boundaries between the 
physical, digital and biological worlds through the use of 
technologies, such as the Internet of Things, virtual reality, 
framing of the monotown issue with a strong ideo-
logical component rather than an objective analy-
sis of facts from which obvious conclusions follow. 
Secondly, by drawing attention to recent improve-
ments in the social, economic and environmental 
spheres in Tekeli, I question narratives of failure 
and decline on an empirical basis. However, these 
signs of recovery can hardly be regarded as mani-
festations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution1  
leading towards a postindustrial town, as envi-
sioned by policy advisers and the Kazakhstani gov-
ernment. Instead, recovery happens in the form of 
small, incremental changes that, nevertheless, lead 
a decisive share of the monotown residents af-
fected to imagine brighter futures in one of these 
alleged vestiges of the past. 
The monotown: A narrative of failed Soviet 
urban modernity 
Decaying urban infrastructure (Kaimuldinova et al. 
2017; Kydyrbaeva et al. 2018), closure of town-
forming enterprises (Bozhko 2017; Zakirov 2016), 
environmental pollution (Kaimuldinova et al. 
2017; Musina, Neucheva 2018), high unemploy-
ment and self-employment rates (Kryukova et al. 
2015; Nurzhan 2015), high levels of criminality and 
low quality of life (Nurzhan 2015), ageing commu-
nities (Junussova, Beimisheva 2020) and a variety 
of other forms of socioeconomic precarity are fre-
quently mentioned problems of contemporary 
monotowns in the media and academic journals. 
When paying attention to the way in which these 
problems are evaluated and contextualized, it 
turns out that the Soviet legacy is very often, both 
in the media and scientific studies, said to be the 
source of the present problems. More specifically, 
according to a common narrative, it is urbanization 
patterns adopted in the Soviet Union beginning in 
the 1930s that left the contemporary societies with 
a system of physical and social infrastructure that 
is essentially and irrevocably misplaced. 
I mention only a few of these of these instances: 
Leon Aron (2009) writes in an article in The New 
York Times titled “Darkness on the Edge of Mono-
town“: „[P]roducts of Stalinist modernization, Rus-
sian company towns were built […] in the middle of 
nowhere and with complete disregard for long-
robotics and artificial intelligence. Moving the country’s 
economy towards Industry 4.0 is the declared aim of the Ka-




term urban viability and economic geography, not 
to mention the needs and conveniences of workers 
and their families.” Nowadays, according to Aron, 
the single-industry towns are problematic relics of 
this regrettable past, „frozen in the 1930s or ’50s.“ 
In a similar vein, the World Bank (2010:24) has 
concluded that it „is likely that only a few of the en-
terprises can compete in international markets,“ 
since their „underlying problems are market un-
friendly locations for enterprises which produce 
uncompetitive products.“ Articles concerned spe-
cifically with Kazakhstani monotowns, such as one 
by Chris Rickleton (2017) in the magazine NIKKEI 
Asia about the town Arqalyq, tell a similar story. 
The article, titled “Decaying Kazakh mining town 
struggles to shift focus. Government initiatives 
yield few benefits so far, as Soviet legacy endures”, 
regards the “shadows of the past” – read: the 
town’s Soviet legacy – as the source of current 
problems monotowns are facing, particularly their 
unsuitability for the global market economy. 
Similar analyses are found in academic studies, for 
instance, in the following one by Clifford Gaddy and 
Barry Ickes dealing with the possible future of Rus-
sia’s economy: 
„In the estimates of some, its greatest 
economic challenges stem from the 
fact that today’s Russian Federation 
has yet to overcome the nonmarket in-
dustrial structure it inherited from the 
Soviet Union. […] [T]he structure of 
the Russian economy’s industrial core, 
along with its legacy of misdevelop-
ment and mislocation for production 
and population, remains intact“ 
(Gaddy, Ickes 2011:165). 
Even though contemporary problems in mono-
towns, such as inadequate financial resources, inef-
fective privatizations of firms, corruption, a lack of 
political continuity, inadequate budget systems 
and one-size-fits-all solutions for urban develop-
ment are acknowledged as sources of monotowns’ 
current hardship in many scientific and media arti-
cles, the underlining narrative remains one in 
which Soviet style industrialization and urbaniza-
2 Trubina (2013) uses the metaphor following Kaika and 
Swyngedouw’s (2000) work, according to which the impo-
sing elements of the built environment (e.g. water towers, 
tion appears as the foundational cause of the prob-
lems and monotowns as a „failed relic of Soviet-era 
central planning“ (World Bank 2018:27). 
According to anthropologist Jeremy Morris, small 
monotowns have largely been written off as „hope-
less relics of the Soviet urban planning that made 
no allowance for organic development or human 
habitability“ (2016:29). The „worthless dowry“ of 
Soviet industrial modernity, a metaphor coined by 
Elena Trubina (2013), is a powerful one that has 
been used to capture the little value that is attached 
to urban setups of monotowns in contemporary 
times.2  Morris criticizes the idea of industrial Rus-
sia – the context where he conducted ethnographic 
research – as a „worthless dowry,“ as it „recalls the 
endlessly reinvented ‘modernization‘ theories 
through which spaces, and ultimately people, are 
reconstructed in a hierarchy of value in Russia to-
day“ (2016:29). In view of the considerable similar-
ities of urbanization and industrialization patterns 
in Russia and Kazakhstan, Morris’ critique can be 
extended to Kazakhstani monotowns. Beyond that, 
I would add that the hierarchy of values are not 
only at play within the former Soviet countries 
themselves but also on a broader level. The hierar-
chy of values within which monotowns’ urban 
dowries appear as “worthless” is embedded in 
powerful transnational discourses, which present 
progress as a predefined path towards a specific 
type of modernity – one that corresponds to the 
ideal of Western market economies (see also Cima 
in this volume). Within this vision of progress, the 
former Soviet countries are seen as a „square peg 
to be rammed into the round hole of the global 
economy“ (Morris 2016:29). In the following sec-
tion, I look closer into how this vision translates 
into concrete suggestions for improving mono-
towns’ situation made in the media and scientific 
articles with an underlying narrative of failed So-
viet urban modernity. 
Hegemonic remedies and their limits 
Even in the 1990s, monotowns were recognized as 
strategically important settlements in the newly in-
dependent countries of the former Soviet Union, 
particularly in Russia and Kazakhstan, because a 
significant part of the countries’ urban populations 
and industrial production was concentrated in the 
dams, pumping stations, power plants, gas stations) that ac-
company technological networks (e.g. water, gas, electri-
city, information) are the urban dowry. 
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single-industry towns. However, there was not yet 
a systematic approach to the development of 
monotowns, but the focus was on the support of 
core businesses, particularly the town-forming en-
terprises (Turgel et al. 2016). In order to prevent 
mass unemployment and social tension, Kazakh-
stan’s government provided special loans and sub-
sidies to selected local enterprises, among them the 
lead-zinc combine in Tekeli (Junussova, 
Beimisheva 2020). In the early 2000s, there was a 
short boom in monotowns; in some, population 
size started increasing compared to the 1990s, and, 
since 2011, there has been a steady increase in the 
population of several Kazakhstani monotowns in-
cluding Tekeli (Bozhko 2017; Kryukova et al. 
2015)(see Fig.3 for development of population size 
in Tekeli). 
Nevertheless, mining companies could not operate 
at the same level of productivity or employ as many 
town residents as in the past; the government sub-
sidies had a temporary effect and kept some enter-
prises alive for only a few years while a diversifica-
tion of production did not occur on a significant 
scale (Junussova, Beimisheva 2020; Kryukova et al. 
2015). The global economic crises in 2008/2009 
again highlighted the vulnerability of monotowns 
to abrupt changes in the economic environment – 
the socioeconomic situation of many monotowns 
was aggravated during this time (Kryukova et al. 
2015; Shastitko, Fatikhova 2015; Turgel et al. 
2016). The Kazakhstani government reacted by 
means of implementing national industrialization 
and innovation programs, but unfortunately, the 
government subsidies did not reach all mono-
towns, and worsening living conditions led to in-
creasing social tension (Junussova, Beimisheva 
2020). In 2011, industrial workers in the Kazakh-
stani oil producing monotown Janaozen, who were 
not satisfied with their salaries and living condi-
tions, went on strike, which evolved into a violent 
conflict with the town authorities leading to over a 
dozen deaths (Junussova, Beimisheva 2020). 
The „specter of social unrest“ (Crowley 2016:400) 
led the governments of the countries of the former 
Soviet Union to take further measures supporting 
monotowns’ socioeconomic development. In 2012, 
one year after the Janaozen protest, the Kazakh-
stani government approved the Program for the 
Development of Monotowns 2012-2020, aiming at 
assisting a selection of 27 monotowns by increas-
ing the efficiency of the main operating industry, 
supporting economic diversification and small and 
medium-sized enterprises, establishing free trade 
zones, attracting domestic and foreign investment, 
stimulating labor mobility, developing social and 
physical infrastructure, professional retraining of 
Fig. 1: Development of Tekeli’s population size from the dissolution of the Soviet Union until 2020 
Source: figure compiled by Leonie Rohner and the author based on Bespyatov (2020) and the Committee on Statistics of 
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the population, particularly training in investment 
and entrepreneurialism, environmental sanitation 
and creative approaches to the design of architec-
tural space (Bozhko 2017; Kryukova et al. 2015; 
Permyakov, Krasnova 2018; Vetrova et al. 2014; 
Zakirov 2016).3 
The experience of European countries, Canada, the 
US and Japan serves explicitly as a role model for 
the monotown’s future trajectories in policy-ori-
ented academic studies. Glasgow (UK), Kamaishi 
(Japan), Tumbler Ridge (Canada) and the Ruhr re-
gion (Germany) are listed as examples of successful 
postindustrial transformation of cities (Kryukova 
et al. 2015; Shastitko, Fatikhova 2015; Vetrova et 
al. 2014; Zakirov 2016). In most of these studies, 
striking a balance between state interventions, on 
the one hand, and entrepreneurial activities of pri-
vate actors, such as companies or individuals, on 
the other, is regarded as the key for the successful 
transformation of monotowns in global capitalism. 
However, there is a clear hierarchy: Market meth-
ods and incentives are preferred over excessive 
state subsidizing in the form of a regular inflow of 
federal resources into monotowns, as the latter is 
suspected of preserving post-Soviet countries’ in-
efficient industrial geography (Crowley 2016:397; 
Kryukova et al. 2015:264; Shastitko, Fatikhova 
2015:5). The ultimate goal of the measures put for-
ward by policy-oriented researchers and mani-
fested in Kazakhstan’s monotown development 
program is to turn the towns from “low-rated“, “de-
pressed“ and “backward“ areas into “active centers 
of economic growth“ with a diversified economy, 
including technology-intensive industries and ser-
vices (Kryukova et al. 2015:261; Vetrova et al. 
2014:930). This ought to be done in line with the 
trend of increasing the proportion and the role of 
the tertiary sector in the global economy, the 
„economy of the future“ (Zakirov 2016:172). 
A preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of 
the Program for the Development of Monotowns 
after the first few years of its implementation and 
another evaluation towards the end of its comple-
tion showed limited success of the program. Even 
though examples have been reported where the 
3 This is an enumeration of the measures most frequently 
proposed in policy-oriented academic studies; there are 
variations on these measures, depending on a variety of fac-
tors, such as the development potential of the monotowns 
(high, medium or low), their degree of remoteness from 
economically strong urban centers and life cycle stage 
(Bozhko 2017; Maymurunova 2019; Junussova, Beimisheva 
2020). In Russia, controlled shrinking – the relocation of 
program led to significant improvement (e.g. Step-
nogorsk, where unemployment declined, industrial 
production and the number of small and medium-
sized enterprises increased, and a stable popula-
tion maintained (UNDP 2019)), „the positive as-
pects of certain monotowns have not been able to 
reverse the general negative situation, nor has it 
ensured that there will be a steady positive dynam-
ics in their development“ (Bozhko 2017:9–10). Ju-
nussova and Beimisheva (2020:238–239) come to 
similar conclusions, postulating that the current 
monotown policy in Kazakhstan is not effective for 
economic or social development because govern-
ment interventions in the form of top-down distri-
bution of subsidies to uncompetitive and unprofit-
able industries create even greater dependency of 
the monotown populations and economics on their 
local large enterprises. 
Despite the limited success in turning “depressed” 
monotowns into “engines of economic growth”, the 
overall development framework has remained 
largely unchallenged so far. The Kazakhstani state 
sticks with its ambitious transformation agenda for 
2050 that aims to link diversified economic growth 
and modernization with urbanization moving to-
wards Industry 4.0. The goal remains to ensure 
economic development based on the principles of 
profitability, return on investment and competi-
tiveness, digitalization and to increase the coun-
try’s urbanization rate from 56 to 70 per cent by 
using a few selected large cities as drivers of the na-
tional economy, based on the hope that these cities 
would „pull others along“ (Junussova, Beimisheva 
2020; UNDP 2019). Negative aspects of previous 
experiences with this model of urbanization are 
largely ignored, for instance, indications suggest-
ing that it might lead to new geographies of central-
ity and marginality both between cities and within 
themselves (Crowley 2020; Sassen 2000). It is very 
likely that monotowns will have a hard time in this 
urbanization model, even though they should ide-
ally benefit from cities of regional and national sig-
nificance in their proximity, as is stated in some of 
the studies quoted above. 
whole populations from economically depressed and 
shrinking towns to more promising ones – has been a com-
mon policy (Crowley 2020). This has not been seriously 
considered by the Kazakhstani government; one reason for 
which might be that there are few monotowns in Kazakh-
stan that are still shrinking and those which are, are shrink-
ing relatively slowly (UNDP 2019). 
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My aim in this section has not been to judge 
whether the measures proposed by the Kazakh-
stani government, scholars and policy advisers are 
suitable or not for supporting monotowns’ socioec-
onomic development, but, much more modestly, I 
wished to highlight that the measures proposed to 
solve the “monotown problem” are part of a 
broader narrative framing of monotowns with a 
strong teleological component. According to this 
framework, postindustrial cities in the West, and 
urbanization patterns more generally, are re-
garded as desirable endpoints of monotowns’ fu-
ture trajectories. In the next section, I would like to 
give further nuances to this outlook by contrasting 
it with the experiences of ordinary residents of the 
monotown Tekeli and with accounts by scholars 
who have been exploring the limitations of the 
“economic plus urban growth” paradigm in finding 
a viable future for monotowns. 
Alternative views on monotowns’ trajecto-
ries 
Posters bearing the lettering “Promyshlennaya 
Revolyutsiya 4.0” (Russian: “Industrial Revolution 
4.0”), “Ry’hani’ Jan’g’yry’” (Kazakh: “Modernization 
of Consciousness”) and “Kazakhstan 2050 Strat-
egy” were hung up all around Tekeli during my 
fieldwork in the small monotown from 2017 to 
2019. When I asked local residents about their 
opinion of the slogans on the posters and the state-
led projects and aspirations they advertise, it 
turned out that none of them had a clear idea about 
what the Fourth Industrialization Revolution, Mod-
ernization of Consciousness or the Kazakhstan 
2050 strategy were all about. They explained to me 
that such posters were so ubiquitous and their con-
tent changed so often that they hardly paid any at-
tention to them, or even completely stopped notic-
ing them. Those interlocutors who did take a stance 
on the posters did so in a rather unenthusiastic 
manner: Regarding “Ry’hani’ Jan’g’yry’”, one inter-
locutor told me that some projects are being imple-
mented in this context but, in general, a lot of it is 
empty promises and idle talk. Another interlocutor 
referred to the “Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy” as a 
strategy of the government to make Kazakhstan 
“big”. When pronouncing the word “big”, he made a 
gesture with both hands and noises showing a bal-
loon being inflated – and mischievously added that 
they already changed the final date of the country’s 
aspired rise from 2030 to 2050. In short, my re-
search revealed that the government-promoted 
narratives of modernization, Industrial Revolution 
and economic growth were weakly connected to 
the ordinary residents’ experience of ongoing de-
velopments in their hometown. 
However, this does not mean that my interlocutors 
from Tekeli and residents of similar monotowns 
are satisfied with the status quo of their 
hometowns and do not desire any improvement – 
quite to the opposite. I interpret statements like the 
one comparing the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy to 
the inflation of a balloon more as a fundamental 
questioning of the kind of development that the 
government strives to make palatable to its citi-
zens. Apart from questioning the desirability of 
turning Kazakhstan into one of the thirty most de-
veloped countries by 2050 and joining the global 
outlook of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, some 
interlocutors also questioned the very possibility 
of the endeavor. The reasons for their hesitation 
are manifold and include both the microlevel of or-
dinary residents’ ‘mentality’ and the macrolevel of 
the global political economy – and everything in be-
tween. In brief, in the view of many residents of 
Tekeli, Kazakhstan occupies a relatively marginal 
position in global political and economic power re-
lations and monotowns within Kazakhstan even 
more so, which, since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, have been undergoing processes of discon-
nection and marginalization within the country. 
This is reinforced by the fact that, in their opinion, 
local and higher-level politicians are not seriously 
committed to taking the country forward but ra-
ther to enriching themselves, and ordinary citizens 
lack the will and resources to be driving forces of 
the aspired “revolution”. 
However, in contrast to the proponents of narra-
tives depicting monotowns as epitomes of failed 
Soviet modernity, the overwhelming majority of 
my interlocutors evaluate the Soviet moderniza-
tion project overwhelmingly positively and do not 
see it as the fundamental cause of current socioec-
onomic problems of their town. Rather, it is the ces-
sation of the Soviet “social wage” (Morris 2016) – 
canteens, childcare, transport, leisure facilities, 
etc., which used to be largely provided by the town-
forming company – and current shortcomings of 
the government organs responsible – mismanage-
ment, incompetency, corruption, etc. – that are 
seen as the major sources of their current hardship. 
In addition to that, Tekeli’s typical monotown built 
environment, which in many architects and urban 
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planners’ view would be characterized as „face-
less”, „featureless” and „identical” (Permyakov, 
Krasnova 2018:2) due to the salience of standardi-
zation and prefab technologies, is assessed differ-
ently by most of its inhabitants: The town is gener-
ally perceived as both beautiful and functional – the 
urban forms meet the demands of the residents. So-
viet building quality is praised, and it is linked, for 
instance, to the facts that the Soviet-era hydro-
power plants are still functional, the thermal-
power plant has been working uninterruptedly for 
many decades and most multistory housing blocks 
are habitable. If there are complaints about the 
built urban environment, they do not concern the 
general urban forms of the monotown but the qual-
ity of current maintenance works and newly built 
edifices. 
When residents of Tekeli reflect on the quality of 
their present lives in a post-Soviet monotown, this 
often happens in a way aptly captured by Morris for 
the Russian context: „[…] [L]ocal people switch in 
an instant from a tale of woe to a grudging acknowl-
edgement of the town’s relative emergence from 
the turbulent 1990s; with some additional prod-
ding the same individuals will then switch their 
tone and tack once again” (2016:7). In my experi-
ence with residents of Tekeli, the town’s “relative 
emergence from the turbulent 1990s” is linked to 
small, incremental improvements in the town’s 
condition, more specifically, in ameliorating migra-
tion developments, improvements of the built and 
biotic urban environment, and the revitalization of 
the town’s economy. Since the early 2000s, the 
number of those who have moved to Tekeli has 
steadily been bigger than the number who moved 
away; in 2019, the town had more inhabitants than 
ever before in its history.4  Over the course of my 
fieldwork, new houses were in the process of con-
struction, the riverside promenade was beautified, 
a viewpoint platform was built and many court-
yards were equipped with new playgrounds. Fur-
thermore, the re-cultivation of the last remaining 
tailing pond started in the summer of 2020. Re-
garding the town’s economy, small businesses, 
such as food stands, small grocery stores or game 
rooms, have been mushrooming over the last few 
years, the former town-forming enterprise was re-
4 A large share of the population growth in Tekeli is owed to 
the settlement of Kazakh repatriates, so-called “qandas” 
(former “oralman”), in the town. It is likely that the pres-
ence of qandas did not only lead to an increase in the popu-
commissioned based on a new economic orienta-
tion and the tourism sector has been expanding sig-
nificantly (Fig.4 shows one of the businesses that 
recently opened). A slowly recovering economy 
was not only the subjective impression of my inter-
locutors but also supported by statistics published 
by the municipal government in the local newspa-
per Tekeli Tynysy, according to which the general 
level of economic activity increased in 2017, 2018 
and 2019 both at the city-forming enterprises, in 
small and medium-sized businesses, and in other 
enterprises. Additionally, the first ten months of 
the 2020 were „characterized by a positive dyna-
mism of the development of all branches of the 
economy” (Tekeli Tynysy 2020:4). 
Fig. 4: Final workings before the brand-new de-
partment store in Tekeli’s town center opens its 
doors. 
Source: Picture by the author. 
However, material incentives, such as the increase 
of the level of activity of the formal economy, are 
only one part of the story of why a significant share 
of Tekeli’s inhabitants stay in the town and, thus, 
contribute to a future of the town possibly beyond 
shrinkage and decline. In line with an increasing 
number of studies transcending the mainstream 
view of monotowns as places of economic and 
moral decline and hopelessness, my data from 
Tekeli strongly suggests that people are engaging 
in diverse practices to make their hometown com-
fortable and habitable against abstract measures of 
human potential, such as the availability of ameni-
ties or opportunities of social mobility.5  As noted 
by other authors as well (Bolotova, Stammler 2010; 
lation number but also contributed to Tekeli’s socioeco-
nomic development, as many qandas started their own 
businesses. 
5 See Morris (2016) for an overview of these studies. 
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Crowley 2020; Khlinovskaya Rockhill 2016), many 
elderly inhabitants have strong emotional attach-
ments to the urban environments which they built 
with their „own hands” (Bolotova, Stammler 
2010:208) and do not see migration as an option, 
even if it would very likely raise their standard of 
living. Inquiring into the actual lived experience of 
monotown residents further reveals that younger 
generations who did not participate in the towns’ 
construction can also develop strong feelings of at-
tachment and rootedness (Laruelle, Hohmann 
2017). 
In the case of Tekeli, it is particularly through “na-
ture practices” such as urban agriculture and for-
aging (for berries, mushroom, etc.), that many in-
habitants make their hometown pleasant to live in. 
I hypothesize that the widespread engagement in 
urban nature practices among Tekeli’s residents 
contributes importantly to the town’s recent recov-
ery and the urban community’s resilience more 
generally. On the one hand, it does so by providing 
a significant share of the urbanites’ sustenance and 
strengthening social ties through mutual help and 
food sharing. On the other hand, engaging with lo-
cal nature, particularly the soil, enhances people’s 
feelings of attachment to their hometown. The pos-
sibility of engaging in these practices on a daily ba-
sis makes many residents of Tekeli consider a small 
monotown in a far-flung place in the mountains a 
better place to live in than a big metropolis. 
Conclusion: What kind of second life for 
monotowns? 
Inhabitants of monotowns in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union are confronted with manifold 
social, economic and environmental challenges. I 
have highlighted in this paper that, in many in-
stances in the media and academic studies, these 
challenges are regarded as rooted in the Soviet past 
with its legacy of urban and industrial misdevelop-
ment. Mirroring the way in which the “monotown 
problem” is analyzed in these accounts, the reme-
6 An example of this is “diverse economies” by J.K. Gibson-
Graham and Kelly Dombroski (2020); also see Cima in this 
volume. Instead of focusing predominantly on formalized 
and monetized activities, such as wage labor, or market 
transactions and investment carried out by private enter-
prises, it would be worthwhile paying more attention to the 
uncountable other practices that people carry out in the 
pursuit of their livelihoods. In the case of Tekeli, sustenance 
farming, foraging and food sharing are prominent examples 
dies proposed to solve it aiming at overcoming So-
viet legacies, subscribing to specific types of 
(‘Western’) urbanization and economic develop-
ment models. I challenged the specific teleology im-
plicated by this development model by drawing at-
tention to alternative framings of monotowns’ tra-
jectories giving examples from my own ethno-
graphic fieldwork in Tekeli and from other authors 
engaging with the lived experience of monotown 
populations. Without the intention of providing an 
alternative recipe on how to solve the “monotown 
problem,” I would speak in favor of approaches to 
monotowns that focus on the plurality of (eco-
nomic) practices already established locally, rather 
than predominantly on the towns’ deficiencies.6 
What these towns’ second life will look like in fu-
ture is at stake: Becoming – most likely bad – repli-
cas of Western postindustrial cities or embarking 
on alternative paths, which have not yet been de-
termined but would ideally be based on the unique 
assets of monotowns. To name but a few, these as-
sets are their relatively small size7 and, thus, wide-
spread absence of common problems of metropo-
lises (e.g. traffic jams, smog, noise pollution, ano-
nymity, spatialized social inequality), residents’ 
strong attachment to place, and well-established 
and diverse economic practices transcending capi-
talist imperatives of economic and urban growth. 
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Towards a Central Asian public transport renaissance? 
Wladimir Sgibnev 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, economic decline, political upheaval and lack of funds led 
to a significant decrease in public transport provision in Central Asia. Entire systems were 
closed down, many more significantly curtailed. Marshrutka minibuses became the predomi-
nant feature of public transport in the region – with decline and informality as the dominant 
analytical lenses. However, recent developments cast doubt on this paradigm. Significant in-
vestments have been made into metro systems in Tashkent and Almaty, or to Dushanbe’s trol-
leybuses. Samarkand has seen the opening of a tramway system – a unique case in the entire 
former Soviet Union. How to make sense out of these seemingly counterintuitive developments? 
Based on media reports and rolling stock database analyses, the paper attempts to scrutinize 
current developments in the sphere of public transport in Central Asia, to challenge the post-
independence decline paradigm of public transport provision, and to embed it in transborder 
knowledge flow circuits. 
Introduction 
In mid-December 2020, a new three-kilometers-
long trolleybus line has been brought into service 
in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe. Remarkably, this 
has been the first line extension in the city since the 
late 1980s – in a network that has mainly seen de-
cline, closures, detours and empty promises ever 
since. In the course of thirty years after independ-
ence in 1991, six stations had been added to Tash-
kent’s metro system. Only the last year has seen the 
opening of 15 more. Furthermore, Samarkand 
stands out as the only city in the entire former So-
viet Union, where a new tramway system has been 
built from scratch, in 2017. How to make sense out 
of these developments? Does the expansion of local 
public transport signify an increased awareness to-
wards socially relevant and environmentally 
friendly mobilities? A redefinition of state means 
and capacities, after decades of disinvestment and 
neglect? Consultants-driven tokenist ventures to 
greenwash and smartify otherwise overbearing 
mass motorization? Or gilded gimmicks in the style 
of the monorail in Ashgabat’s “Olympic Village”? 
This paper is raising questions more than answer-
ing them, and should be seen as a first and rather 
descriptive step, to build upon for further inquiry. 
The ambition of this paper is, therefore, to draw at-
tention to phenomena that re-equilibrate our per-
ception of Central Asian urban public transport. In-
deed, it has been depicted both in media (Stanradar 
2019), scholarship (Grdzelishvili, Sathre 2011) and 
activism (Varlamov 2020) in terms of post-Soviet 
decline and deficiency: widespread line closures, 
decrepit vehicles, unreliable service, and a ubiqui-
tous incursion of dominantly privately provided 
minibus services, locally known as marshrutki – 
themselves more often than not depicted in unfa-
vorable and exoticizing terms. 
The paper is largely based on an analysis of the 
Transphoto rolling stock database (Transphoto 
2021), as of January 2021. This is an online bottom-
up non-profit community of mostly Russian-speak-
ing public transport enthusiasts. The website pro-
vides an unfathomable source of information on 
systems throughout the globe, yet with a particu-
larly detailed outlook on the former Soviet Union. 
Almost every single post-Soviet tram and trolley-
bus vehicle in service may be found there. The da-
tabase focuses on ‘electric’ public transport modes, 
and does not take buses, long-distance rail, etc. into 
consideration. This is reflected in the graphs and 
charts of this study. The Transphoto picture 
metadata provides information on series, manufac-
turers, provenience, transfers, state of repair and 
other details. Still, as every other crowdsourced re-
source, the information needs to be treated with 
the appropriate caution, e.g. with regard to data 
completeness or particular biases of the contrib-
uting population (Bittner et al. 2016). 
The surprising 1990s: Overcoming decline 
narratives 
Public transport provision in the five Central Asian 
republics is, as of now, as a tendency analyzed and 
assessed in the light of the Soviet past. With the ex-
ception of Tashkent’s tramway, dating back to the 
Russian Empire, all urban public transport systems 
in the region have been part and parcel of the So-
viet infrastructural society-engineering mega-pro-
ject. In the Soviet Union, urban transport systems 
were the responsibility of different ministries of 
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the member republics – buses mostly under the ju-
risdiction of the Ministry of Automotive Transport 
and electric urban transport systems under the 
Ministry of Communal Services. Their high hierar-
chical position indicates the importance of public 
transport for Soviet urban administration. A sys-
tem of cross-subsidies and annual debt write-offs 
enabled the financial survival of these systems 
(Akimov, Banister 2011). 
Considering infrastructures as cornerstones of mo-
dernity, is by no means specific to the Soviet and 
post-Soviet realm. Soviet-era developmentalism, 
the gigantic scope of infrastructural projects with 
the plethora of implications on nature, human lives 
and livelihoods had their respective counterparts 
in other world regions. However, these high mod-
ernist ambitions of mastering and subduing nature, 
and the creation of the new, Socialist Man through 
infrastructures were declared state policy, and 
spelled out and celebrated accordingly. The invest-
ments into urban public transport – from the capi-
tal cities up to the farthest peripheries of the Union 
– are therefore one little element of this infrastruc-
tural paradigm.
These past infrastructures literally build future be-
cause of their decade-long period of existence. The 
common infrastructural heritage justifies, for the 
purpose of the paper, the specific regional contain-
erization of Central Asia. Large technological sys-
tems are still reminiscent of Soviet-era connected-
ness – in terms of physical infrastructures such as 
the formerly common electric grid, pipelines, rail-
way gauges – materialities, as well as related mem-
ories, practices, institutions and normativities. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought forth 
widespread failures in transport, water, heating, 
electricity, or healthcare provision, and marked the 
disruption of infrastructures built in assumption of 
a political – and thus technological – unity. Along-
side old industrial regions, particularly the periph-
eries of the former Soviet Union experienced cut-
backs, not only because of economic downturns 
but also due to out-migration of experts, and re-
gional conflicts, with borders cutting through elab-
orate railway, pipeline or electricity grids. Yet, per-
haps most significantly, the shift from a centralized 
infrastructural regime to individualized, frag-
mented and ailing systems affected relations be-
tween citizens and the state. Unstable provision 
was coupled with steadily rising costs, which, in 
many cases was the most important single factor 
for a still prevailing nostalgia for the Soviet Union 
as a caretaker state. 
Economic decline and the political turmoil of the 
1990s, however, led to a substantial abatement of 
publicly run transport. Responsibility for providing 
public transport services was transferred from 
central ministries to the municipalities, without 
any appropriate transfer of funding (Gwilliam 
2001). The ageing rolling stock was decaying and 
no resources were available for the purchase of 
new vehicles or even spare parts, or the mainte-
nance of overhead lines. Running vehicles were 
taken out of service to cannibalize on the spare 
parts. Municipalities throughout Central Asia at-
tempted to privatize bus fleets and created legisla-
tive frameworks for line tendering in the course of 
the 1990s – with various degrees of success 
(Akimov, Banister 2011; Finn 2007; Gwilliam 
2001). In contrast to the bus systems, tram and 
trolleybus systems did not lend themselves to pri-
vatization due to high initial investment costs and 
they continued to place a severe financial burden 
on urban budgets (Muktarbek uulu 2008). There-
fore, the municipalities either had to keep up high 
levels of subsidies (up to 70 per cent of the running 
costs according to Akimov and Banister 2011; up to 
98 per cent according to Gwilliam 2000), or decide 
to close down the systems. In the case of Uzbeki-
stan, apart from failing public budgets, market pro-
tection interests played an important role in clos-
ing down trolleybus systems, as this provided a 
large market for the locally produced GM Uzbeki-
stan minibuses – ‘Damas’ – and Isuzu Uzbekistan 
midi-buses. These were the heydays of the massive 
replacement of the public ‘large-volume’ tram or 
bus lines with marshrutki (Rekhviashvili, Sgibnev 
2018). 
Out of the more than 30 electric public transport 
systems that were built in Central Asia in Soviet 
times, two thirds were closed down after the de-
mise of the Soviet Union (Tab. 1). Almost all fixed-
track systems in Uzbekistan were closed down, 
with the notable exception of the interurban trol-
leybus line between Khiva and Urganch. Most sys-
tems in Kazakhstan are not running any longer, and 
the remaining ones have experienced severe cut-
backs. Turkmenistan’s only trolleybus network in 
Ashgabat was cut down to one line out of eight in 
the early 2000s and closed entirely in January 2012 
– with the vague promise of a metro line to be built
in some distant future.
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Tab. 1: Opening and closing dates of Central Asian electric public transport systems, as of April 2021. 
Country City Opened in Closed in Mode 
Kazakhstan Aktobe 1982 2013 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Almaty 2011  Metro 
Uzbekistan Almalyk 1967 2009 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Almaty 1937 2015 Tramway 
Kazakhstan Almaty 1944  Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Andijon 1970 2002 Trolleybus 
Turkmenistan Ashgabat 1964 2012 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Atyrau 1996 1999 Trolleybus 
Kyrgyzstan Bishkek 1951  Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Bukhoro 1987 2005 Trolleybus 
Tajikistan Dushanbe 1955  Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Fargona 1971 2003 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Jizzakh 1990 2010 Trolleybus 
Tajikistan Khujand 1970 2012 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan N. Bukhtarma 1979 1981 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Namangan 1973 2010 Trolleybus 
Kyrgyzstan Naryn 1994  Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Nukus 1991 2007 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Nur-Sultan 1983 2008 Trolleybus 
Kyrgyzstan Osh 1977  Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Oskemen 1959  Tramway 
Kazakhstan Pavlodar 1965  Tramway 
Kazakhstan Petropavlovsk 1971 2014 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Qaraghandy 1950 1997 Tramway 
Kazakhstan Qaraghandy 1967 2010 Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Qostanay 1989 2005 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Samarkand 1947 1973 Tramway 
Uzbekistan Samarkand 2017  Tramway 
Uzbekistan Samarkand 1957 2005 Trolleybus 




In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the picture looks 
somewhat different: although these two countries 
were hit worst by the dissolution of the USSR, local 
trolleybus systems are almost all in place and have 
received substantial public funding over the last 
few years. The fleets in both capitals – Bishkek and 
Dushanbe – are being renewed, not to mention the 
small system in Naryn in the Tien-Shan mountains 
that opened in 1994 in the midst of economic tur-
moil after independence. A second line is being 
built for the trolleybus system in the southern Kyr-
gyz city of Osh. Only Khujand in northern Tajikistan 
has closed down its trolleybus network in 2012, af-
ter many years of agony, yet rumors of a potential 
re-opening surface every now and then (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1: Trolleybuses standing idle at the Khujand 
depot after a substation failure, shortly before 
the final decision to close down the system 
Source: Photo taken by Sgibnev 2010. 
Large-scale investments in Soviet times, a rapid de-
cline thereafter, massive rise of marshrutki, and 
then, some sporadic and unsustainable invest-
ments here and there – this is the classical story of 
public transport trajectories, along the lines of 
many other accounts of post-Soviet infrastructure 
provision. This account is not only present in schol-
arship, but has also been firmly internalized by 
many local actors, caught in a self-orientalized sus-
pense between the loss of a Soviet-era modernity 
project, and a prospectively unattainable bright 
sustainable mobility future. Yet it is worth delving 
into the details, in order to decipher some intri-
guing developments that run counter this narra-
tive. 
Looking at the total number of active electric public 
transport systems in the region, two trends are 
worth noting: First, also the Soviet era saw the 
shutdown of a tramway system – the one in Samar-
kand – which happened to be re-built 44 years later 
in time. Second, the peak for active trolleybus sys-
tems occurred, with a total of 24, in the year 2000, 
almost ten years after independence (Fig. 2). Coun-
terintuitively, line extensions and system openings 
took place well after the end of the Soviet Union. In 
Khujand, for instance, the interurban trolleybus 
line to Chkalovsk and Ghafurov opened in stages 
from 1995 to 1999, in spite of the ongoing Tajik 
civil war. Taking aside the much later openings of 
the Almaty metro and the Samarkand tramway, the 
‘wild’ and austere 1990s saw a linear continuation 
of Soviet-era trolleybus system openings in the re-
gion (Tab. 2). Surely, most of these systems were 
already on the drawing board well before inde-
pendence. Worth noting is the institutional and so-
cietal inertia that kept those projects running, and 
brought them, eventually, to fruition – in spite of a 
dire economic situation and a general lack of fund-
ing. Yet back then, the Soviet-era knowledge net-
works, supply chains, and institutional practices 
seemingly still worked well enough in order to 
make these projects feasible and affordable.  
Kazakhstan Taras 1979 2013 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Tashkent 1936 2016 Tramway 
Uzbekistan Tashkent 1947 2010 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Tashkent 1977 Metro 
Kazakhstan Temirtau 1959 Tramway 
Uzbekistan Urgench 1997 Trolleybus 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data. 
Note: Tashkent data reflects the broad-gauge tramway system (1936-2016). Prior to that, the city also had a horse tramway 
(1897-1912) and a narrow-gauge tramway system (1912-1968). 
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An even more revealing exercise consists in adding 
those systems to the picture that have demonstra-
bly been under construction, yet have been moth-
balled before opening (Tab. 3). The timeline  
spreads through the entire 1990s. The list includes 
second-order cities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. For the latter, it would have brought 
electric public transport to almost every province 
capital. Transphoto forum members speculated 
about the existence of a state-wide investment pro-
gram for mid-sized cities in Uzbekistan in the mid-
1990s, which might have been at the roots of this 
development. The suspicion is that symbolic capi-
tal equally played a role: as every capital city de-
serves a true metro, each regional capital surely de-
serves an own trolleybus network – or at least dis-
played the ambition to receive one. This might also 
have played out at the local level where trolleybus 
construction served as a local prestige project – as 
in Qorako’l with its 17,000 inhabitants and a doubt-
ful prerequisite for a trolleybus system installation, 
to say the least. 
Fueled by national or local ambitions, either way, 
the investment programs did not prove successful 
or sustainable. Most construction projects never 
saw completion. Out of the five which were actually 
brought into service, only two survived until the 
current day. Most probably, construction invest-
ments from the ‘center’ were not matched by local 
operating and maintenance funds. Unstable elec-
tricity provision, rising motorization rates, and 
waning political support brought these latecomer 
trolleybus systems to an untimely end. 
Nevertheless, the sheer presence of latecomer sys-
tems and construction sites in the 1990s shows 
that the demise of the Soviet Union did not put an  
Tab. 2: Public transport system openings after 1990 
Country City Opened in Closed in Mode 
Uzbekistan Jizzakh 1990 2010 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Nukus 1991 2007 Trolleybus 
Kyrgyzstan Naryn 1994  Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Atyrau 1996 1999 Trolleybus 
Uzbekistan Urgench 1997  Trolleybus 
Kazakhstan Almaty 2011  Metro 
Uzbekistan Samarkand 2017  Tramway 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data 
Tab. 3: Trolleybus systems under construction, which, however, never opened. 
Country City Mode Construction stage 
Uzbekistan Qarshi Trolleybus 1989-1990 
Kyrgyzstan Jalal-Abad Trolleybus 1990-1991 
Kyrgyzstan Balykchy Trolleybus 1992-1994 
Uzbekistan Qorako’l Trolleybus 1994-1997 
Uzbekistan Navoiy Trolleybus 1996-1998 
Uzbekistan Qarshi Trolleybus 1989-1990 
Kazakhstan Turkistan Trolleybus 1999-2000 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data 
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immediate end to Soviet-era transport planning 
trajectories. Interestingly, this kind of trajectory is  
not to be found in other parts of the former Soviet 
Union, neither in the conflict-ridden South Cauca-
sus, nor in the Russian Federation or the Baltics, 
where mass motorization was faster to unfold. The 
catch-up modernization project stuck more firmly 
at the formerly Soviet periphery than elsewhere, 
and with it, the infrastructural appeal of trolley-
buses. The successful cases of Urganch and Naryn 
are, in this regard, worth further scrutiny, as poten-
tial sites of a localized translation of Soviet-era 
public transport plans and ambitions to new socie-
tal, political and economic conditions, as testing 
grounds of some sort of regional, Central Asian, 
public transport knowledge paradigm which builds 
on legacy infrastructures and re-develops them in 
the light of novel conditions. 
White elephants amid decline: 2000-2015 
Roughly, the years from 2000 and 2015 may be 
seen as the darkest ones for electric transport in 
the region. For two decades, trolleybus systems 
were able to survive on virtually no investment, in-
stead relying on makeshift maintenance, the inge-
nuity of staff, and captive riders (Sgibnev 2019). 
Yet at some point, the 1980s rolling stock came to 
an end of its life cycle. Decreased rolling stock 
availability led to ever-increasing service intervals. 
Lacking maintenance led to continuous break-
downs, and therefore utterly unreliable service lev-
els. Voluntarily deferred maintenance coupled with 
rising motorization led to an increased number of 
road space conflicts and accidents. Trolleybus 
switches are illustrative in this regard: these may 
be located a couple of meters in front of an inter-
section. Dated or malfunctioning switches force 
trolleybuses to come almost to a halt in order to al-
low the traction poles to change from one wire to 
another. For drivers, trolleybuses braking at – from 
a driver’s perspective – unexpected locations, be-
came an accident-prone nuisance. Eventually, pub-
lic transport passengers turned to marshrutki, leav-
ing either the elderly – still entitled to free travel – 
or the poor waiting on the stops for trolleybuses 
that may never come (Vozyanov 2014). Thus, mu-
nicipal public transport got stuck in a vicious circle 
of disinvestment, loss of farebox revenue, dwin-
dling municipal backing, and dire public imagery 
(Fig. 3). 
Fig. 2: Number of active electric public transport systems in Central Asia 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data. 
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Fig. 3: Municipal bus, trolleybus and marshrutka 
minibus at the Sadbarg intersection in the Tajik 
capital Dushanbe. 
Source: Photo taken by Sgibnev 2010. 
With public transport planning – in line with many 
other planning decisions throughout the globe that 
are prone to elite projections on the added values 
of policies – municipalities grew reluctant to invest 
in ‘social’ services. Instead, they pushed for marsh-
rutki, accepting ‘social’ fares, often with no or lim-
ited effect, yet still coupled with disinvestments 
into municipal public transport offers. In Khujand, 
the trolleybus system allegedly closed down after 
the municipality refused to invest some 10,000 € in 
the repair of an electric substation. Other systems 
closed due to real estate projects vying for depot 
premises. Widening roads at the expense of track 
alignments in the populist assumption that this 
would help alleviate traffic jams, or removing 
tracks and wires from central squares and thor-
oughfares for representational purposes were fur-
ther sources of public transport’s decline in these 
years. All in all, the end of most electric transport 
systems in the region was neither planned nor 
spectacular, yet substantial and comprehensive. 
Nevertheless, some few cities did not exhibit this 
rapid decline. In the course of the 2000s, maintain-
ing a status quo can already be seen as a particular 
phenomenon. This concerned such systems as the 
Oskemen tramway and the Tashkent metro, since 
rail-based vehicles have longer life spans than 
(trolley)buses. In the case of Tashkent, huge pas-
senger flows, and national representativity ambi-
tions equally contributed to maintaining a state of 
good repair. Furthermore, large-scale investments 
were injected into trolleybus systems in Dushanbe 
and Bishkek. In Tajikistan the investments were 
terrific indeed, considering the country’s otherwise 
dire budget: roughly US$ 15 million were spent on 
trolleybuses from 2005 to 2010. State money was 
directly allocated to the town of Dushanbe for trol-
leybus purchases, reflecting in no way the financial 
capacities of the city-owned transit company Du-
shanbepassgortrans (Sgibnev 2014). 
In Dushanbe, 45 trolleybuses built in the 1970s-
1980s had survived the 1990s – sufficient to pro-
vide a basic service on a rudimentary network. In 
2001, four vehicles were purchased from the Rus-
sian TROLZA factory – the first investment in the 
electric transit system since independence. 2004-
2006, one hundred more were delivered to Du-
shanbe. A follow-up contract in December 2008 en-
sured another delivery of 60 trolleybuses in Febru-
ary 2009. In Bishkek, the administration proved its 
commitment to the trolleybus system as well, even 
if on a smaller scale: 35 TROLZA vehicles joined the 
rolling stock from 2001 onwards, and 21 units from 
the Minsk-based Belkommunmash plant in 2009 
(Sgibnev 2014). 
The older TROLZA engines were immediately 
scrapped after the 2005 delivery, although they 
were still in running state. Even the four vehicles 
delivered in 2001 were put out of service. Out of 
160 engines available, barely 90 were in daily ser-
vice, as of 2012. A total of 70 vehicles stood still – 
considerably more than necessary for an emer-
gency reserve. One reason for this was the lack of 
staff: drivers found good employment opportuni-
ties in Russia’s trolleybus systems and were there-
fore prone to labor migration. Furthermore, the 
large funding aimed at renewing the capital’s trol-
leybus fleet had no financial follow-up at all to pro-
vide for maintenance of the new vehicles – or the 
overhead wire system. As no financing for spare 
parts exists, drivers either had to shoulder these 
costs themselves, or brand-new trolleybuses were 
cannibalized for spare parts to keep the rest of the 
fleet running. At least 20 machines from the latest 
deliveries have already been scrapped for lack of 
maintenance and spare parts. The decision to re-
new the vehicle fleet seems therefore to be exces-
sive and unsustainable, driven to a large extent by 
the desire for symbolic activity. 
Although state authorities had, by then, cut back al-
most all Soviet-era welfare benefits and public ser-
vices, they were being upheld in the mobilities sec-
tor by means of a subsidized trolleybus system. 
With regard to the limited role of trolleybuses in 
fulfilling mobility needs, they are all the more im-
portant for the representative dimension of poli-
tics: in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, trolleybuses con-
vey more than their capacity to transport people. 
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Looking at the rampant power shortages of those 
days, functioning trolleybuses of the 2000s were 
running examples that the authorities are able to 
address this vital issue on a large-scale. Where so-
cial benefits are cut back to a minimum, for a pen-
sioner a free ride in a trolleybus maintains the illu-
sion of a functioning welfare system. Finally, in 
countries with limited resources, trolleybuses al-
low futuristic vehicles to run on streets, promising 
modernity for a relatively low price, whereas Al-
maty, Astana/Nur-Sultan and Tashkent engaged in 
metro investments for the same reason. 
Thinking big: recent public transport in-
vestments 
In recent years, the region’s public transport is ex-
hibiting a number of interesting trends. What we 
can state for sure, is that, at least for the respective 
capital cities, public transport is once again on the 
agenda, attracting national funding and municipal 
attention. The Almaty and Nur-Sultan metros have 
received some recent attention – the latter before 
all with regard to respective scandals, cost over-
runs, re-planning, shelving and resurfacing, change 
of contractors and political pressure coupled with 
repeated fundamental criticisms and mode 
changes. The project clearly had a turbulent his-
tory, and a yet uncertain future: from monorail to 
heavy metro, to BRT, to light rail, back to BRT, and 
light rail once again, until the bankruptcy of the 
Chinese light rail contractor put the project on hold 
by 2019. However, also other major cities of the re-
gion feature massive and surprising public 
transport investment programs. 
Looking at construction and procurement rhythms 
of the Tashkent metro is enlightening in this regard 
(Fig. 4). The Soviet era saw both a steady inflow of 
metro wagons, as well as a regularly paced con-
struction program, expanding the network station 
by station. The very early 1990s still profited from 
previous preliminary work and delivery contracts 
– and from there on the metro system basically 
lived on a status quo. It took until 2001 that the 
Yunusobod line – in construction from 1988 – 
opened for revenue service. This opening was cou-
pled with a purchase of 20 metro sets from the Rus-
sian Metrovagonmash factory – the same manufac-





Fig. 4: Tashkent metro rolling stock purchase 
and station openings 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data. 
This current expansion is part of a wider invest-
ment program: more stations are under construc-
tion, and even more on the drawing board, part of 
a wide modernization agenda – arguably coupled 
with the ascension of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to presi-
dency in 2016. Indeed, the tremendous price tag of 
metro construction presupposes a strong engage-
ment of the central state, and thus its heavy influ-
ence on transport policies in the capital. The struc-
tural precondition for these investments were set 
up in late 2016, when Tashkent metro assets have 
been transferred from the municipal operator 
“Toshshahartranshizmat” to the state-owned Uz-
bek Railways (Gazeta.uz 2016a). This structure 
also allows to tap into the technical and project 
management capacities of the railway company, 
which has proven effective in introducing high-
speed rail services between Tashkent and Samar-
kand, and has equally eagerly expanded the net-
work throughout the country. 
Fascinatingly, the Uzbek Railways have also been at 
the core of re-establishing the aforementioned 
tramway system in Samarkand – a prime example 
how a voluntarist and unsubstantiated decision in 
one place turned into a pragmatic and seemingly 
beneficial process in another location. The tram-
way system in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent saw a 
series of line closures in the course of the 2000s, 
authorities citing low passenger flows, insufficient 
track quality, and the need to widen road surfaces 
to accommodate rising automobile flows 
(Gazeta.uz 2016b). Tashkent’s last tram line was 
shut down by May 2016. However, only four years 
prior to the closure, Tashkent received twenty new 
low-floor Vario.LF tramway vehicles ordered from 
the Czech Pragoimex factory. All while receiving 
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state funds for overpriced vehicle procurement (al-
most a million US$ per vehicle!1), the municipal 
company was unable to pay its electricity bills, 
which contributed to line closure decisions in 
2015/2016. This is revealing of the haphazard and 
unsustainable funding flows and policy directions. 
After the final closure of the tramway system, the 
municipality attempted to sell the remaining vehi-
cles for more than the procurement price, unsur-
prisingly with little success. 
In the meantime, Islom Karimov, the long-standing 
president of Uzbekistan died in September 2016, 
while Shavkat Mirziyoyev rose to power and devel-
oped a surprising vigor with regard to public 
transport projects. Two weeks after being ap-
pointed acting president, he announced the re-
launch of Tashkent metro expansion plans. On 1 
October, combined bus+metro tickets became 
available for the first time in history. On 5 October, 
Mirziyoyev announced the construction of a tram-
way system in Samarkand. This was enabled by a 
transfer of Tashkent’s second-hand vehicles, as 
well as all wirings, substations and equipment that 
could be salvaged from the capital. On 28 October, 
the aforementioned transfer of metro assets to the 
state railway company came into force. 
The opening of the tramway system was an-
nounced for the 2017 Navruz celebrations, in late 
March – alongside with Independence Day, the 
fixed date for festive openings of all sorts. With lim-
ited tram construction knowledge capacities 
within the country, again, the State Railways were 
charged with laying the tracks. These were built to 
heavy rail curvature and load parameters, on 
crushed stone ballast, running side-discharging 
mineral wagons on tramway tracks through the 
city to deliver construction materials. In spite of the 
frenzied construction activity, the Navruz opening 
date was missed by one month. This was met with 
disdain by the trainspotters’ community, which 
also eagerly commented on the line’s ‘un-urban’ 
construction parameters, and seemingly low-cost 
and low-quality construction. Yet this does not di-
minish Samarkand’s exclusive role of the one and 
only tramway system in the entire former Soviet 
Union, which opened after its demise. Construction 
activities went on, with a second line opening in 
due time for Navruz 2018, and two more lines in 
planning stage. 
                                                                
1 As discussed in the Transphoto forum; see here: 
https://transphoto.org/photo/912501/  
One further empirical example for the recent public 
transport investment boom is the trolleybus net-
work in the Tajik capital Dushanbe. Following the 
aforementioned disproportionate rolling stock 
procurements of the early 2000s, another wave 
was launched recently, shortly following the arrival 
of Rustam Emomali – the current president’s eldest 
son – in the capital’s mayoral office in 2017. In late 
2018, an order for one hundred trolleybus vehicles 
was placed with the Minsk-based Belkommunmash 
plant. The last batch arrived – again in time for the 
upcoming Navruz celebrations – in early April 
2021. Shortly before, a three-kilometers-extension 
to a housing district on the Western edge of the 
capital marked the first significant line opening 
since the Soviet days. Furthermore, the Turkish bus 
producer Akia teamed up with a Tajik investor for 
opening a vehicle plant in Dushanbe. Apart from 
‘big’ urban buses, a trolleybus production line has 
equally been put in place, with first deliveries ex-
pected in the course of 2021. 
Contrary to previous procurement waves, attempts 
were made to attract and qualify drivers (Asia-Plus 
2016, 2019), as well as to couple rolling stock de-
liveries with maintenance and the retrofitting of 
electric substations. All measures received funding 
from the European Bank of Reconstruction and De-
velopment, and were planned and implemented 
with active involvement of (mostly Baltic) consul-
tancy companies. Yet, once again, the scope and 
ambition of the modernization drive seems to 
prove unsustainable. A large part of the fleet does 
not leave the depot: as of January 2021, out of the 
176 active vehicles, 57 were not in revenue service 
– far more than usual precautionary vehicle plan-
ning would presume. Dushanbe’s entire TROLZA 
fleet (built in 2009/2017) has been relegated to the 
backyard, in spite of its still working state. 
Today, the Dushanbe trolleybus system has the 
lowest average vehicle age throughout Central Asia 
(Fig. 5). When looking at the active rolling stock, an 
average age of 2.8 years is exceptional even by 
global standards. While it is a good sign for a sys-
tem to receive investments in the first place, this 
low average age may hide low survival rates of ve-
hicles due to insufficient maintenance, excessive 
procurement volumes due to an unaccountable 
availability of international donor funding, and un-





Fig. 5: Average age of rolling stock of Central 
Asian electric public transport systems 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Transphoto data. 
This rolling stock age distribution also shows a po-
larization between two types of systems: on the 
one hand, those that still live off Soviet-era heritage 
– Naryn trolleybus, Pavlodar, Temirtau and Oske-
men trams – and are therefore significantly threat-
ened by further decline. On the other hand – the 
trolleybus systems in Dushanbe, Bishkek and Al-
maty that have profited from repeated injections of 
new rolling stock, but remain heavily dependent on 
central government interventions and interna-
tional donor funding. 
The ‘production’ of public transport be-
tween pasts and futures 
In this paper, I have shown that public transport in 
Central Asia does not necessarily adhere to the 
widespread decline and deficiency narratives that 
cling to the region’s infrastructure provision. The 
surprising continuity of Soviet-era public transport 
priorities throughout the 1990s, the glimpses of 
(unsustainable) investment in the early 2000s, the 
massive capital-focused investment programs of 
the late 2010 and early 2020s are all together tell-
ing of the changing and conflictual mobility narra-
tives and normativities as well as of national and 
local state capacities and ambitions. The sharp GDP 
decline of the 1990s is not necessarily connected to 
a dismissal of public transport, while the economic 
recovery of the 2000s did by no means entail its re-
covery. The availability of supply chains and 
knowledge networks plays a role, yet changing ide-
ologies, political agendas and mobility paradigms 
and mobility cultures (Hoor 2020) equally play a 
role. Metros, trams and trolleybuses appear here, 
once more, as more than simply a means to move 
around town. The symbolic value of preserving and 
expanding these costly systems has played a role in 
political decisions surrounding them – as also wit-
nessed by a conspicuous simultaneity of leadership 
changes and public transport investments in Uz-
bekistan and Tajikistan alike. 
Public transport investments reflect the Soviet leg-
acy of exercising state authority via unsustainable 
‘great projects’: although the political systems have 
nominally changed since independence and di-
verge across five Central Asian countries, the 
means to exercise power often seem to have not. 
Also out of these motivations, authorities are will-
ing to shoulder excessive investments – yet with-
out proper rolling stock maintenance and upkeep 
of overhead lines, these investments still risk re-
maining ‘white elephants’. These tendencies are 
connected to post-Soviet inferiority discourses that 
meet effectively failing infrastructure provision, a 
concurrent neglect of Soviet-era infrastructures 
and experiences, and a still prevailing nostalgia for 
Soviet-era mobility provision in terms of pricing, 
modes and design. The memory of a lost Soviet-era 
public transport modernity is being contrasted 
with the all-marshrutki 1990s. These, in turn, are 
being demonized from two sides: consultants and 
development agencies, with own green and sus-
tainable public transport agendas on the drawing 
board; and political leaders vying for shiny infra-
structures marking their ambitions to be part of a 
global modernity project – one, which is not on the 
agenda for most citizens, all the more in peripheral 
regions. A ‘domestic’ public transport knowledge 
production, one which is neither driven by self-ori-
entalization and deficiency discourses, nor by 
greenwashed smart city agendas, remains out of 
reach, exacerbated by the tremendous role of inter-
national development banks and related consul-
tancies. 
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Returnees, blood relatives or backwards? Foreign politics, stigma and 
coloniality in the debate on how to call ethnic Kazakh immigrants to 
Kazakhstan 
Zarina Mukanova, Rune Steenberg 
The focus of this paper is the 2020 government rebranding of the formal category of Kazakh 
ethnic returnees from “oralman” (returnees) to “kandas” (blood relatives). Over the thirty years 
of Kazakhstani independence, the term oralman – meant to be only a temporary legal designa-
tion prior to the obtainment of Kazakhstani citizenship – has become a stigmatizing social cat-
egory. It was this stigma that the government sought to remove by changing the designation to 
something with a more positive connotation. This paper traces local Kazakh discourses on the 
topic on social media, in established media and in quotidian discourse. It discusses a number of 
arguments for and against the change and concludes that the positions in the debate highly 
depend on the speakers’ identity and place in society and is mired in continuing and little re-
flected colonial narratives and value hierarchies tied to notions of modernity vs. backwardness 
and Russian vs. Kazakh. 
Introduction 
On 17 September 2019, Kazakhstan’s president 
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev tweeted out his intention 
to change the official term for ethnic Kazakhs mov-
ing to Kazakhstan from abroad. Instead of oralman 
(returnee) they should in future be known as kan-
das (blood relative) (Umirbekov 2019). The idea 
was welcomed by many. Since its introduction as a 
legal category in the early 1990s, the term oralman 
has taken on a pejorative meaning in social dis-
course and carries a degree of stigma. Originally, it 
was created as a way to support immigrants to Ka-
zakhstan who could prove their Kazakh ethnicity 
through lineage or family history within the legal 
system. They were assigned the term of “returnee” 
to mark them as returning “lost sons and daugh-
ters,” who through this legal category were guaran-
teed certain privileges and preferential treatment 
within the Kazakhstani system. When a given oral-
man received citizenship some years later, the cat-
egory no longer officially applied as they were now 
given the same legal status as other Kazakhstani 
citizens. Yet, in the course of the 1990s, integration 
difficulties, local envy and cultural conflict gave the 
term a negative connotation and created a social 
category that did not disappear when the legal cat-
egorization was lifted. It marked the differentiation 
between immigrant and non-immigrant Kazakhs 
detached from its original legal meaning. 
This negative connotation and the conflict it sym-
bolized were now to be removed through the coin-
ing of a new term: kandas. The term connotes kin-
ship and historical belonging – major integrating 
factors in Kazakh society where both kinship and 
ethnicity are imagined through strong 
patrilineages (Esenova 1998; Schatz 2000). While 
many agreed with the need for a new term, not all 
welcomed the one suggested by the president. In 
the Kazakhstani under-house of the parliament, the 
Mejlis, deputies Nurlan Dulatbekov and Kualish 
Sultanov, suggested the term bauyrlas (brother) 
which entails the metaphor “liver” instead of 
“blood” and connotes a similar kinship relation. It 
is often used to denote direct siblings or close line-
age kin and to some connote a closer relation than 
kandas. Yet, according to Kazakh ethnographer 
Zhambyl Artykbayev, bauyrlas is being used for Uz-
beks and thus does not qualify for Kazakhs. Similar 
to the term kandas, it can be used to connote all eth-
nic Kazakhs but also in some uses all other Turkic 
peoples depending on the context. Both terms by 
creating a distinct category imply that those re-
ferred to by them constitute a distinct group. They 
may be closely related to Kazakhs born and raised 
in Kazakhstan, but they are not the same, not part 
of an “us.” As Marilyn Strathern (1985) has argued 
in relation to the concept of “constitution” when 
used in anthropological writing, the definition of a 
relationship between two categories also estab-
lishes them as distinct no matter how close this re-
lation is described. Both bauyrlas and kandas thus 
still preserve the distinctiveness of ethnic Kazakh 
immigrants to Kazakhstan from the native Kazakh 
population. Why then, many oralman ask, make 
this distinction at all in the first place. 
A temporary or permanent distinction 
The idea behind the original term of oralman was 
not to create a social category nor for it to become 
permanent. The term was intended only as a tem-
porary distinction, denoting only a special legal 
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status in the Kazakhstani bureaucracy: immigrants 
on a fast-track to citizenship because of their Ka-
zakh ethnicity. This status would be lifted as soon 
as they became citizens, and it is actually lifted in a 
legal sense. One of the problems with the term oral-
man is exactly that it did not disappear with the le-
gal status but lingered on in quotidian use. A bu-
reaucratic concept was transformed and taken 
over into a popular social one and while the bu-
reaucratic status as oralman could be easily re-
moved, the social concept of oralman could not. 
Over the years, it even developed into a social 
stigma. In a Facebook post from 19 September 
2019, Kazakh journalist Saken Sybanbay argues 
that introducing the term kandas in place of oral-
man would solidify this stigma. According to him, 
this terminological shift would create a social cate-
gory distinct from ’native Kazakhs’ even more dif-
ficult to shed as the inclusive logic of the term kan-
das almost per design makes it permanent. As he 
put it: They would not stop being blood relatives 
when they become citizens. The same would apply 
to the alternative term bauyrlas. Instead he encour-
aged substituting with an unambivalently tempo-
rary category. If people no longer liked the term 
oralman, he argued, then why not return to the 
original descriptive legal category that Kazakh law 
shares with many others: the “repatriate” 
necessary to Sybanbay of someone “returning to 
the ancestral homelands,” which the two other sug-
gestions also fail to do. According to his line of rea-
soning, the category of “repatriate” automatically 
stops being relevant when the person in question 
receives citizenship. Similarly, two Kazakh Philolo-
gists, Batyrbolat Kabosh and Anar Fazylzhan both 
expressed support for keeping the designation 
oralman which they saw as linguistically correct 
and “a good word”. Unlike the other words such as 
kandas and bauyrlas but also tuystas (relative by 
blood), agayin (brothers of the same patrilineage), 
and otandas (compatriot, of the same motherland) 
all of which had been suggested as alternative 
terms, oralman defines a category that is distinct 
from the rest of the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. Seman-
tically, the other terms all include many more peo-
ple than the legal category is meant to designate 
and this would be confusing and imprecise, they ar-
gued (Akhmetuli 2019). 
                                                                
1 First administered as a distinct part from the rest of Cen-
tral Asia during Czarist times, the area became known as the 
Kyrgyz (Kazakh) Autonomous Soviet Republic in 1920 and 
was renamed the Kazakh Soviet Republic in 1925. In 
Within a year, the debate was decided by the poli-
ticians that had started it. Kazakhstan’s president, 
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had already spoken of the 
issue during his election campaign in 2019, when 
after taking over office from resigning Nursultan 
Nazarbaev, he was aiming to become legitimately 
confirmed by the people’s vote. He began the offi-
cial parliamentary hearings on the topic in March 
2020 and by 7 September 2020, the matter was 
signed into law. The law went into effect on 1 Janu-
ary 2021. The counterarguments and warnings of 
journalists and philologers were to no avail in the 
legal debate, but they still give important clues as 
to the larger social issues and the structural vio-
lence at work within the social debates surround-
ing the topic. The contributors’ positionality, their 
social identity and place in Kazakh society is clearly 
reflected in the views they take on the issue of how 
to call the ethnic Kazakh immigrants. The debates 
therefore provide insights into the sociology, 
power-relations and colonial legacy of contempo-
rary Kazakhstan. In order to appreciate the posi-
tionality of the contributors to the debate, it is 
needed to briefly recapture the history of the oral-
man. 
Historical background 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Kazakh-
stan, along with the other Central Asian republics, 
was left with a number of structural problems. One 
was the massive emigration of ethnic Russians 
from its territory to Russia, which constituted both 
a brain drain and a loss of labor power. A large 
number of Russians had arrived with the coloniza-
tion of Central Asia in the nineteenth century and 
during the Soviet Union, but many chose to leave 
the country when it became independent and the 
power relations and opportunities shifted 
(Kosmarskaya 2014; Oka 2007:6). During the So-
viet period a number of Kazakhs had left the then 
Autonomous Soviet Republic1 for Mongolia, Uzbek-
istan and Xinjiang, fleeing forced collectivization, 
famine and Stalinist purges on the Kazakh steppes 
in the 1920s and 1930s (Cameron 2018; Kindler 
2018; Pianciola 2004; Svanberg 1999; Zardykhan 
2004:64). It is estimated that possibly significantly 
more than 200,000 Kazakhs left the Soviet Union 
for China, Mongolia, India and Afghanistan, while 
February 1936, it was renamed to Kazakh Autonomous So-
viet Republic as a part of RSFSR and in December of the 
same year became Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic gaining 
the status of a full union republic. 
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these countries and Turkey also had substantial 
populations of Kazakhs (Ablazhey 2014:8; Benson, 
Svanberg 1988, 1998; Finke 2018; Mukanova 
2014:41; Syroyezhkin 1994:8). Some of those who 
had fled to Xinjiang, returned in 1958-1962 during 
Mao’s catastrophic Great Leap Forward just before 
souring relations between the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China closed the border be-
tween Xinjiang and the Central Asian Soviet Repub-
lics (Ablazhey 2014:73–129, 2016). The border 
was to remain closed well into the 1980s with rel-
atives being divided for more than 20 years. In ad-
dition to these migratory movements, the borders 
established between the Qing Dynasty and the Rus-
sian Empire in the nineteenth century did not 
neatly align with the living spaces of local popula-
tions. The concept of ethnicity was not popularized 
before the 1920s and Kazakhs were mainly no-
madic herders organized into local lineages more 
or less loosely related in tribal congregations who 
migrated seasonally between summer and winter 
pastures (Bacon 1958; Benson, Svanberg 1998; 
Khazanov 1994; Sneath 2009). Some of them had 
been living outside the areas that were to become 
Kazakhstan for centuries. Yet, during the Soviet 
rule, ethnicity had been introduced as both a state 
bureaucratic category and a social concept arriving 
to the area within the ideologies of historical mate-
rialism and nationalism and with the establishment 
of a modern state bureaucracy. It was the bureau-
cratic utilization of ethnic categories such as Ka-
zakh, Kyrgyz, Uyghur and Uzbek that established 
and popularized them as identity markers. In the 
course of the decades of Soviet rule, they took hold 
in people’s imaginaries and became a natural part 
of their self-conceptions. By the time, Kazakhstan 
became an independent republic in 1991, national-
ist rhetoric was an integral and very popular part 
of the state’s nation building efforts. Therefore, as 
Russian emigration left a void that saw the coun-
try’s population decline, it seemed natural to at-
tempt to fill it by bringing in ethnic Kazakhs from 
the surrounding countries, where up to five million 
were estimated to reside (Cetin 2018:9; Diener 
2005; Finke 2018). Finke (2013:176) and 
Zardykhan (2004, 2016) have argued that this can 
also have been part of a conscious strategy on the 
side of the government to secure northern Kazakh-
stan against Russian nationalist claims. 
                                                                
2 https://egov.kz/cms/ru/articles/kandas_rk 
The history of oralman 
From the outset of Kazakhstan’s history, in 1991, 
first president Nursultan Nazarbaev invited Ka-
zakhs living in other countries to Kazakhstan, re-
gardless of how long they had lived there, if they 
were diaspora (whose parents, grandparents or 
older ancestors had left the lands now part of Ka-
zakhstan) or if they were irridents (living in their 
historical homelands that had become part of other 
states). They were promised a fast track to citizen-
ship, land, free secondary education for their chil-
dren and in some cases economic support 
(Bonnenfant 2012; Kalysh, Kassymova 2015:20). 
From 1993 on, the state fixed quotas of how many 
families a year would be accepted for repatriation 
and agreements were made with the neighboring 
countries from which they were going to move to 
Kazakhstan. Thousands, sometimes ten-thousands 
arrived each year and little by little they received 
citizenship (Alff 2012; Barcus, Werner 2010:210; 
Diener 2009). In the past thirty years, more than 
one million people have been repatriated as oral-
man and many more have arrived. According to 
Sadovskaya (2015) some repatriates from China 
preferred to keep their Chinese passports in order 
to more easily conduct trade across the border. Re-
gardless of their places of origin and their family 
history, Kazakh immigrants from abroad were 
called oralman (returnees). This was constructed 
as a legal category meant to be temporary, used 
only until citizenship had been achieved; a process 
expected to last 2-3 years at most.2 After this, le-
gally speaking, they would no longer count as oral-
man but simply be Kazakhs (ethnically) and Ka-
zakhstani (in terms of citizenship). In quotidian 
discourse, though, the term stuck. It no longer had 
any legal significance, but it acquired a social one. 
According to informants from within oralman com-
munities, in the initial years, the term did not hold 
any bad connotation. Yet, as conflicts began to ap-
pear between local Kazakhs and oralman, the value 
of the term changed. The conflicts partly hinged on 
local dissatisfaction with the state benefits given to 
the repatriates combined with these finding condi-
tions to be much more difficult and less welcoming 
than they had expected. The first batches of oral-
man in the 1990s had been dominated by Kazakhs 
from Mongolia who came as migrant laborers to 
work in the still functioning kolkhoz (state run col-
lective farms) up until 1994 (Baltabayeva et al. 
2015:250). Like those arriving from Uzbekistan 
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and other post-Soviet states in the late 1990s 
(Baltabayeva et al. 2015:285) and early 2000s who 
had also grown up in the Soviet system and ideol-
ogy, they were fairly well accustomed to Soviet-
style management and bureaucracy. This was less 
the case for the Kazakhs moving across the Chinese 
border from Xinjiang in the early 2000s 
(Sadovskaya 2015). They arrived in larger num-
bers, and the differences in culture and expectation 
seemed more pronounced than those of their pre-
decessors from Mongolia and Uzbekistan 
(Baltabayeva et al. 2015:297). The Xinjiang Ka-
zakhs often saw themselves as moving for patriotic 
reasons and in order to be part of a country that 
they saw as their own in an ethnic sense, instead of 
being second rank citizens in China (Baltabayeva et 
al. 2015:298; Kalysh, Kassymova 2015). Local Ka-
zakhs viewed them with suspicion, as economic mi-
grants and competitors for scarce state resources 
(Sancak 2007:90). 
Through this immigration program, the Kazakh-
stani state hoped to recruit new labor power, re-
ceive populations to fill the void left by Russian em-
igration, claim the land in the north of the country 
and to make the population more Kazakh 
(Baltabayeva et al. 2015:232). During Soviet times, 
the percentage of Kazakhs within the population of 
the Kazakh Soviet Republic had dropped from al-
most 60 to less than 40 per cent and was now in the 
process of recovering (Kozina 2007:76). Also, the 
Russification of Kazakh culture and language dur-
ing the Soviet Union made many of the incoming 
oralman “more authentically Kazakh” in the eyes of 
elites employing a nationalist, folkloristic perspec-
tive to pursue an ethnically focused nation build-
ing. Yet, along with this ethnic authenticity came a 
similar connotation to that attributed to the Ka-
zakhs by the Russians in the Soviet Union: a notion 
of being less developed, more rural, less educated, 
less civilized and more backward. Also, the oral-
man did not follow the plans laid out by the govern-
ment and elites, but settled in large numbers in the 
south of the country around Almaty and along the 
borders to China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
                                                                
3 An article of the news portal Azattyk quotes an official note 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
to Russian citizens who are travelling to Kazakhstan. The 
note warns them against using offensive words like mam-
bet, myrk and kalbit. Professor of philology Guldarkhan 
A growing stigma 
During the 2000s, the term oralman began to take 
on pejorative connotations. Tilek Yrysbek, a Ka-
zakh poet, writer and translator, originally from 
Mongolküre in Xinjiang, moved to Kazakhstan in 
2005 when he was 11 years of age. He said that he 
was bullied in school for being an oralman. His 
classmates called him a traitor, because they had 
heard that oralman were the descendants of rich 
Kazakhs who had fled the homelands in the 1930s 
when life here became difficult. This is a modern 
nationalistic narrative that condemns “those who 
left when their people needed them the most,” but 
it also draws on Soviet demonization of the local 
elites (often called kulaks) fleeing collectivization 
and expropriation. Exactly why life became so dif-
ficult in the 1930s is rarely elaborated on in detail, 
as the Kazakh history of colonial abuse at the hand 
of the Russians threatens to damage crucial rela-
tions to Putin’s Russia. Another denigrating narra-
tive about the oralman met by Yrysbek and others 
holds that they are unhygienic and uncivilized, ru-
ral and badly educated. A major reason for them to 
be viewed as backward and uneducated is their 
lack of command of the Russian language. During 
Soviet times, Russian was construed as the lan-
guage of development, modernization and high cul-
ture superior to Kazakh and other Central Asian 
languages. This colonial imaginary found expres-
sion in the Russian term “mambet”, which was used 
about Kazakhs to brand them as rural, backward 
and ignorant (Lakhanuli 2017).3  These value hier-
archies and their institutional shapes in the educa-
tional system saw large parts of the Kazakh elites 
adopt the Russian language as their own above the 
Kazakh language. One of the big ethno-national 
projects of the nascent Republic of Kazakhstan in 
the 1990s was to reinvigorate the Kazakh language 
and Kazakh culture (Baltabayeva et al. 2015:234; 
Bonnenfant 2012). For this the oralman were actu-
ally seen as models and important contributors, ad-
mired to have retained the Kazakh culture and lan-
guage more thoroughly than those in Kazakhstan. 
Yet, at the same time, the colonial stigma of back-
wardness and lack of development brought about 
by the Russians throughout the century before also 
came to be attributed to the oralman. As they came 
to be seen as bearers of traditional Kazakhness, 
Smagulova, is then cited to explain the history and connota-
tions of these words, all of which are denigrating terms for 
being undeveloped or “backward”. She also points out that 
these words are hardly used in younger generations 
(Lakhanuli 2017). 
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they also inherited this colonial stigma. Editor-in-
chief of the magazine Exclusive, Rasul Zhumaly, in 
2011 said that the lack of Russian skills led to oral-
man being treated as second class citizens both by 
fellow citizens and the state (Akuli 2011). Many 
settlements of oralmans reportedly were not pro-
vided with running water, sanitation and crucial in-
frastructure. Tilek Yrysbek pointed out that just 
like the Russians had treated Kazakhs as second 
class citizens in the Soviet institutions, now the 
oralman were treated as second class citizens by 
the local Kazakhs4. In his words, the oralman have 
become the new mambet. Only this time the stigma 
was placed by the very people who had been vic-
tims of the same type of stereotypification few dec-
ades earlier. 
Conflicts mainly arose between local Kazakhs and 
the oralman who had arrived from Xinjiang and 
centered around Almaty province. In conversations 
led by one of the authors, local Kazakhs in Almaty 
province expressed that they only considered the 
arrivals from China oralman while those from Mon-
golia had been living among them for so long and 
were “just like us.” The Kazakh immigrants from 
China were also regularly called Chinese5. This was 
even reported by families who had arrived from 
Xinjiang as far back as in the 1960s6. They ex-
pressed their frustration at never fully being recog-
nized as Kazakhs by their neighbors. Many oralman 
feel that they are being permanently excluded from 
the community of Kazakhs, the joining of which 
was often their motivation to come in the first 
place. In spite of widespread narratives of the oral-
man having come as economic refugees and beg-
gars in order to take advantage of state resources, 
many of them insist that they were living materially 
good and wealthy lives in Xinjiang and chose to re-
settle out of patriotic and political reasons. Tilek 
Yrysbek does not think that he and other Kazakhs 
from Xinjiang have been given a fair chance to 
properly integrate into Kazakh society and he sees 
the term oralman as having become both a symbol 
of this and a tool in the continuous division upheld 
by the local Kazakhs. 
4 From personal conversations with Tilek Yrysbek in Al-
maty, Kazakhstan in March 2021. 
5 This data has been gained from numerous interviews with 
oralman from China during the fieldwork in 2016-2018 in 
Almaty province (ZM)" 
6 See the comment of the Tileukayl Suleimenuli 
https://web.facebook.com/ssyb-
anbay/posts/2294452257350003?_rdc=1&_rdr 
A debate published on the US-sponsored news plat-
form Azattyk in 2011 gives voice to some of these 
tensions around what it terms oralmanophobia. 
The discussion took place in the wake of verbal at-
tacks on the oralman community by officials and 
public figures7 accusing them of stirring protests 
and organizing oil worker strikes as well as calling 
them illiterate and further insulting them in public. 
In addition, the repatriation schemes for the oral-
man were not working efficiently. Oralman re-
ported facing constant bureaucratic hassles and 
discrimination and they were further disadvan-
taged by being included into the new law “On mi-
gration” along with other migrants and refugees 
and through administrative restructurings when 
the Ministry of Migration was closed and its powers 
transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Akuli 2011). One of the difficulties oralman re-
portedly faced in the bureaucracy in 2011, was that 
they did not speak Russian and the clerks pro-
cessing their papers and requests tellingly could 
not speak Kazakh. In Azattyk’s debate, the oralman 
were praised for retaining Kazakh cultural ele-
ments that had been lost during Soviet times, for 
their piety, for being united and standing up for 
their rights and for contributing to making Kazakhs 
once more the majority in the country. Their plight 
was lamented and mainly attributed to failures in 
migration policy and integration efforts by the 
state, and – by some readers in the comments sec-
tion – to the “Russian-speaking environments” and 
“the Russian language press.”8 
Changing the name 
The change of term from oralman to kandas in all 
officials went into effect on 1 January 2021. A web-
site providing information and support to repatri-
ates was renamed “qandastar.kz” and in many of its 
articles (but not all) the term oralman seems to 
have been changed to kandas.9  The change was 
seen by many as a chance of erasing the shame, 
stigma and negative narratives associated with the 
term oralman and giving the category of repatri-
ates a more positive connotation. Three Kazakh re-
patriates from China and Mongolia expressed their 
7 Figures such as Chairman of the Board of the Samruk-
Kazyna State Fund Timur Kulibayev, former chairman of the 
migration agency, Khabylsayat Abishev and Talgat Ma-
mashev, First Deputy Chairman of the World Community of 
Kazakhs 
8 see readers comment nr. 2 called Haknazar in Akuli 2011 
9 https://qandastar.kz/?cat=12 
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support for the new term on Azattyk (Lakhanuli 
2019), explaining that the old term, oralman, has 
not succeeded in shortening the distance between 
people, that it differs and divides and that its end-
ing -man carries connotations of being lower class. 
Meanwhile, in their view, the new term, kandas, ex-
presses closeness, unites the people and “warms 
the soul.” Expressing a similar attitude, local Ka-
zakh professor in pedagogy at Nazarbayev Univer-
sity, Gultas Kurmanbay, declared that she does not 
accept the term oralman, because the repatriates 
are her relatives (kandas, bauirlas, agayindilar) 
(Akhmetuli 2019). 
A few web users express frustration with all this ef-
fort being put into changing the name without ad-
dressing the actual, material and structural issues 
that lead to conflict and dissatisfaction. To them 
problems seem to have been rebranded rather than 
solved. This view is expressed off record or on so-
cial media rather than in the more official public 
media. Here we also find speculation that the re-
branding could be used to deny the now-kandas 
their right to land by deemphasizing their lineal 
connection to the national territory and categoriz-
ing them along with other foreigners prior to their 
acquirement of citizenship, which for some takes 
many years of arduous bureaucratic work. Tilek 
Yrysbek stressed that it had taken him five years 
and a letter to the president in order to avoid exor-
bitant bribes before his family was granted the cit-
izenship that had originally been promised to them 
within a year. Recently in April 2021, an unpopular 
moratorium on land use from 2016, allowing for-
eigners to buy and lease agricultural land in Ka-
zakhstan, was reversed with the explicit addition 
that kandas would be treated in the same category 
as other foreigners (KapitalKZ 2021). The new 
name may also be catering to the Chinese narrative 
of the Kazakhs in China being an integral and con-
stant part of the “Great Chinese Family of Peoples” 
( ) though blood-related (kandas) to the 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan rather than being seen as 
“returnees” (oralman) that left Kazakhstan for 
China on a temporary basis. Some even see a subtle 
potential claim to the Kazakh homelands in Xin-
jiang in this new term and its allowing for the fact 
that Kazakhs are not new to these areas but have 
been living there for centuries, or a refusal of po-
tential Chinese claims to all of Kazakhstan, as they 
may – according to some more worried voices – try 
                                                                
10 See testimonies and stories on the website shahit.biz.  
to argue that the Kazakhs were always a part of the 
Great Chinese Family of Nations and thus their ter-
ritory rightfully belongs under Chinese rule. This is 
an argument the Chinese have used in regard to the 
territory of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Xinjiang Uy-
ghur Autonomous Region). 
The current relations between Kazakhstan and 
China are economically close but also tense and 
ambivalent. This is in no small part due to the situ-
ation of the ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang during the 
last five years. Substantial evidence has mounted 
that thousands to ten-thousands of Kazakhs along 
with Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xin-
jiang have been extralegally detained under hor-
rific circumstances, interrogated and sometimes 
tortured in detention centers, indoctrinated and 
put under immense psychological pressure in reed-
ucation facilities and often subsequently sentenced 
to long prison terms for acts like having WhatsApp 
on their phone, sending money to relatives in Ka-
zakhstan, sending their children abroad to study or 
applying for a passport (Bunin 2019).10 The testi-
monies of several Kazakhs from Xinjiang including 
a number of repatriated Kazakh citizens have an-
gered many in Kazakhstan while the government 
which holds close economic and growing political 
ties to China has made efforts to lessen the tension 
and put a lid on popular protest against China and 
a rising Sinophobia in the population, which esca-
lated in attacks on Dungans (local Chinese Mus-
lims) in February 2020 (AFP 2020; Varshalomidze 
2020). In 2018 Sayraygül Sayutbay, a Kazakh kin-
dergarten principal from Mongolküre in Xinjiang, 
fled across the border into Kazakhstan reporting 
that she had been held captive and forced to indoc-
trinate Kazakhs in one of the Chinese reeducation 
camps (DW Deutsche Welle 2020). Her trial for il-
legal border crossing lasted a full year in which the 
Chinese government demanded her extradition 
while rights groups lobbied for Kazakhstan to grant 
her asylum. This dilemma was solved when Swe-
den agreed to accept her and her family as political 
refugees (Putz 2020). Similarly, Serikhzhan Bilash, 
the most prominent and effective oralman/kandas 
activist documenting the mass incarceration of eth-
nic minorities in Xinjiang and effecting the release 
of scores of detained Kazakhs form the camps, was 
arrested by the Kazakhstani authorities, sentenced 
for inciting ethnic hatred, released upon popular 
protest against the promise not to work politically 
for the next six years and finally forced to leave the 
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country for Turkey and then the US in 2020. Others 
voicing critique of China’s policies have likewise 
faced hostility and sanctions from the Kazakhstani 
government, such as the Russian-Kazakhstani Si-
nologist Konstantin Syroyezhkin, who was ar-
rested on charges of treason, convicted to ten years 
in prison and had his Kazakhstani citizenship re-
voked after voicing strong criticism of China 
(Fergana Agency 2020, 2021; Toguzbayev 2019). 
Russian-American scholar and activist Gene Bunin 
who like Serikhzhan was essential in documenting 
the incarceration and abuses taking place in Xin-
jiang did not get his visa extended and was likewise 
forced out of the country. A Kazakh Facebook user 
by the name of Nurgisa Toremuratov posted that 
he hoped that changing the name of oralman to 
kandas could be one of the ways to stop Chinese in-
fluence in Kazakhstan, citing popular protests 
against the planned construction of 55 Chinese fac-
tories near the city of Zhanaozen (AsiaNews 2019). 
He connects the new term with standing up to the 
Chinese, as it expresses closeness to the Kazakhs in 
Xinjiang and thereby solidarity with them. At the 
same time, kandas, which can also be used for 
brother nations like Uzbeks or Kyrgyz, also allows 
a reading where it remains within the Chinese dis-
course by not stressing that Kazakh immigrants 
from Xinjiang are returning and at the same time 
giving them a distinct category rather than calling 
them simply Kazakhs. These two parallel interpre-
tations may not have been entirely unintended by 
the government, as they seem very similar to its on-
going double policy of appeasing both the national-
ist sentiments of the population and the political 
pressure from China. 
Positionality and colonial narratives 
Unlike the term oralman, that of kandas potentially 
removes the categorical difference between local 
Kazakhs and repatriates. As one commentator 
noted on Facebook: All Kazakhs are kandas to each 
other.11 Ideally therefore, as long as it functions as 
a bureaucratic category, it ties the repatriates 
closer to the Kazakh people than other immigrants 
and the moment they become citizens there should 
be no difference any longer, because the bureau-
cratic category no longer applies and any social 
                                                                
11 https://web.facebook.com/ssyban-
bay/posts/2294452257350003?_rdc=1&_rdr 
12 On the label of “Hispanics” and its suggested change to 
“Latino” in the USA, Martha Gimenez argues that “any stand-
ardized terminology is unavoidably flawed and conducive 
category that derives from it should not linguisti-
cally mark a distinction from other Kazakhs. Yet, 
precisely here several intellectual local Kazakhs 
from the elite see a problem. Ethnographer 
Zhambyl Artykbayev and journalist Saken Syb-
anbay both point out that the new alternative 
terms do not distinguish the repatriates clearly 
from either other Kazakhs or other brother nations 
(Akhmetuli 2019). Similarly, the two Kazakh Phi-
lologists, Batyrbolat Kabosh and Anar Fazylzhan 
argue for sticking to the term oralman because it is 
unambiguous and clearly demarcates this group 
from all others. They support the term exactly be-
cause it draws linguistically and logically correct 
distinctions (Akhmetuli 2019). Yet, as identity 
studies theory has taught long ago: linguistically 
correct categories can be constructed along a myr-
iad of different criteria, most of which remain irrel-
evant and unexpressed. It is the political employ-
ment of it that makes them socially relevant (Finke 
2018). Not surprisingly, neither of these intellectu-
als holding on to the category of oralman are them-
selves repatriates. They insist on a logically and lin-
guistically correct term, but they do not reflect why 
or through which mechanisms oralman received its 
stigma or that this stigma is perpetuated through 
the linguistic distinction. This is most certainly due 
to their privileged positions. In contrast to their ex-
perience, people who are themselves affected by 
discrimination are forced to face these questions. 
Journalist Aidos Zhukanuli, himself a Kazakh from 
Mongolia, opposes both terms and questions the 
need for having a term at all. Why would it be so 
difficult to just call us Kazakhs, he asks. To refor-
mulate the question in historical terms: How did a 
temporary bureaucratic term become a perma-
nent, stigmatizing social category? Similarly to 
other pejorative and discriminating terms through-
out history, the most well-known of which carry 
profoundly racist meanings,12 this is unlikely to 
have been created by the term itself. Instead, one 
may be able to find some answer for it in the very 
positionality of the speakers in the debate outlined 
in this article, i.e. in the differences in their struc-
tural positions in Kazakh society. According to 
Tilek Yrysbek, the Kazakh poet and translator from 
Xinjiang, the change of the term has not changed 
anything in the positions or practice of 
to the development of racist or, at best, trivial stereotypical 
analysis of the data thus produced.” She recommends that 
“the label should be abandoned” (Gimenez 1989). See also 
Bonilla-Silva (2006), Burgest (1973) and Mignolo (2007). 
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discrimination. Particularly Kazakhs from Xinjiang 
are being targeted – in his eyes because they are 
more traditional and lack skills in the Russian lan-
guage, which is why he feels that oralman are 
treated as neo-mambet in the sense of being 
branded as uneducated and backward (Lakhanuli 
2017). The structural positions in Kazakh society 
that allow this branding, are the legacy of colonial 
structures and logics. Whereas before 1991, the 
higher positions were occupied by Russians and 
the lower by Kazakhs generally, today the higher is 
taken by local Kazakhs and the lower by oral-
man/kandas. Seen from this perspective, it be-
comes clearer why some speakers in the debate in-
sist on the linguistic distinction while others wish 
to dissolve it altogether. The distinction is drafted 
along the lines of Kazakhstan’s modernist, colonial 
heritage. It develops “essentialized representa-
tions of inferiority that are reproduced in both 
global imaginings of the region and in its own sub-
jectivities and positionings” . 
The dichotomy between “developed” and “back-
ward” and its related stereotypes such as the mam-
bet are products of what Madina Tlostanova calls 
“mind-colonization,” forged over centuries of colo-
nial practice “firmly linking imperialism and capi-
talism” as a type of “racial, economic, social, exis-
tential, gender and epistemic bondage” (2012:133) 
tied to bureaucratic practices and categories that at 
the same time enhance and uphold it (Mignolo 
2011). It is an expression of “the colonial wound in-
flicted by five hundred years of the historical foun-
dation [of] modernity as a weapon of imperial/co-
lonial global expansion” (Mignolo 2007:165). This 
is a wound and a colonial heritage that few in Ka-
zakhstan have been willing to address or even 
name as such in order not to disturb the relation-
ship with Russia, but also because the elites are still 
benefiting from the structures it established. This 
may be changing slowly in the new generations.13 
Whatever the intention of the renaming may have 
been and whatever its effect on foreign policy and 
relations to China and Russia, it seems a hesitant 
step towards addressing such wounds of colonial-
ism and violent modernization. Wounds that did 
not stop being inflicted after 1991, but merely 
changed in shape and participating actors. Current 
inequalities and colonial structures are reflected in 
                                                                
13  When in 2020 an international scholar presented his re-
search on the 1930s famine in the newly established Kazakh 
Soviet Republic caused by forced collectivization and over-
zealous, miscalculated political and economic reforms in Al-
maty, he was approaching a topic that Kazakh historians 
have largely avoided. Yet, his presentation was welcomed 
the distinction between local Kazakhs and oral-
man/kandas. The fact that the issue is addressed 
and debated on the highest levels and that the dis-
course has changed since the Azattyk event of 2011 
indicates that a shift is possible, yet the result and 
success of this shift will most likely hinge on 
whether it can be connected to and maybe even 
help catalyze a more general critical and decolo-
nizing (cf. ; Mignolo 2011) self-re-
flection on Kazakhstan’s history, society, economy 
and future path. 
Conclusion 
The exact motivation to change the term for repat-
riate Kazakhs migrating to Kazakhstan from 
abroad from oralman to kandas remains opaque. 
Election strategies, foreign policy signaling and 
window dressing of conflicts to avoid addressing 
real social discrepancies may all have played a role. 
Many well-meaning non-repatriate Kazakhs like 
the new term because it sounds warmer and seems 
to connect the repatriates closer to the rest of the 
population, while others argue that it confuses cat-
egories and may end up further alienating the im-
migrants. Repatriates themselves often do not feel 
comfortable with either term but do see the change 
and the debates around it as a way of addressing 
their grievances and recognizing the problem of 
discrimination and stigmatization. The stigma 
manifests as a temporary legal category is turned 
into a permanent social one. This is tied to the term, 
but also as much to the structural position within 
Kazakh society that the term expresses and that 
other terms may likewise come to express. These 
different structural positions become particularly 
clear in the respective arguments phrased online, 
in the media and during personal conversations. 
They hold deep roots in perpetual and historical 
colonial narratives of modern vs. backwards popu-
lations as it is locally reflected in the distinction be-
tween Russian and Kazakh language and culture. 
The change of the name has probably not solved 
any of the deeper lying problems, but to an extent, 
it has made them more visible and brought them to 
the fore in public conversations. 
and praised and behind the scenes, people expressed satis-
faction that the crimes of the Soviet regime (and thus Rus-
sians) against Kazakhs were being discussed and examined. 
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Hijabs in Kyrgyzstan: alternative modernity, (dis)integration and 
individualization 
Gulzat Baialieva 
The veiling practice in Kyrgyzstan sparked hot controversial debates in the early 2000s. Today 
the discussions are more moderate. The issue of women’s donning hijabs has emerged as a 
promising avenue of research to explore both features of Islamic revival and tensions between 
different social groups in a post-Soviet context. The polarized views and misunderstandings 
arising from these debates define the spaces of dressing and acting both for Muslims who veil 
and those who don’t. Based on an ethnographic case study of the Islamic veiling movement, 
this paper examines hijab practices in Kyrgyzstan from 2012 to 2020 and looks at the individ-
ualization of veiling. The research presents the dynamics of veiling which can here be an act of 
religious devotion, modesty, piety and a marker of belonging to a “new” global Muslim identi-
ty. The paper looks at the ways in which some veiled women navigate their adopted religious 
markers in constructing their new (religious) identities within the context of tensions between 
traditionalism, the Soviet past of women emancipation, conceptions of modernity, and the in-
fluence of wider political Islamic communities. The findings show how veiling does not repre-
sent a singular response to globalized Islam, but can result from the interaction of quite dif-
ferent structural factors – on the one hand, female empowerment, modernity and on the other, 
patriarchal domination. 
Introduction 
“How can you simply look at those covered 
women (orongon), we need to explain 
things to them and make them take off their 
strange headcloth. If they really want to be 
modest and observe Islam, they can do it 
without wrapping themselves. I also read 
the Quran, I also love Allah but I wear just 
jooluk1 which covers my head and hair. I 
don’t like it when our young silly Kyrgyz 
women prefer this different type of jooluk 
and see themselves like Arab women” [Ajar, 
personal interview, 2012, Kyzyl-Jar village]. 
“Most of my classmates started wearing 
these headscarves. It is funny, they look like 
wrapped babies. By hiding their beauty, 
they display their ugliness. Can you imagine 
yourself or myself wrapping the face like a 
newborn? It is terrible and they are wrong” 
[Nazira, personal interview, 2013 Sha-
maldy-Sai town]. 
About two decades ago, the word hijab was not 
used in Kyrgyzstan. Nowadays, in 2020, the word 
is widely accepted and celebrated on the Interna-
tional Headscarves Day on the 1st of February. 
Religious organizations and communities such as 
                                                                
1 Jooluk is a Kyrgyz women’s traditional headscarf worn 
like a bandana with the neck open 
Mutakallim2  and some well-known Islamic cloth-
ing designers and activists, such as Aijamal 
Akylbekova, organize celebrations with hijab fash-
ion shows. On this day, other well-known bloggers 
also show the varieties of headscarves, how to tie 
them and how to combine them with national 
clothing.  In addition to the celebration of Islamic 
headscarves, there are competitions and festivals 
held mainly in Bishkek such as the Muslim Fash-
ion Show and the Muslim Fashion Festival. 
A new type of women’s headwear was prospering 
two decades ago but the local population back in 
the early 2000s would rather circumscribe the 
new veiling practice3 than using the word “hijab” 
itself (McBrien 2017). It was often described by 
gesturing on the face and neck mimicking how the 
head scarves were worn or other phrases like 
“covering”, “wrapping” (jamynyp aldy, oronup 
aldy) were used to connote the veiling practice. 
These action verbs in the context of hijabs were 
used two decades ago and still are used mainly by 
unveiled women and imply negative connotations 
of the veiling being backward and a form of sub-
                                                                
2 -  
/ 
3 By using the terms veiling, Islamic headscarf, hijab and 
veil, I refer to the practice of some Muslim women in Kyr-
gyzstan to cover their hair and neck. The modern Islamic 
garments vary in many ways: manner of wearing head-
scarves, choice for color and textile and combination with 
the rest of clothing (whether a full cloak or slim/baggy 
blouse with long skirt or loose/tight pants). 
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ordination. However, almost twenty years have 
passed since the first arrivals of new Islamic influ-
ences on clothing and today the representations 
are much less homogenous. The word hijab is 
widely used, you can see them in stock in many 
retail places, do custom tailoring and order online 
through social media (see Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1: Hijabs sold through an Instagram web 
shop in Kyrgyzstan 
Source: image courtesy @jooluktar_duynosu, 
https://www.instagram.com/jooluktar_duynosu/. 
Islam, gender and hijabs in Kyrgyzstan 
After independence, religious practice increased 
in importance and has been transforming from 
more local, traditional forms into more charis-
matic expressions of religiosity. By the 2000s a 
number of Islamic movements such as Hizb ut-
Tahrir, Nurcular, Tablighi Jamaat etc. had been 
localized in post-Soviet Central Asia (Balci 2003; 
Toktogulova 2014). The issue of women’s veiling 
thus emerged as a promising avenue to explore 
both features of Islamic revival and tensions be-
tween different social groups in a post-Soviet con-
text. Faced with frequent, varied criticism of the 
hijab, veiled women in Kyrgyzstan compete for 
their rights in the urban space and challenge 
claims on the city (Nasritdinov, Esenamanova 
2018). This paper demonstrates how different 
discourses about the meaning of veiling have 
emerged based on gender, social group and identi-
ty politics, and utilizes Olivier Roy’s conceptual 
framework of ‘Holy Ignorance’ for approaching 
modernity and political Islam (Roy 2010). Beyond 
discourse however, the paper also attempts to 
demonstrate how veiling does not represent a 
singular response to modernity (or globaliza-
tion/globalized Islam), but can result from the 
interaction of quite different structural factors. 
Academic publications released on contemporary 
hijab issues tend to deconstruct previously ac-
cepted views on Muslim women as victims. Com-
monly perceived public interpretations of the 
hijab range from ideas about Muslim women’s 
moral imprisonment, subjugation, modesty, devo-
tion to God, or conflicting emotions to “fashion” 
(Tarlo, Moors 2013). Still what many fail to realize 
is that quite a number of veiled women are em-
bracing their religion as a means through which 
they can express gender identity, power and crea-
tivity (Laruelle 2018). There are various ap-
proaches in this regard including the so-called 
“Islamic feminists” (Ahmed 1992; Mernissi 1987). 
If Islamic feminism relates veiling to oppressive 
practices and patriarchal interpretations of Quran, 
“liberal feminists” argue that women’s new veiling 
is a form of protest and symbolism that emerges 
from tense subcultural dilemmas, involving ele-
ments of resistance and acquiescence (MacLeod 
1992). Ethnographic studies of women’s veiling in 
the Middle East reveal concepts of women’s sub-
jectivity, agency and resistance as connected to 
the decision to veil (Abu-Lughod 2016; Mahmood 
2012). European intolerance, political debates and 
court cases around the respective “headscarf af-
fairs” have also been discussed (Joppke 2012; Roy 
2004). A good corpus of literature exists regarding 
the veiling trends and signifiers mainly researched 
in the Middle East and Europe. However, their 
insights cannot be fully transferred to the veiling 
processes in Central Asia. Despite the seventy 
years of Soviet atheist agenda – with official re-
strictions on religious beliefs and practice – Cen-
tral Asians’ identity as Muslims was not eradicat-
ed (Hann, Pelkmans 2009; Louw 2007; Privratsky 
2001). Massell (1974) argued that Central Asian 
women constituted a “surrogate proletariat”. So-
viet policies saw women as the “keystone of a 
closed family system” and were motivated to lib-
erate women to advance their agenda (Roy 
2000:79). Yet, the double project of emancipating 
Central Asians from patriarchy and religion was 
experienced differently across the region. 
After the former USSR’s disintegration, the Central 
Asian Muslims experienced a relatively free space 
for open conversation about faith and religious 
practice (McBrien 2017). General interpretations 
of Islam, which emphasized regular prayer, cov-
ered forms of dress, and mosque attendance, ex-
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panded within the community and interacted with 
interpretations in the wider Islamic world (Khalid 
2007). Yet, the newly independent national gov-
ernments continued to restrict the influence of 
Islam in the public sphere. Scandalous contesta-
tion of images of women, religion and tradition in 
Kyrgyzstan occurred in the public space in July 
2016. Figure 2 presents a billboard portraying 
Kyrgyz women in different types of clothing. 
These appeared on the central streets of the capi-
tal city Bishkek and some other big cities. This 
billboard in three images depicts the alleged tran-
sition of women’s clothing in Kyrgyz society. The 
billboard asks “Kairan elim, kaida baratabyz?” 
(“Poor people, where are we going?”). The left-
sided first section on the banner contains an im-
age of smiling, happy women wearing a Kyrgyz 
traditional head-dress (Elechek), the middle image 
depicted a group of women looking submissive 
with faces half-covered by hijabs. The last part is a 
monotonous dark image of women in black Islam-
ic clothing and niqabs. The banners were promot-
ed by the private educational sector and financed 
by the administration of the president of Kyrgyz-
stan. Almazbek Atambayev, who was the presi-
dent back in 2016, commented that these bill-
boards warn people which way not to go and that 
Kyrgyz people do not need foreign culture and 
religion (Azattyk 2016). 
The number of veiled women has grown rapidly in 
post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan since the 2000s. The new 
veiling process in Kyrgyzstan is a departure from 
traditional jooluk and/or “Western” or Soviet 
styles of clothing and signifies a self-conscious 
personal and social change. In the Kyrgyz context, 
this change is often expressed by visual religious 
markers. They include men growing a long beard 
and wearing long dress-looking shirts and women 
wearing religious headscarves and covering up. 
Like in many European states, the religious veiling 
in the Muslim Central Asian region engendered 
hostile reactions and legal bans by the local na-
tional governments (Bayram 2018; Grigorenko 
2018; Najibullah 2019). However, there are vary-
ing degrees of headscarf-restrictions across the 
region. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
have seen the hijab banned in secular educational 
institutions, while in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
despite the hijab remaining legal, there have been 
attempts to prohibit them in public schools and 
workplaces. 
Description of the setting 
This paper presents an ethnographic study of cas-
es from the town Shamaldy-Sai in the northern 
part of the Ferghana Valley (at the Kyrgyzstan - 
Uzbekistan border) in Jalal-Abad oblast. It in-
cludes neighboring villages Yntymak, Dostuk, Ba-
zyl-Ata, Kyzyl-Jar villages and Shamaldy-Sai town. 
Shamaldy-Sai is a town located along the Naryn 
river in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Along with Soviet 
infrastructural projects such as the construction of 
dams and hydropower stations on the flowing 
rivers of Central Asia, many new “industrial” set-
tlements were created. One of these is Shamaldy-
Sai with its surrounding villages. The population 
of the township comprises of around 15.000 peo-
ple. Shamaldy-Sai, as many other surrounding 
local communities, has witnessed religious 
movements ranging from Christian organizations 
like Jehovah Witnesses and Baptists to Islamic 
groups like Wahabi, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Ja-
maat and so on. Officers of the regional depart-
ment on Actions Against Extremism, Conflicts and 
Migration reported that Shamaldy-Sai and 
Yntymak settlements accommodate fundamental-
ists of the prohibited religious group Hizb ut-
Tahrir spreading its ideas through mass media 
(leaflets, newspapers, discs). During my fieldwork 
in these areas, I have observed such activities by 
local women who belonged to the Tablighi Jamaat 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir religious movements. 
Theoretical overview 
This paper applies Olivier Roy’s theoretical con-
cept of ‘Holy Ignorance’ in order to explain the 
phenomenon of religious veiling and gender iden-
tity in Central Asia. I define the concept of ‘Holy 
Ignorance’ as a process of deculturation when 
individuals undergo ‘conversion’ within the same 
religion and enter a new social/religious space 
which in general rejects and disrupts connections 
with local traditional cultures and traditional 
forms of religiosity which are treated by the ‘re-
formatted believers’ – as ‘neo-paganism’ (Roy 
2010). I consider ‘new converts’ or ‘reformatted 
believers’ those who abandon popular and tradi-
tional forms of Islamic religiosity and adopt what 
they consider as ‘pure Islam’. The so-called re-
formatted believers culturally abandon traditional 
cultural communities and radically change their 
views about modernity, traditions, and religious 
practices. They create a new autonomous space 
and “reconstruct themselves in a space that is no 
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longer territorial and is therefore no longer sub-
ject to politics” (Roy 2010:2). The donning of the 
headscarf signifies an act of conversion within the 
same religion, the cultural norms are ignored to  
“salvage the purity of faith” and “religion turns 
inwards toward identity” using religious markers 
(Roy 2010:142). Donning Islamic headscarves, 
newly veiled women contribute to the visibility of 
Islam and play an important role in creating a 
sense of religious community. The largest propor-
tion of newly veiled women in Kyrgyzstan comes 
from either the middle-class well-educated urban 
sector or from rural low-class fractions with 
stronger patriarchal subjugation. 
As noted earlier, there are different paths to reli-
gious conversion and the choice of veiling. As Oliv-
ier Roy (2010:190) argues: “Formatting then can 
occur as part of various strategies, both top-down 
and bottom up […]. It can take place within a ‘lib-
eral’ or conversely a ‘fundamentalist’ perspective, 
since […] fundamentalism can also be the expres-
sion of modernity through deculturation”. Choos-
ing the path to deculturation and joining the veil-
ing movement is mostly initiated by women on a 
voluntary basis. Kyrgyz veiled women are active 
in the management of the religious community. 
For example, the Muslim Women NGO Mutakallim 
managed to prevent the adoption of a new law on 
veil prohibitions through regular meetings, picket-
ing and protests. Muslim women activists organize 
educational circles, there is even a new phenome-
non of women daw’at-chis of Tablighi Jamaat in 
Kyrgyzstan proselytizing and preaching Islam. In 
the context of information technologies, there are 
also a range of popular social media groups, an 
Islamic Fitness App4 and other trendy Islamic 
developments on the internet. Another important 
inspiration for the newly veiling women are local 
Kyrgyz celebrities and bloggers who promote the 
hijab and the Islamic fashion industry. 
Methodology 
The phenomenon of Kyrgyz women’s veiling in the 
context of religious revival has been causing hot 
debates in the Kyrgyz community including polar-
ized views and misunderstandings, which have 
prevented fruitful dialogue between opponents 
and supporters. I have therefore generally pre-
ferred conversations to interviews and had them 
at various social events that I was invited to 
through social connections already established. I 
could get information during casual chats and 
dinnertime conversations but also arranged con-
versations such as in-depth interviews about 
headscarves. 
My informants included newly veiling women 
ages 18-50 of Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnicity and 
                                                                




Fig. 2: The billboard “Poor people, where are we going?” appeared in cities of Kyrgyzstan in 2016 
Source: Azattyk (2016). 
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different socio-educational backgrounds. My main 
sites for recruiting contacts were women Muslim 
circles (Taalim) and other associations which 
bring these women together. The conversations 
and interviews were facilitated by the fact that I 
already have extensive contacts in these circles. I 
was able to establish strong connections with 
several Muslim women activists as well as profes-
sors, experts, and journalists. Through them, I 
expanded my network. 
I spent 20 months of fieldwork in 2012 and 2016-
2019 in the riverine communities Yntymak, Kyzyl-
Jar and Shamaldy-Sai. In total, I interviewed 25 
women from different Islamic groups (Tablighi 
Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Wahabi). All of them were 
veiled and had different experiences with the 
headwear, four of them later stopped wearing 
hijab due to disapproval from family and school. 
In addition I conducted semi-structured inter-
views with seven women who acknowledge Islam 
but do not follow any revivalist group. Besides 
attending weekly Muslim gatherings (Taalim) 
required by the Tablighi rules, I was able to go to 
their houses and interact with them in their eve-
ryday lives. I was able to participate in their social 
lives such as shopping, visiting their relatives and 
other regular routines. 
Disintegration of hijabs at schools 
There is no decree by the Ministry of Education 
that prohibits hijabs but local school principals 
put forth their own regulations. Some schools do 
not intervene into the individual choice of clothes 
but they are few. The majority of secondary 
schools in both rural and urban areas in Kyrgyz-
stan ban Islamic headscarves. School principals 
justify the ban arguing that the school regulations 
(shkolnyi ustav) do not allow them. When I talked 
with the female directors of three schools, they 
said that girls should dress properly and follow 
the school's requirement on dress:  
“I know that there is no law banning the hi-
jabs but I fight for the school regulations. 
According to our school regulations, which 
are fixed by the Regional Justice Depart-
ment, the school uniform is clearly de-
scribed. For boys, the school uniform is a 
light top/shirt and dark pants/trousers, for 
girls it is the same, light blouse, dark skirt 
and the white bows on the hair. There is 
nothing about headscarves, hijabs. That’s 
why I do not dare to allow schoolgirls to 
cover themselves. They have to study and 
not pray. I do not care about their dress 
outside the school walls. What I require is to 
follow the school regulations on the uni-
form. That’s all!” (Amina, 57-year-old school 
director) 
During my fieldwork in May 20125, I witnessed 
cases where parents and the school principal ar-
gued over the dress regulations and their inter-
pretation. Three girls were not admitted to the 
school because they were wearing hijabs. One of 
them was 14 years old and the two others were 
15. The school director made an ultimatum to only 
allow them to continue studying if they give up 
their headscarves. They stopped attending the 
schools but later their parents and relatives de-
cided to clear up the situation. In some rural area 
in Kyrgyzstan before going to court, in case of civil 
conflicts, the local informal organizations such as 
Informal Court of Elders (Aksakaldar Sotu), the 
district police (uchastkovyi) and Women’s Council 
(Jensovet) are involved to try to solve the issue. 
The municipal local administration usually pro-
vides a space for such “hearings'' where the heads 
of these informal institutions and the conflicting 
parties meet. The “hearing” of the case with the 
14-years-old girl did not last long, the director 
was justifying her actions saying she cannot break 
the school regulation and allow the girls in hijabs. 
Given the fact that the parents of the girls were 
not experienced in speaking out, they were sitting 
silent and looked like they were feeling guilty. 
Representatives of the Aksakaldar Sotu, Jensovet 
and a district police had the same opinion as the 
schoolmaster regarding the proper school uni-
form. The girls’ parents were almost silent and did 
not express their views well but disagreed with 
the committee's ideas of what it meant for girls to 
be dressed “properly”. It was obvious that no 
compromise would be achieved because the “offi-
cials'' sounded dominant and the opposite side 
was not participating in the debate. In the begin-
ning, they tried to refer to religion, to morality, to 
their own choice for dress but they could not 
stand against the oratory skills of the committee. 
In the end, the parents came up with an idea that 
it is up to girls to decide. Two girls agreed that 
they would take off their headscarves inside the 
school and put them back on once outside, anoth-
er girl resisted. She said that she preferred to stay 
home and never take off her hijab. 
                                                                
5 The situation on the hijabs at schools remains relatively 
the same after almost a decade. 
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Veiling: jooluk vs. hijab 
The Soviet atheist campaigns in Central Asia were 
extreme cases of categorical secularization of so-
ciety. Within these, Muslim identity became in-
trinsically tied up with national identity and poli-
tics where clothing came to “speak volumes” 
(Khalid 2007; Roy 2000; Suyarkulova 2016). 
There is the anecdotal evidence of some Central 
Asians defining themselves as atheist Muslim – a 
definition of Muslimness which excluded central 
Islamic observances and labelled them as fanatical 
and backward. Contemporary Central Asian gov-
ernments have conducted repressive measures 
against political Islam and attempted to remove 
religious symbols from the public sphere. For ar-
dent secularists and most state officials, the hijab 
is an imported thing. They see it as belonging to a 
“foreign culture”. Even the presidents of each of 
the five Central Asian republics have explicitly 
expressed their opposition to hijabs (HRW 2020). 
Re-interpretation of Islam and awareness of “true” 
religious practices is being proselytized through 
social media, internet, leaflets, translated mini-
books, mp3 and other material in the Kyrgyz and 
Russian languages. It is also promoted through 
regular gatherings held by local religious leaders, 
regular Islamic talks and circles, door-to-door 
preaching practice (davaat), Tablighi women’s 
religious gatherings (Taalim, Masturat) and many 
other on- and off-line means. 
The traditional moral code requires all married or 
elderly Kyrgyz women to cover their heads with a 
traditional head cloth – jooluk which is part of 
Kyrgyz traditional clothing. It is a head cloth worn 
tied at the back of the neck and still remains a 
feature of women’s outfits outside the major ur-
ban centers. Most frequently worn by older wom-
en, the scarf is widely interpreted as traditional 
and Central Asian. Despite the fact that these tra-
ditional headscarves could also close around the 
head, hair and neck if tied up properly, the "new 
Muslim women" who veil mostly prefer an “im-
ported” cloth in the form of the hijab over the tra-
ditionally worn Kyrgyz bandana (a jooluk worn to 
realize the spiritual aims and appear modest). 
They refer to the Islamic textual foundations. 
Young women were the first to adopt the hijab in 
Kyrgyzstan. There is a clear generational divide in 
the experience of the post-Soviet reformatting of 
religion. They see the elder generation as ruined 
and destroyed by the Soviet-era value system that 
has led to the current economic and spiritual aim-
lessness. To them, restoring spiritual sustenance 
and dedication to religious values presents a hope 
for a better future. Given that traditional modest 
headwear is available which can serve to “protect” 
women, the choice made by wearers of the new 
Islamic headscarves in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan 
must be seen as a search for a new religious iden-
tity free from the long-established negative asso-
ciations of backwardness. For many veiled women 
the adoption of modest behavioral codes and a 
devout lifestyle gives a new sense of mastery over 
themselves, their lives and their future. 
Hijabs as alternative modernity 
In the case of some Kyrgyz women who made the 
individual decision to wear hijabs, veiling signifies 
their autonomy and is a sign of an erasure of di-
mensions of the local past and Soviet identities. 
Meanwhile, other women are expected by their 
community to wear hijab and cannot resist their 
conservative values and communal control. In 
their cases, veiling indicates a decision made for 
the woman – by parents or even a mother-in-law 
concerned with the family’s reputation, or by a 
husband controlling his wife’s dressing. Still, in 
both cases the decision is to a degree internalized 
by the woman herself. I now turn to some con-
crete examples of women's attitudes towards veil-
ing in post-socialist Kyrgyzstan to better under-
stand the meaning this has for them and how it 
connects with their religious and cultural identity 
and relations with their traditional environment. 
Individualization of hijabs 
Zuloiha is a young married 17-year-old girl. I met 
her some months into her marriage. Her husband 
is a 25-year-old devoted Muslim attending 
mosque and going on Tablighi Jamaat’s dawaah 
trips. She was unhappy with her marriage. When I 
saw her first, she looked sad and I could feel her 
regret with her destiny. She was a young, inexpe-
rienced, shy girl with the free spirit of a teenager. 
At times she sounded obedient to the traditional 
rules of marriage and the husband’s role, at other 
times she expressed resistance against these ide-
als and a couple of times she said that attempted 
to flee her new home. She lived with her in-laws 
and told me that her husband forced her to cover 
herself and wear a hijab. 
Contrarily, Hadicha was wearing a hijab of her 
own account. She said that no one expected it 
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from her and no one pressured her. It was her 
own choice to come to the true path and live a 
good “Muslim life”. Although it took her years to 
stay firm on her decision to wear the Islamic 
headscarf, she found the strength and step by step 
decided to wear a hijab in public. She said that she 
worried about her parents, siblings and neighbors, 
about what they would say, how they would react 
and how she would behave in her new garment. 
She did not change her clothes radically. First, she 
started wearing longer skirts and no pants and 
jeans anymore, then she added long-sleeved 
blouses and tops. Later she combined both. She 
said people around her were interested and asked 
whether she was getting “devoted to religion” 
(dinge berilip kettinbi). She said she did not hide 
her changed attitudes toward Islam or that she 
had started regular prayers and learned passages 
from the Quran. She said on the first day when she 
wore a hijab, she didn’t feel as constrained as she 
had expected: 
“I think people have gotten used to hijabs already. 
Years before it had been negatively perceived and 
I myself hadn’t encouraged wearing it. But when I 
went out of my home in a hijab (hijabchan) I was 
ready to ignore the glances people could give me 
and possible teasing comments. Luckily, I didn’t 
get these and I felt very good about myself 
(ozumdu jakshy sezdim). Only some of my friends, 
relatives and younger neighbors were joking 
about my new attire. They found it ironic that I 
now had become a decent girl. I joked that I also 
take responsibility for their sins and am on a mis-
sion to be a role model. Through jokes I tried to 
convince them that they should also make a firm 
decision and cover their naked parts.” 
The motives and practice of wearing hijabs, as we 
can see, are not homogenized and have individual 
characteristics. The normalization and integration 
of Muslim headscarves in the Kyrgyz public space 
is presenting favorable conditions for the wearing 
of hijabs. As was mentioned earlier, only decades 
ago, there were no production and even no name 
for the hijab, which was referred to by the descrip-
tive words "wrapped","covered” bearing negative 
connotations (jamyngan, orongon, chumkongon). 
Today, translocal Islamic views, Kyrgyz traditional 
elements and constructive polemics are woven 
together making hijabs less confrontational. Ac-
tive proponents like Nurgul are emerging.  Nurgul, 
is a local Muslim activist and online influencer. 
She owns a beauty salon and a small store in the 
local bazaar. She has been wearing hijab for the 
last three years and has a popular Instagram ac-
count where she motivates others and welcomes 
them to hijab fashion. 
Conclusion 
There are different paths to religious conversion 
and veiling in the region. Young women rather 
than their parents were the first adopters of hijab 
in Kyrgyzstan. Wider communal control in regard 
to Islam is weak, and the new Islam-oriented mor-
al authority in the Kyrgyz youth is observed to 
come not from their parents or neighborhood 
communities but rather from sources that are 
personally, culturally and geographically remote 
(social media, religious books, local mosque gath-
ering, daw’at-chis, global community of Muslims). 
Younger generations feel their parents do not 
properly understand the commandments of Islam 
because they lived under the Soviet rule and their 
lives were hopeless and ruined by communism. 
The Islamic style of clothing effects and signifies a 
transformation of the “self”. This is seen in the 
dynamics of hijab practices in Kyrgyzstan. New 
headscarves in the region, therefore, can be said to 
represent an individualization of veiling. This 
transformative process contributes to a larger 
assemblage of social change and represents a new 
historical consciousness and a process of changing 
subjectivities. 
In the Kyrgyz context, the veiling movement acts 
as a contributor to new social identities, which 
often contradict and counteract traditional hierar-
chical relations and also mark different standards 
of morality between the generations. Given that 
traditional modest headwear is available to “pro-
tect” women's shame, wearers of the hijab in post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan can be said to search for a new 
identity free from established negative associa-
tions of backwardness. For them the hijab is a 
symbol of a new spiritual and moral order untar-
nished by the failed Communism and uncertain 
present. New Islamic clothing promotes self-
discipline and self-consciousness for veiled wom-
en; it serves as a bodily reminder to the wearer of 
her commitment to be a dutiful, modern Muslim 
woman. Hijabs signal new religious identity, 
which they navigate to distance from the autoch-
thonous, colonial past and postcolonial uncertain 
present in order to provide the foundations for a 
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granted the epithet “post-Soviet.” While this is technically true, the region has been shaped 
and diff erentiated not only by seven decades of Soviet rule, but also by a pre-Soviet feudal and 
colonial history as well as various more recent phenomena and developments. Thus, each social 
phenomenon observed in Central Asia today has its own unique combination of elements from 
the past deriving from “layered legacies” – legacies of diff erent phases that reinforce, interact 
with or contradict each other in complex ways and can have very diff erent consequences in 
diff erent local contexts.
This volume examines some of the region‘s layered legacies by eclectically zooming in on to-
pics, such as urban planning, water management, agricultural production, communal coopera-
tion, migration patterns, ethnicity, Islam and gender. The overarching question explored across 
these diff erent examples pertains to the relative relevance and dynamic interaction of these 
layers of legacies. Are Soviet structures still relevant today? How much was disrupted by the 
transformation eff orts in the 1990s and to what degree are the Central Asian republics today 
aff ected by current global socio-economic and political dynamics? 
These questions were addressed in two workshops in 2020 and 2021 in Augsburg and Ebers-
walde that brought together Central Asia researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds to 
present and discuss their ongoing research on the region. These two events also served as the 
fi rst annual meetings of the Central Asian Studies Network in Germany (CASNiG), an open net-
work of Central Asia researchers and experts set up to exchange ideas, concepts and fi ndings, 
and to promote collaboration, mutual support and solidarity. This volume presents selected 
papers based on contributions from the two workshops, addressing contemporary issues and 
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